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 SUMMARY 
 
 
This investigation addresses different viewpoints regarding the configuration of 
meaningful information in the context of different environments, such as the information 
society, ontological milieu, interpretation and representation.  It is important to explore 
options in terms of which the configuration of meaning can be pursued.  Information 
science should be seriously considered as an explorer and configurer of meaningful 
information.  For information science to become such an explorer, the discipline needs to 
be approached not as yet another science to involve and concern itself with information 
and its related aspects, but as a special kind of science.  This investigation proposes that 
it should be seen and developed as an interscience.  Disciplinary boundaries do not imply 
that they are fixed and these boundaries, especially of an interscience, can be 
approached as constantly moving and changing.  This allows for interchange between 
disciplines and continued growth without losing the unique characteristics of information 
science. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We find ourselves in an age where information is viewed so central to survival and 
progress that it is often referred to as the information age.  In this age we have access to 
an incredibly large amount of information, which is still expanding.  It is, however, at a 
cost because it is very difficult to cope with, let alone utilise.  Dupuy (1980:10) summed it 
up in the paradox of  Amore and more information, less and less meaning.@ Without 
meaning no amount of information will increase value or impact.  For this reason the 
configuration of meaningful information is central to this study.  It is also for this reason of 
the utmost importance that we explore ways and means in terms of which the 
configuration of meaning can be pursued. We could seriously consider information 
science as one such way, as an explorer and configurer of meaningful information. Note 
here, the mention of exploration and not discovery.  This will impact on how we will 
approach the subject field of information science. The role of information science will not 
be a passive one, but one of active participation in the configuration of meaningful 
information. For information science to become such an explorer, the discipline needs to 
be approached not as yet another science to involve and concern itself with information 
and its related aspects, but as a special kind of science. What is proposed here is that it 
should be seen and developed as an interscience. 
 
Before we can begin to consider information science as an interscience, we will need to 
consider the key concepts, relevant for the configuration of meaningful information. A 
major reason for a definitional detour is the inherent contradictions involved in an 
overload of information, and the postulated benefits of a society strongly based on 
information. This will specifically be attended to according to the myths of an information 
society, as identified by Dupuy. To overcome the paradox of Dupuy we need a 
systematic approach to be able to arrive at solutions within an ever changing, but 
sometimes oddly stagnant view of, context and environment. The first essential aspect of 
such a system (understood as an open-ended system) is the configuration of meaningful 
information, in other words not only finding meaningful information, but also turning 
information into something meaningful. The second aspect is the role of information 
science in this regard (ie of the first aspect). The third aspect relates closely to the first 
two aspects. This is the question of what kind of information science will be able to fulfil 
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such aims. Information science needs to become that kind of science, which we refer to 
as 'interscience'. The present state of information science does not seem very promising 
in reaching these goals and needs to become a formal and systematic, yet flexible, 
approach. 
 
The discussion on information science depends on the consideration of the core 
concepts of 'information' and 'knowledge'. These are not approached as concepts to be 
defined as words, but specifically as concepts.  Only through conceptualisation can we 
hope to form a clear view of the complexities surrounding the varied uses and contexts of 
the concepts. It is also crucial to attend to these concepts before we turn to the 
configuration of meaningful information, especially when attending to the relationship 
between information, knowledge and meaning. Ultimately it is knowledge that concerns 
us in a configuration of any meaningful information. It is important because it is such 
configured meaningful information that will lead to, intensify, and challenge our existing 
state of knowledge. This relation impacts on the physical milieu of an information society. 
The information society, whether we consider it to be one or not, is the milieu within 
which we will be placing the configuration of meaningful information. 
 
We need to locate the ontological milieu of meaningful information. This is done by 
looking at the meaning of being or existence, being in the world, and the relationship of 
Dasein to 'others' in that world.  Exactly where will information science be the explorer 
and configurer of meaningful information? Perhaps in those areas so often neglected in 
the study field of information science. Chosen for this study are those areas of which the 
exclusion is considered detrimental to the development of information science as an 
interscience.  These are language (attended to in Semiotics, but seldom strongly in our 
context here), image, aesthetics, madness and power.  Concepts such as 'power', 
'meaning', and >understanding= will appear frequently.  They are unavoidable in the main 
discussion, and appear often in the literature. The role of power, for instance, has an 
influence on what we consider meaningful information to be; and the meaning of 
>meaning= itself is as labyrinthian as the meanings of information and knowledge. 
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The above accentuates the importance of determining what information science is about, 
and what kind of challenges it has to face. As a science, information science includes 
particular elements, such as a research methodology, aims and objectives, functions, 
practical and theoretical aspects, training and education.  These elements are essential 
to properly directed actions. As a possible way of dealing with, and making sense of, 
disturbing and disruptive, but also creative, factors such as knowledge, power, and 
action, information science needs to be rearticulated. These factors are not the negative 
side of disruption and disturbance, but can prove to be of great value in an information 
society that seems to shy away from strangeness.  Such a society seems to avoid action 
due to its resulting challenges that must be faced.  Shaped and guided by meaningful 
information, these challenges can be successfully met. These factors are central to an 
understanding of how, why, and in which way we are going to configure meaningful 
information. 
 
The configuration of meaningful information is precisely information for action.  But for a 
science to cope with this there are certain suggested or proposed requirements to 
comply with.  The last part of the study focuses specifically on information science. 
Disciplinary boundaries do not imply that they are immovable, stagnant, fixed, or 
dormant. These boundaries, especially of an interscience, can be approached as 
constantly moving and changing borders (also called 'fault-lines'). Such fault-lines allow 
for creative interchange between disciplines, concepts, and continued growth without 
lowering the unique structure and characteristics of information science as a science. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Our first consideration will be what information and knowledge are, or are about, before 
we begin to look at meaningful information.  Even though information and knowledge are 
unique concepts, a very close relationship exists, and it is often difficult, if not impossible, 
to define the one without making mention of the other.  It is this close relationship that is 
important in determining when information is meaningful or acceptable, and when not. 
 
We pay attention first to information, then knowledge.  This order should not be a linear 
understanding, as is often the case, that we first have percepts, then data1, then 
information, then knowledge, then wisdom.  There is no linear order determining that the 
one must exist before the other can come into being, the arrangement is rather circular 
and undifferentiated (Mizrachi 1998:178).  This should become clear in the discussion on 
information and knowledge.  Definitions of concepts are often limited in the sense that it 
briefly states what something is, but not always what it is about.  Information and 
knowledge will be conceptualised. Reference will be made to the field of information 
science, especially since the various approaches to central concepts such as 
'information' and 'knowledge' have implications for the proper demarcation and 
understanding of the nature and targets of the subject field. 
 
                                                 
1 Data will be treated as a singular noun (a unified concept is intended) (Chambers 21st 
Century dictionary 1996, sv >data=). 
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1.2 Information 
 
There is an incredible amount of literature available on the meaning of 'information'. 
Kochen (1983a:278) focuses our attention on the changes that have taken place in 
approaches to 'information' as concept since the 1950s.  It ranges from the simplistic 
view that information reduces uncertainty to the view that information is decision-relevant 
data. Schrader refers to such multiplication as Aconceptual chaos@ (Schrader 1986:179).  
He strongly urges that we should define fundamental concepts clearly, and avoid certain 
others, specifically 'information'.  Another warning is against the understanding of the 
concept 'information' as an entity, or some universal essence.  According to Fairthorne 
(Schrader 1986:180; Wersig 1997:220) we should say what we mean, rather than using 
the concept 'information' as an easy way out.  We will not avoid the use of the concept 
>information=, due to the implications of the improper use and definition of a concept such 
as 'information', and the drawbacks it holds for the definition of information science.  This 
is especially so because conceptual chaos and confusion will negatively impact on the 
aims and efforts of information science (Schrader 1986:179-180).  
 
Many views on what information is appear contradictory, perhaps because the authors 
define from within different backgrounds and understanding, unique to their field of 
expertise and conviction, as well as the time period in which they define it. As with other 
concepts, the concept of information did not remain unchanged. Through time 
information moved from its original popularisation in a mathematical theory, to different 
disciplines and contexts, ranging from communication, linguistics, psychology, sociology, 
to biology. Such movement resulted in information being conceptualised in other ways 
and related to other concepts and contexts. Everyone use the concept information, but 
mean something different by it (Wersig 1997:220-221). 
 
The concept 'information' literally means to give form or shape to something. A very 
linear view is that data becomes information when data is structured to convey a 
message and form a meaningful system.  People, receiving and understanding this 
message, may or may not benefit from it.  This message has the power to change 
someone's existing mental state and image of reality, but for this to happen, the message 
must comprise information for the recipient (a meaningful message). Information, 
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according to Thompson (Belkin 1978:79), can be considered as the organisation of 
sense-data and experience.  Such information may  lead to the reduction of uncertainty 
or to the increase of uncertainty. Successfully communicated information will not only 
change, but increase the existing knowledge, or confirm it. It is not only the recipient=s 
state of knowledge that may be affected, but also of the generator=s knowledge 
structures. (Wersig 1997:222). 
 
Kochen (1983b:374) refers to 'to be informed' as the experiencing of change in a 
cognitive structure, and 'to inform' as effecting such an experience of change.  Data 
remains data unless it communicates meaning, knowledge, ideas. Porat (in Lyon 
1988:10) similarly defined information as data that has been organised and 
communicated.   
 
Another definition, related to that of Porat, is by Ingwersen who defines information as 
Agenerated and perceived data which may transform knowledge states producing various 
kinds of action@ (Ingwersen 1992:309).  Using our senses, we can obtain information from 
a source, object, or entity that contains information which can reduce uncertainty. 
Negative or misinformation forms an intricate part of the fuller picture of information, such 
as illusion, propaganda, misrepresentation, concealment, deception.  Neither does an 
increase in information decrease uncertainty.  Related to uncertainty is risk.  Information 
does not reduce risk, but makes more clear the degree of risk and its nature.  It makes 
risk-taking more informed, not less risky (Kochen 1983a:289). 
 
The information process is often influenced by manipulation, willingness, and other 
additions to that process (Schrader 1986:179).  Information inputs are not merely part of 
the act of acquiring information.  These inputs may be rejected, accepted, altered, related 
and/or  measured. Not all definitions take into consideration the large variations in human 
behaviour, including imagination, curiosity, creativity, free will, and habit. The concept 
'information' is used in so many different senses, and in such a variety of contexts, that it 
can become quite difficult to interpret when the author of a text, for example, is referring 
to documents, notions, sensations, or printed marks.  The variety of definitions have two 
aspects in common, that is the material and immaterial characteristics of information.   
This bipolar nature of information is not reflected in all definitions, but implied by the 
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absence of the one characteristic.  We find then that only one aspect, for example the 
material characteristic, of information is explored or accentuated by the definition.  This is 
complicated by the view that although information has always been part of our human 
existence, it has been forced into the spotlight by rapid technological developments, an 
increase or growth of knowledge, a deeper acceptance of the importance of information 
(ie more than a superficial focus on its value as a resource), and the contemporary pace 
at which we live (Debons, Horne & Cronenweth 1988:1-2, 158; Schrader 1986:180).  
 
Technological developments especially influence, and support, the many definitions 
which, as part of the information process, emphasise strongly the 'transfer' of information 
(referring here to the transfer of meaning and not the physical processes of transmission) 
where a person becomes informed and aware.  Becoming aware of data, though, does 
not mean that we have acquired knowledge, but only that we have become informed.  It 
also does not really define information itself. If, according to Debons et al (1988:6), we 
store it in our minds (cognitive representation) or write it down (physical representation), 
then these representations of data that we are aware of, constitute 'information'. 
 
Davenport quotes a similar definition of information:  A ... any physical form of 
representation, or surrogate of knowledge, or of a particular thought, used for 
communication@ (Davenport 1992:287). This definition of Farradane, which provides 
objects for study and allows for predictable factual outcomes which can be verified via 
experimentation, seems to be what Schrader warned against earlier on, that is, 
understanding and presenting information as an external entity and reality (Schrader 
1986:180).   
 
It is a fundamental characteristic of humankind to externalise mental processes by 
reproducing them outside him- or herself into material symbols and cultural ideas.  
Information is often regarded as a commodity in the economic sense, where someone 
can control or possess a body of information, and determine its availability and cost 
(Debons et al 1988:2). Coming back to our earlier reference to two typical approaches to 
information, we can define information according to material and non-material categories, 
varying from seeing information as an external movement, information as process, 
information as an object (entity), to information as facts or data elements (Debons et al 
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1988:4).  Context and intention (eg political, economic) of use play a role in whether we 
refer to information as a material or non-material concept, which is not always indicated 
clearly in information science related definitions. 
 
At this point we may even agree with Debons et al that defining ambiguous concepts 
such as information adds additional complications, such as the lack of agreement among 
those using the concept, and its applicability to a continuation of cognitive states, ranging 
Afrom sensory awareness to synthesis of ideas@  (Debons et al 1988:4). It is also the 
>how= or method of obtaining information that adds its own complications, for instance 
interpersonal exchange.  Other examples are our own knowledge obtained from 
experience, a personal collection of sources (recorded), organisations such as the library, 
etc.  The thinking process involves the continuous processing of information.  The >how= 
of information also involves the environment. We take information in from our 
environments, do things to it, and use it in our interaction in and with the world.  The 
message only informs after being experienced through the senses and the mind has 
formed percepts of it.  The message also has to be understood to be able to inform, and 
it must not be a mere repetition of what the recipient already knows (Crane 1995:111; 
Penzias 1989:21).   
 
Earlier definitions, such as that by Artandi and Otten (Belkin 1978:69), associate 
information with matter and energy (information embedded in or transmitted by forms of 
energy) by seeing it as that which stands for all non-material aspects and interactions, as 
well as for knowledge.  Information is then the interpretation of external (outside the 
mind) stimuli.  Information as energy implicates that it can be  measured in a way similar 
to a physical entity (Debons et al 1988:2). The internal changes it may result in are not 
always observable on an external level.  One information concept may lead to different 
ideas of interpreted information to exist in the mind of one person.  Reflection on the 
acquired information may lead to further ideas developing without further external input. 
This information event is the structuring of what one experiences.  The effect of 
information in such a system is the change in the organisation of the subject.  Information 
is capable of changing and transforming existing structures.  The sender deliberately 
structures the message to affect the image structure of the receiver.  To be able to do 
this, the sender needs to have prior knowledge of the receiver's structure.   
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Depending on the intended use, information can be a commodity, a process, a state of 
knowing, an environment, or a message.  This kind of conceptualisation approach to 
information can be understood as information being the result of processing activities (of 
data).  Such information has real or perceived value and is seen as adding to the existing 
knowledge of the recipient or user.  Such information should at the same time be relevant 
to a given situation (present or future). (Belkin 1978:65-80; Brinberg 1989:61-62; Nitecki 
1985:388-389). 
 
One of the reasons offered by Kochen as a possible impetus to changes in the 
definitional literature, is the initial uncritical adaptation of the mathematical 
communication theory which created unrealistic expectations.  What many of those who 
adopted this theory ignored, was the insistence of the creators of the mathematical 
communication theory that it was important to distinguish between meaning and 
information.  Information is separated from meaning and imprecise interpretations which 
could interfere with the transmission-rates of information as codes.  This contributed to 
the eventual dominance of data processing using computers, and information denoting 
processed data (Kochen 1983b:371-72; Wersig 1997:220).  Budd emphasises how the 
technological revolution led to serious changes in the information needs of users and the 
different forms in which they acquire and require information (Budd 1992:44).   
 
These changes also show us how limited our definitions of information have become.  
Narrow conceptions lead to narrow applications, and less space for creative thinking. In 
mathematics, physics, and engineering, information is related to order, energy, entropy, 
organisation and control.  Information was seen as the key to the unknown, especially 
because it was seen as being able to offer answers to how nature is organised and how 
systems are formed and maintained, and unlocking the mysteries of life and mind 
(Kochen 1983b:371). 
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The dominant definition of information, in a very different context, has in essence, 
remained as that which reduces uncertainty, and which was transmitted as message to a 
receiver over a Anoisy transmission channel@ (Kochen 1983b:372).  Information is used 
and understood in its technical sense, signifying what is transmitted (as flow or pattern) 
over a communication channel, and its main aim being the reduction of the receiver's 
uncertainty. 
 
Acknowledgement of the double (or rather multiple) nature of information, which comes 
to the fore when we try to conceptualise  'information', allows for the inclusion of its many 
characteristics.  There are different approaches to information, and Wersig (1997:225) 
suggests an integrated, if ambiguous, group of concepts.  These include constructivism, 
systems theory, action theory, and modernisation theory.  If information is defined as the 
reduction of complexity or disorientation, it will change every time it is used.  The 
information used will change according to the context of its use and measurement.  
Information is perhaps always the organising factor for knowledge. This allows for the co-
existence of more than one meaning of information (Wersig 1997:225). 
 
1.3 Knowledge 
 
Using the insights of Gernot Wersig (1990), knowledge will be approached from two 
perspectives as identified by Wersig. One benefit of such an approach is the opportunity 
it offers in finding some order from a seemingly chaotic literature on knowledge (a 
situation similar to that of the concept of information). As in the case of information, we 
will use >definition= and >concept= in the following manner: >definition= here refers to the 
Awhat it is@ approach of dictionaries; and >concept= refers to a deeper meaning-making or 
conceptualisation, which takes context (why, how, and when it is what it is) into 
consideration. Our specific purpose and context is in the configuration of meaningful 
information, and information science. Before we can deal with these matters, we need to 
be clear on what we are dealing with first. 
 
The two main perspectives of knowledge are aesthetics and calculus. This may seem 
similar to other dualistic approaches to knowledge, such as theoretical and practical, 
direct and indirect, a priori and a posteriori, sensation and mind, material and immaterial, 
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experience (empirical) and reason (rational), communal and individual, stable and state-
of-flux. They are all characteristics of the concept of knowledge, and should not be 
treated as the one being subordinate to the other.  According to Weizenbaum (1984:11) 
there is a necessity to be wary of the strong tendency to trust modern science as the only 
source of reliable knowledge of the world. We need to reinstitute a comprehensive 
relationship. Neither science (as calculating reason) nor pure intuition can ever >contain= 
all the things that the world is. It can only offer an attempt to conceptualise these things, 
including an allowance and tolerance for the unreachable (Weizenbaum 1984:277). 
 
The original duality was inherited from how our knowledge of the knowledge universe 
grows and our world changes. We inherited two parallel developments caused by a 
critique of the Renaissance. One development was the ideological (reason, >pure= 
thought), within which cultural and religious systems transfer answers to the concrete 
world. The other, initially parallel, development was the scientific. This development was 
based on calculus and depended on empirical evidence (sensory experience, empirical 
truth). The scientific model of calculus became dominant, especially due to strong 
information technology developments (functional dimension), and was realised as the 
basis of rational behaviour, which distinguishes humans from animals, but led to 
unfortunate similarities drawn between humans and machine. The concept of knowledge 
was influenced as strongly as that of information by the suppression of the potentials of 
aesthetics in favour of the potentials of calculus. 
 
The seemingly irreconcilable models of calculus and aesthetics are related to each other 
if we consider that which makes humans unique, as well as human potentials. These 
potentials we have even in a world dominated by a scientific model. Examples of such 
potentials are playing, phantasy, illusion, beauty, hate, sadness, happiness, mental 
images, self-consciousness. These potentials determine our success and survival in a 
world dominated by a singular focus on, and investment in, modern technological and 
scientific developments. Besides these potentials, humans have a potential for calculus. 
Humans control their potentials, mix them with calculus, and let them interact (Wersig 
1990:191).  The chapter on the information society shows how important this interaction 
is. 
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Before we conceptualise knowledge it is necessary to consider a typical dictionary 
definition. The Chambers 21st century dictionary (1996, sv 'knowledge') defines 
'knowledge' as Athe fact of knowing, awareness, understanding, the information one has 
acquired through learning and experience.@  What is emphasised is that knowledge is 
always knowledge about something. To know something is a type of condition called a 
disposition or aptitude.  Most definitions link knowledge to information by stating that 
knowledge is not just a consciousness of information, it is beyond awareness; it can be 
useful; it can generate further knowledge without additional input from outside the mind.  
The latter is possible because the categories or niches for ideas, etc, form a web.  The 
way in which a category forms part of such a web determines how it relates to other 
categories, and in this way it gives meaning at any time.  This means that unfamiliar 
questions can be answered, and entails more than a linguistic understanding of the 
question (Kochen 1983b:374). When the cognitive faculties (mind) of a person receives 
information, the following can happen: it could confirm existing knowledge; it could be 
irrelevant; and/or it could drastically change the existing knowledge.   
 
A problem here is that it is not always information that is the initial >instigator= of 
knowledge. It is more often percepts, sensations, experiences, and existing ideas, 
especially regarding personal or individual knowledge. If it is information that is acquired 
by a person, such information may be seen as potential knowledge, because if 
information is the organising element of knowledge, such information comes from an 
existing >stockpile= of accumulated knowledge. Understanding is always mentioned in 
relation to knowledge, because it adds new relations among the various categories for 
ideas.  It can lead to the revision of large sections of the existing knowledge space 
(Kochen 1983b:374).   Knowledge is thus always limited, and never fixed in an ultimate 
form.   
 
Our existing knowledge is constantly exposed to changes.  Even knowledge that over 
time seems to have proven itself good or solid, will eventually be challenged. The object 
or event can never be described with certainty, because the object or event is never 
exactly the same from one day to the next. For example, human error remains a constant 
part of knowledge, even in the seemingly stable and certain world of physical science, if 
not specially there.  Bronowsky (1973:365, 374) foresaw a view of science as a very 
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human form of knowledge.  Importantly, he clearly indicated that speculation and 
argument in physics require insight and imagination as much as in any other science.  
Plotkin, in 1994, seemed to confirm the sciences as a special kind of human knowledge, 
and that human knowledge represents only one kind of a much wider knowledge.  
Plotkin, similar to Bronowsky, also refers to the important discovery that human 
knowledge is fallible and prone to error (Plotkin 1994:xvi, 4). Large stores of accumulated 
knowledge will not necessarily lead to better understanding, decision-making, problem-
solving, or even wisdom, all of which are needed for survival and life improvement 
(Kochen 1983b:374). 
 
Two longstanding approaches to knowledge in epistemology (theory of knowledge) are 
that of empiricists and rationalists. These relate to Kant=s separation of theoretical (a 
priori knowledge) and practical reason (a posteriori knowledge) (Adorno 2000:79). The 
empirical approach represents those who think that without sensory experience there is 
nothing to form thoughts (ie the mind is a blank slate), and knowledge is associated with 
the quality of thought. A totally opposite approach is that of the rationalists who think that 
real knowledge is not sense-based. To the rationalist the human mind contains ideas, 
such as beliefs and concepts, at birth and we arrive at genuine knowledge by pure 
thought. We will not explore the philosophical debate on knowledge as justified true belief 
(the latter three concepts are part and parcel of traditional epistemology, and will 
sometimes be referred to). The value of the two approaches is that they, in their 
contradiction, expose knowledge as being reliant on experience as well as on reason.  
 
In determining that not everything a person knows is from sense experience, it brings us 
to direct and indirect knowledge. Direct knowledge are the things a person perceives 
(sense experience), and indirect knowledge is derived from those perceptions (Brook & 
Stainton 2001:1-3, 16). To use Kantian concepts, even though a priori knowledge 
precludes experience in its independence from experience, it needs some kind of 
perception to obtain such knowledge (Adorno 2000:79). We need both kinds of 
knowledge to survive, and it is not only the survival in the particular world of the individual 
alone.  It includes survival within a particular society.  Knowledge is needed to articulate 
this into speech which then can be connected to the necessary action. Knowledge 
includes everything that is in the mind.  Knowledge is cognitive and can have an 
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influence on behaviour B soul/mind and body/physicalness may be viewed, studied, and 
understood as separate entities, but they are always closely related.  
 
The way that knowledge influences behaviour, for example patterns of error, is of a 
greater concern than its ultimate truth. The way in which knowledge influences behaviour 
can be related to  Boulding's (1986:21-23) 'image', that is, the view a person holds of the 
universe. Knowledge is an individual's view of reality (how things seem), and this image 
is composed of information that enters the individual=s mind through percepts.  In 
everyday life the images one has of the world, and the picture of this in the complexity of 
one's mind, are continuously tested.  In determining the value or truth of knowledge, we 
often use the criteria of depth, originality and excellence. This is to bring it as close as 
possible to what we perceive the so-called accurate or true world to be. It is not always 
possible to distinguish between how something >seems= to be, and how things >are=. The 
external world, which we cannot directly observe, is one of the main sources of our 
knowledge, and we therefore find it reasonable to believe in the external world, from what 
it seems to be alone, to be able to explain observable phenomena (Brook & Stainton 
2001:16, 21). 
 
One way of 'gathering' knowledge is thus through observation.  Observation may be 
objective when fitting a situation, but it may also be subjective because of the way in 
which each individual describes a situation.  This will modify and even change the initial 
objective observation.  General rules learned through experience and in a particular 
group are handy for everyday living and survival, but for new and imaginative ways of 
'more than survival', new situations could be approached and presented in innovative 
ways (Feyerabend 1988:158-161; Roszak 1986:22).  
 
Another division of knowledge that reflects different sources/origins of knowledge, is 
practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. Practical knowledge, which is known first, 
does not need signs or language. Sensations are the material of our knowledge. 
Theoretical knowledge is understanding and ideas that need signs and language to be 
able to reflect on the sensations and expose the relations contained in the >material= 
supplied by sensations (Condillac, in Derrida 1980:45, 95-96). Practical knowledge is 
similar to the empiricist viewpoint, in that practical knowledge is seen as preceding 
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theoretical knowledge (Derrida 1980:96). An individual person is not the only knowledge 
source. A major source is the cumulative knowledge of a society, and an individual 
acquires it through social agencies.  Knowledge is the creation of individuals.  Menou, as 
quoted in Kochen (1983a:297), states that because information itself is culture sensitive, 
culture can be viewed as transmitted social knowledge. Social knowledge depends on 
personal knowledge for its existence.  A large amount of personal knowledge is in turn 
derived from social knowledge.  Knowledge in the form of public belief may be stable until 
that public belief is overthrown or revised through different processes.  Knowledge is 
never stable, because each individual has his or her own unique way of receiving, 
interpreting, and using knowledge (Feyerabend 1988:158-161; Roszak 1986:22). 
 
An example, or happening, of the recognition that our knowledge universe is not a strictly 
separable one, is as early as 1973 in the physical or natural sciences, where Bronowsky 
gives an account of the influences on our understanding of what knowledge is.  He 
explained it from the point of view of physical science, where the aim has been to give an 
exact picture of our material world in which knowledge is certainty.  In the twentieth 
century physics proved such an aim unattainable.  Each added line or description added 
to the picture we 'draw' of something we encounter, strengthens or explores the picture, 
but does not complete or fix it.  Bronowski uses the analogy of the picture to illustrate that 
it is the only method towards knowledge.  It also indicates to us that there is no such 
thing as absolute knowledge, because all information is imperfect, and for something to 
be absolute and irrefutable, it needs to stand on something that is equally 
unquestionable. 
 
It is precisely the instruments we continuously develop to observe our world, that led to 
the recognition that there is a paradox of knowledge.  The paradox is that no matter how 
fine our observation instruments become, we see that our observations remain as fuzzy 
and uncertain as ever.  This is not only so at the atomic level, but also on the scale of 
human beings.  Human errors remain in observations, and what is important is what the 
errors tell us, especially because errors are bound up with the nature of knowledge.  It is 
an area of uncertainty (Bronowsky 1973:353, 356-360).  More than three decades ago, 
and close to the outbreak of the Second World War, a realisation was already apparent 
within the physical sciences that we have no certainty or final knowledge.  We can never 
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fully separate the objects we observe from our perception of it, which is why our world is 
not a fixed arrangement of objects out there.  We interact with an ever shifting world 
which yield knowledge to us, but we need to interpret it ourselves (Bronowsky 1973:364). 
 
It seems from the above paragraphs that we can group knowledge according to two very 
broad conceptual categories.  The first is knowledge that can either be expressed 
externally (given embodiment outside) and be observed by others, or it can be 
internalised through the senses. Knowledge that can be expressed is explicit knowledge, 
and knowledge which cannot be expressed is tacit knowledge.  To have knowledge, 
someone who knows is needed, and when knowledge has not been externalised, it is lost 
when that someone dies.  We need to indicate the relationship between knowledge and 
understanding here, because they are often used interchangeably.  To complicate 
matters, the concepts of information and wisdom are usually mentioned in the same 
breath as knowledge and understanding.  For example, knowledge may be described as 
information and understanding about something.  Many definitions and 
conceptualisations tend to refer to knowledge and understanding as if they were 
synonyms, and indicate wisdom as their ultimate goal. Understanding is distinguished 
from knowledge by Kochen (1983b:374-75), by viewing understanding as leading to 
deeper answers regarding questions on how and why; and knowledge as know-what and 
know-how. This does not resolve the problem that it is understanding that determines 
whether percepts or information become knowledge, especially if we view knowledge as 
being beyond awareness. If we bring knowledge and understanding to bear on shaping 
our world for human ends by human means, then we have wisdom as our ultimate 
intellectual and scientific purpose.  Wisdom includes the know-when or choice of action 
based on justified knowledge and understanding (Kochen 1983b:375).  Knowledge 
comes to us through our senses and is something we have as a cognitive state.  It is an 
awareness of something, or knowing that something is 'true'.  It is not an ultimate or  
universal truth, but rather that which is perceived as true knowledge in a particular 
society or group, regardless of the ultimate validity of such a >truth=.   
 
The information-knowledge processes can lead to an awareness of the universe which 
consists of relating perceptions of aspects of that universe into integrated patterns.  Here 
information represents, as differing from knowledge, not yet fully assimilated perceptions. 
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Knowledge is a state of known relations that are expressed in a system of knowing 
already acquired by an individual.  Returning to the external and internal characteristics 
of knowledge (similar to the double nature of information referred to in the section on 
information), new knowledge, instead of being a product of external and unaltered 
knowledge, is rather a result of a person's own subjective processes.  New knowledge (or 
items thereof) can also alert the knower to previously unstated questions.  New 
knowledge results in an awareness that we do not know everything (knowledge is never 
final) and important new knowledge is always needed (Kochen 1983b:375).  There exists 
a strong viewpoint that knowledge is based on systemised, interpreted percepts which 
are organised to form a system with a structure of ideas or thoughts.  This is strongly 
supported in traditional philosophy according to which knowledge connotes truth and in 
formal logic, validity.  A good example of a formal system is science, but as Bronowsky 
has alerted us, even the so-called 'hard' sciences already realised in the 1970s that 
nothing is fixed forever.  A formal system is not closed or indifferent to influences and 
creative impulses from outside, or from within itself.  A natural science may have its main 
focus on natural or physical phenomena, but it is most often related back to the human 
context within which its research findings will create awe and admiration, and application.  
 
The social perspective was already underscored by Belkin (1978:57) to whom science is 
a social activity that investigates humankind, phenomena of the human environment, and 
interactions with that environment, and making the gained knowledge available to the 
public.  It is therefore social knowledge, the result of cognition upon subjective 
information.  In this sense the term 'knowledge' is used in the same way as in the social 
sciences, giving it a broader context than that of truth, validity and belief in philosophy.  
Some conceptions of knowledge view it as a true belief, and others as an all-inclusive 
term of being aware of the world around us.  Knowledge is an idea, abstraction, which is 
open-ended and constantly changing in terms of newly acquired understandings of 
relations among aspects of our world (Belkin 1978:57, 71; Collins Cobuild essential 
English dictionary 1988, sv 'information', 'knowledge'; Nitecki 1985:388-390). 
 
Knowledge, which contains the world as part of its totality or whole, means that the 
person is changed by that knowledge, and that change represents the thing as known by 
that person.  The human capacity to gain and impart knowledge is a type of adaptation.  
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Adaptations are forms of the incorporation of the world into the structure and organisation 
of living things.  Knowledge, or the knowledge universe is, for example, the 'scheme' 
used to organise information storage in a way that permits the system to apply that 
information in unforeseen situations (Penzias 1989:146; Plotkin 1994:ix, xiv-xv). Our 
knowledge universe includes many kinds of knowledge ranging from biology to 
psychology, and not all of these knowledges pertains specifically to human beings at all. 
Yet, knowledge remains a human construct, even if the origin of certain obtained 
knowledge is non-human, or experimental.  
 
In a sense >originating= knowledge predates information (the latter being dependent for its 
success on the invention of writing and printing, and the information technology 
revolution), as percepts predate data (the latter being human-made). This can be related 
to a person who comes to have knowledge of something, and the brain-state that 
represents that something is a particular form of organisation that bears a relationship to 
a feature of the world.  Knowledge denotes a cognitive state that bears a significant 
relationship to some feature of the world. Knowledge also exists about things that do not 
exist in the material world, but in our imagination or dreams. The latter is not allowed for 
in either the empirical or the rational approach to attaining knowledge. Knowledge can be 
gained through the experiences of others, and this sharing results in cultural knowledge, 
as we shall refer to again in the chapter on the information society.   
 
Knowledge, and the relation between language and reality, were thought of as based on 
cause-and-effect relations (causation is the regular succession of events and the 
determination of one event by another). What we do is determined by how we take the 
world to be, and this is not always how the world is.  The thoughts which determine 
behaviour are representational of how one sees the world to be.  It is how things are 
represented in thought, not just what they represent.  We do certain things because we 
thought it to be or represent something (Crane 1995:61-62, 67-68; Plotkin 1994:xv-xvi, 3-
4, 10-11). The chapter on relations with others and the world will attend more closely to 
existence and being. 
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The above paragraphs are all two-part approaches to knowledge, and we need to relate 
them to each other to be able to avoid the continuation of their rigid separation. Using 
another division, aesthetics and calculus are used to show how the many characteristics 
of knowledge are related, and still remain unique and functional entities so necessary in 
the sciences (social, human, natural). A slight digression is in order to illustrate another 
point. If information is understood in the same way as by modern information 
technologies, information becomes calculus-dependent. The important human potentials 
we already referred to are reduced when systems offering calculi are used widely without 
taking their restrictions into consideration (Wersig 1990:194). This is accentuated by the 
use of data, fitted for specific calculi such as measurement, that is not properly 
understood or used appropriately outside the calculus. The reason for referring to 
information here, is that this makes it clear that >information= does not necessarily mean 
>knowledge=. This is especially important in light of tendencies in computer circles which 
are already using phrases such as Aknowledge-based-systems@ (Wersig 1990:194). This 
excludes a whole domain of knowledge from such systems, as they only reflect human 
knowledge.  
 
Knowledge has a much broader competence as it is everything the human being stores 
for future help in actions. We have determined that knowledge is complex. It cannot be 
simplified without the risk of ignoring some of its characteristics. These characteristics 
stand in relation to, and represents, the potentials and uniqueness of humans. These 
potentials are our link to calculus and aesthetics as the broader characteristics according 
to which knowledge can be conceptualised. An important aspect of knowledge which also 
links them is that knowledge consists of extreme components, such as experience, 
generalisations, secondary experiences, clauses, skills, and evaluations (Wersig 
1990:194). The discussion on the two main characteristics are done separately for clarity, 
and will be related to the potentials of humans. 
 
1.3.1 Aesthetics 
 
The aesthetic potentials of humans mentioned here are but a small representation of 
what can be included. Examples are phantasy, playing, illusion; inconsistencies, 
mysteries; emotions, beauty, ugliness; envy, sympathy; confidence, self-consciousness; 
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likings, sadness. Traces of myths, magic, rites, idols and religious beliefs are found in this 
group, because we inherited it from our historical development (Wersig 1990:190-191). 
Aesthetics can be referred to as personal knowledge, softer knowledge, or pure intuition 
(Weizenbaum 1984:277, 279). According to Wersig (1990:196-197) there are specific 
potentials that must be stressed more to provide more knowledge for humans. These are 
images (the presentation mode in which aspects of both the rational/calculus and the 
aesthetics are combined naturally; the trivialised image needs to be revitalised); language 
(largest store of knowledge for aesthetics and calculus are still natural language, reverse 
technological reduction of language to >texts= or databases by rediscovering the magic of 
language in interpretation, analogues, etc); objects (neglected form of knowledge, 
sharpen our senses for aesthetical dimensions of knowledge); story telling (provide 
specific form of knowledge, world interpretation, interaction of world objects); personal 
knowledge (purest version of knowledge, fixed to a person, use persons as knowledge 
sources, sharing even in virtual spaces); and staging of information (information services 
are boring, knowledge potential seldom tapped, need relation of knowledge to time and 
space, stories and people, senses and the whole being, knowledge on stage as 
integrated communication offer).  
 
Everything is interrelated with everything in the complex of knowledge. Knowledge can 
therefore never be divided into isolated elements. If the elements of knowledge are 
isolated, the relation that knowledge has to those elements is lost. This brings us to the 
second main aspect of knowledge, that is calculus. 
 
1.3.2 Calculus 
 
This domain is also referred to by Weizenbaum (1984:277, 279, 280) as scientific or 
harder knowledge, calculating reason, and instrumental reason. The human potentials we 
deal with in calculus is control; empirical evidence (logical consistency, laws, empirical 
truth); rational behaviours; machines (Wersig 1990:190-191). A typical approach to a 
problem in this group is the consideration of options to solve it, which type of calculus to 
use in its evaluation, and the ideal is that the calculus resolves the problem.  Even if it 
needs a supplementation due to failure, aesthetics is excluded or transformed into an 
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element of calculus, and data is selected from the appropriate set of calculi (Wersig 
1990:191-192).  
 
Positivism also belongs to calculus in its use of general laws to make valid explanations. 
Such explanations must be compatible with general empirical laws. Positivism seeks laws 
beyond the immediately observable. The theories it expresses become the basis of 
hypotheses that will be tested against empirical evidence. These laws and theories 
provide the language within which its natural laws can be expressed (Radford 1992:410-
411). It employs both the empirical and rational approaches to knowledge. 
 
The relationship between calculus and aesthetics can be seen in the characteristic of 
knowledge as something that humans consider trustworthy and relevant. Humans use it 
to organise their interaction with their environment. Here knowledge appears as analysis, 
synthesis, or clauses. It also includes the following kinds of knowledges typically 
associated with aesthetics: mythical knowledge, magical, ideological, of social norms, 
aesthetics, and negative. Knowledge not only offers an explanation of the world, but an 
interpretation of it. It is knowledge about the world, as well as a construction of that world. 
It is simultaneously calculus and aesthetics. The challenge is to re-introduce some 
aesthetic potentials (as referred to) that are lost in our technological dominant world 
(Wersig 1990:195-196). For the purpose of this study, whenever the concept >knowledge= 
is indicated, it includes the aesthetics and the calculus, unless indicated otherwise. 
 
1.4 The relationship between information and knowledge 
 
The relationship between information and knowledge is complicated by the way the 
literature often uses the terms interchangeably, using them to describe the same things. 
Also complicating a discussion on the relationship between information and knowledge is 
the lack of agreement on what information and knowledge is. Yet another limit is that the 
linear approach to data-information-knowledge still dominates in spite of indications to the 
contrary.  For example, Mizrachi (1998:181) writes about the abandoning of the linear 
notion of these concepts in favour of an undifferentiated or complicated circular 
information ecology. Information and knowledge form part of the same knowledge 
universe. This knowledge universe is at present split up into various knowledge layers 
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and fragments, including connections between them. In such a universe according to 
Wersig 1997:225), information may provide order and orientation by developing ordering 
structures for such an ambivalent universe. We already referred to information as an 
indicator of the amount of complexity that needs to be reduced for action. The following is 
an indication of approaches to the relationship. 
 
Dictionaries connect information to knowledge in definitions of information: A... to know 
something about something@ (Collins Cobuild ... 1988, sv 'information'); and A... 
knowledge gained or given; facts; news; ... the communicating or receiving of knowledge 
... A (Chambers 21st Century dictionary 1996, sv 'information').  Views on information and 
knowledge vary from them being mutually exclusive to them being totally interchangeable 
and even indistinguishable. Information, characterised as different from knowledge, exists 
outside the mind, making information more public than private, whereas knowledge exists 
on both levels. Information has a continued existence in memories and in concrete 
records, and knowledge is seen as more fleeting if not recorded. Such a distinction can 
be seen as meaning that information is always in some or other concrete form (eg book), 
whereas knowledge exists independent of whether it has been committed to paper or to 
memory alone. This can be related to Farradane=s (Belkin 1978:78) suggestion that 
information is a representation of internal knowledge or thought. 
 
Knowledge needs the physical form of information to be able to commit itself to a 
permanent form. The physical object is the only external element which is a 
representation of what is to be communicated, and that is information.  Data can be seen 
as the essential components of information, and therefore data relates information to 
knowledge. Regarding knowledge, data is only of importance if that knowledge needs to 
be represented in a physical form, since data is central to information. As a process, this 
relationship implies that knowledge is considered a more developed form of information 
(hierarchical relationship).  A[T]o know something about something@ (Collins Cobuild ... 
1988, sv >information=) can also be stated as Ainformation is knowledge of facts@ (Nitecki 
1985:390).  Information and knowledge are sometimes a continuum.  What we know can 
be expressed in speech, in writing or acting, in such a way that others can deduce this 
knowledge from the selected behaviour.  Something that can be observed through the 
senses (empirical), can be understood by giving meaning to it, and then it can be 
converted into knowledge.  Or, it is successfully communicated information via the 
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senses.  Or, we can differentiate clearly between information and knowledge, by claiming 
that we acquire information by being told, and acquire knowledge by thinking (Belkin 
1978:78-79; Nitecki 1985:390; Roszak 1986:93). 
 
Information and knowledge are not always such a continuum, especially since knowledge 
is not only fixed, but also in a state of flux.  There is always information that never informs 
in order to become knowledge, for example knowledge externalised in the form of a book 
that is never read. Machlup (Nitecki 1985:391) indicated that knowledge and information, 
when considered as parts of a content, are synonyms.  But, when information represents 
a process, and knowledge a content of that process, then they are seen as antonyms.  
Information is related to knowledge in the sense that it is always a part of the total 
relations known.  Information and knowledge both form part of an interrelationship among 
'new' information, and static (existing) knowledge (Nitecki 1985:390-391). Such existing 
knowledge is most often in a recorded form, and is called the most concrete type of 
information available, and it has the potential to inform people, and therefore the potential 
to change their image of reality.  If information is viewed as explicit knowledge (that is, 
externalised), then information cannot be lost.  If we go beyond awareness, we have 
knowledge B applying what we understand to analysing situations and ideas, and drawing 
one's own conclusions. (Debons et al 1988:1-3; Frankl 1990:22).  
 
To be able to 'become', or lead to, knowledge, information needs to have meaning even if 
that meaning is never fixed and often multiple. If information is, according to Wersig, 
knowledge in action, then it needs to have meaning. 
 
1.5 Meaningful information 
 
The discussion on information and knowledge shows us that whenever 'meaningful 
information' is referred to, we are always considering knowledge.  To be able to 
distinguish meaningful information from meaningless, irrelevant information, we need 
knowledge.  Information without meaning cannot be or become or influence knowledge, 
except for knowing that it is meaningless.  Knowledge and meaningful information are 
crucial factors in adaptation, understanding, interpretation, application, thoughts, ideas, 
growth, more knowledge, that is, in every aspect of human life.  The first aspect of the 
main theme is approached in this paragraph first according to what Aconfiguration@ 
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entails, and then secondly what Ameaning@ is about. 
We need to determine what configuration is in the context of meaningful information. 
Formally, configuration ('to form or fashion' B Chambers 21st Century ...1996, sv 
'configuration') is as follows: the external shape, and its characteristics, is determined, 
fashioned or formed by the positioning and distribution of its parts relative to each other; 
thus, to be formed or fashioned according to its parts.  The shape, or outline, though, 
should be viewed as a shifting boundary which always adapts according to its internal 
parts.  The internal parts are also influenced and moved by external matters, if the 
context changes the internal parts cannot remain unaffected.  An example is fault-lines of 
which the characteristics are fertility, adaptiveness, creativity, challenges.  The equation 
could  read: meaningful information equals knowledge for action. Knowledge can be 
transformed into action once a theory has been given meaning through its application, 
whether as a physical system or as an action leading to further study of a phenomenon. 
 
Before we can consider how to configure meaningful information, it is necessary to 
understand where meaning comes from, why or when it 'happens', or even whether it 
existed before our cognition of it. It includes everything that may influence meaning, bring 
it about, or lay it bare.  A[M]eaning does not magically spring out ... A (Brouwer, in Tasiƒ 
2001:48) from somewhere or something, and we will see this when we consider what 
'meaning' is.  The meaning of a concept can be what is understood by it, and what it 
refers to or expresses, that is, the intended thought or idea, having a purpose.  It can also 
be someone's perception or interpretation of information received (Chamber's 21st 
century ... 1996, sv 'meaning', 'understanding'; Collins Cobuild ... 1988, sv 'meaning').  
Some of the concepts that are used interchangeably with 'meaning' are signification, 
sense, message conveyed, idea, denotation, essence, spirit, contents, semantic content, 
context, value.  AMeaningful' is used similar to comprehensible, intelligible, telling, clear, 
unambiguous, declaratory, explicit (Bartlett's Roget's Thesaurus 1996, sv 'meaning'; 
'meaningful'). 
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'Meaning' is often approached as something that can be acquired through a learning 
process, as an entity learnt separately.  Yet meaning is about more than learning, 
because a concept and its meaning for example, are not two things we acquire when 
learning the concept.  Learning its meaning is learning more than pronunciation and 
spelling.  In learning the meaning of a concept we are able to conduct with it, when we 
choose to, many informative and calculative, recorded transactions.  A concept is always 
more than a noise and something else.  It is rather, a complexly qualified noise, endowed 
with a specific saying-power.  A concept can be seen as a semi-institutional enabling 
instrument in the sense that we have learned how to use and interpret it.  The institutional 
aspect of meaning depends on, and encourages, conventional meanings of concepts 
(that which is generally understood by it).  From conventional meanings, more subjective 
meanings are created when it is associated with a private experience of which the 
meaning differs from the conventional meaning, and original subjective meanings may 
influence the conventional meanings.   
 
To be able to ensure the successful conveyance of information it is necessary to have 
agreement on the meanings of concepts, whether between individuals or amongst 
members of a group.  This applies even if no unanimous agreement, on what exactly is 
understood, exists (Belkin 1978:68, 71-72; Crane 1995:141, 171; Frankl 1990:25, 55; 
Ryle 1979:88).  An example of institutionalised conventional meaning, is formal learning, 
in the formative structures of understanding of the formal education system.  It is in such 
a system  where we 'learn' to structure our reality according to dominant intellectual 
traditions. One should always remain aware of such intellectual ethnocentrism (Bourdieu 
1992:40) to be able to avoid using valuable time making classifications and advancing 
certain theories at the cost of other, equally important, structures of thought. This is why 
there should be an awareness of the determinisms of thought to understand the 
processes that led to particular theories or paradigms being dominant.  The importance 
of the latter is expressed in the chapters regarding information science.  
 
Meaning finds expression via language, and a later chapter pays closer attention to 
language.  Reference to it in this section is necessary because it is an integral part of 
meaning, whether we consider language in its different forms, such as spoken language, 
written, gesture, symbols, images. The semantic features for instance, of concepts and 
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sentences are those that relate to their meaning.  A theory of meaning for language is 
called a semantic theory; and semantics is the part of linguistics which deals with the 
systematic study of meaning. Symbols have semantic features and they stand for things. 
Semantics is about the way concepts relate to the world, as well as to one another.  
Symbols in the mind for example, can also have semantic features since symbols 
represent things in the world.  A symbol represents both concepts and urges or feelings 
made recognisable in images.  Emotions and ideas that are subjectively experienced, 
find visual representation in symbols.  Writing and sculpture are examples of the 
externalisation of these symbolic images.  It is through cultural symbols that members of 
a community are able to share their emotional experiences.   
 
An important characteristic of meaning is that, once we understand the meaning of a 
concept, we will continue to understand it in any sentence or context it may appear.  Data 
for instance, can have different meanings, depending on the order in which the data is 
presented.  Sequence can also cause a sentence or sentences to describe different 
events.  How we interpret the sentence or text is another matter as it is influenced by 
experience, memory, insight, linguistic abilities and so on (Belkin 1978:68-72; Crane 
1995:139-140; Frankl 1990:25,55).  These latter influences form part of our existing 
knowledge as well as our ability to create new knowledge. The differences in language 
usage, for example, can be approached as not being in conflict, but rather representative 
of where meaning can be found or constructed and playing a decisive role in whether 
particular information will be meaningful.  What also plays a role in how an observer will 
react to or interpret information, is that the meaning of concepts create different worlds 
for different people.  
 
Concepts and their meaning are inseparable from social, historical, cultural, and 
contextual associations. It is also about the way it expresses our realities as change 
continuously affects spatial, temporal and reality perceptions, and new social interactions. 
An example of this is the accentuation of collective intelligence which is made possible 
through vast electronic networks. Movement of ideas is nomadic because cyberspace for 
example, is not hindered by traditional territories or boundaries, and users are no longer 
passive but active players. This is why linear guidelines on its own is not flexible enough, 
and these developments affect meaning. Human beings are affected by that which is 
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outside (object) them (subject), and cyberspace is no exception.  The meaning of 
information thus remains flexible (De Beer 1994:78-81; De Beer 1998a:96-103; De Beer 
1998b:91-93). 
 
The previous paragraph shows how language structures and usage vary in its meaning, 
interpretation, and understanding. This is further complicated by the communication 
channels, and for whom it holds meaning. These complications are not controllable or 
linear in appearance, and are also influenced by how humans experience time, space 
and reality. What could be deducted, then, is that the object cannot be separated from its 
context without a loss of meaning and understanding of the complex reality it shapes and 
fits into. This is related to the separation between form (the physical structure of symbols) 
and its meaning (what it stands for), which was needed for a computational approach to 
become possible (eg Shannon=s model that was referred to).  Such a model cannot 
address cognitive phenomena, such as language and interpretation, at a deeper level.  In 
contemporary society the disappearance of the form / meaning distinction at a symbolic 
level, and its reappearance in the connecting of meaning to the overall performance (eg 
learning, recognition) seem to become dominant. Now it is the observer who provides the 
correspondence between the global state of the system and the world it supposedly 
handles (or its representations). (Bronowsky 1973:353; De Beer 1994:70-88; De Beer 
1996a:68-80; De Beer 1998b:75-82; Varela 1992:247).  
 
Communication has a strong influence on meaningful information.  Using a speaker and 
a listener as examples, we cannot escape the fact that the listener uses categories of 
thought (a concept often used synonymously with that of meaning) to listen to and 
understand the intended ideas (ideas also used synonymously with meaning) of the 
speaker. These categories of thought are situated in a context different from the context 
of the discourse offered by the speaker. The closer the two categories of listener and 
speaker are, the more adequate the understanding, as well as the presentation (De Beer 
1994:78-81; De Beer 1998a:96-103; De Beer 1998b:91-93).  
 
The above examples are part of the study of information, and the key concern of any 
study of information is meaning. The challenge lies in the configuration of meaningful 
information out of a mass of meaningless and overwhelming information available. 
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Access to masses of information is almost instantaneous and space and time seems no 
longer to offer constraints. It is meaningless to access and retrieve information that is not 
applicable, enriching or enlightening. Yet it is offered to us daily in various guises. The 
inherent value of information cannot be assumed as it may be of value in one situation, 
and totally useless and meaningless in another (whether for a human being or a 
machine). Meaning can be found through, and be influenced by, factors such as 
language, context / environment, aesthetics, value / ethics, interpretation, social practice, 
action, discovery and inventiveness. These factors have implications for configuring 
meaningful information. Such a configuration is important because it is not about the 
discovery of one absolute truth, but a search for meaningful  information.  
 
Only meaningful information can truly re-empower society. Applying information with 
appropriate meaning is indicative of the interactive relationship between science and 
society. Language, context, and ideology all have an influence on the way knowledge is 
translated into action. Also of importance is the realisation that the linear and the rational 
should not limit richer enquiries into understanding and wisdom, but enhance and 
encourage it through an interdisciplinary approach in a science such as information 
science. The main aim of configuring meaningful information is to overcome the paradox, 
as identified by Dupuy (1980), that we may have Amore and more information@, but that it 
is with Aless and less meaning@ (Dupuy 1980:10-11). 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
The aim here was to provide background on meaningful information and why it is 
necessary to understand the challenges created by its configuration in information 
science.  We need to take into consideration how desired information is influenced and 
determined by ideology and personal preference (also referred to as underlying personal 
philosophies). Information without meaning is useless  and more information does not 
guarantee more meaning. To be able to configure meaningful information, we need a 
transformation and not a mere shift in our way of thinking about information and the 
importance of knowledge. In such a transformation it is necessary to pay attention to 
nontraditional concepts in information science such as aesthetics and unreason, to be 
able to contribute to the configuration of meaningful information. An overload of 
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information may or may not be able to contribute to the forming of a knowledge base of 
meaningful information. 
 
The role of knowledge has long since gone beyond documentation and representation 
within disciplines such as information science. As individuals, societies, and technologies 
evolve, so do the structures of application and thought. The changes in these structures 
are not always brought into focus with the changed needs and attitudes of individuals, 
societies, and technologies (De Beer 1998b:90-91; Foucault 1981:31-34; Wersig 
1993:230-233).  This is something we will try to address in the relationship between 
knowledge and action. Having mentioned society and technologies, the next chapter 
specifically deals with the milieu within which meaningful information needs to take place. 
No matter how the milieu changed and will change, and whether we call it a postindustrial 
or postmodern or post-postmodern or information society, meaningful information 
remains our key concern. We will call the contemporary milieu >information society= which 
will allow us to identify changing characteristics or approaches within it such as 
modernism, postmodernism, and so on. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INFORMATION SOCIETY AS MILIEU OF MEANINGFUL INFORMATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the information society is approached according to the origins of the idea 
of an information society, its strong affinity to information theory and technology, and the 
ambiguities and myths surrounding its promises and existence. We focus on Dupuy=s 
paradox that in spite of having more access to information than ever before,  we seem to 
have increasingly less meaning.  If the reason for calling ourselves an information society 
is based on the presence or availability of vast amounts of information, then what are we 
to be called if the majority of that information is meaningless and useless?  And how 
much does our understanding of the information society have to do with humans, and not 
only information technology? 
 
2.2 The idea of an information society 
 
Dominant in discussions regarding the information society, is a definite link to  information 
theory and the consequent rise of information technology and the later powerful 
convergence of information and communication technologies (ICTs).  There seems to be 
two parallel developments on the idea or concept of an information society.  The 
stronger, or better advertised concept, is an 'Information Society' as part of a planned 
future vision, something that will ultimately culminate in a Global Information Society.  
Such a vision has a strong technological focus driven by economic and political forces, 
where the success of the visible technological device is celebrated.  The second concept 
is the gradual, historical development into an information society due to a changing world 
and world view.  Even though such a society has as a strong impetus the progress in 
information technology, it recognises the impact the new technologies have on social, 
cultural, psychological, and emotional factors.  This second idea of an information society 
also re-examines matters such as community and responsibility. These two approaches 
do not take place separately, because the technology leading to the growth of such a 
society, will in time itself be influenced by the very society it helped bring about. 
A third related division can be added, and that is the two broad approaches in 
 
 
31 
postmodernism to the information society.  The first approach centres information and 
information society in economic terms, occupational shifts, or the flow of information 
across time and space, especially in terms of information technology (Webster 
2002:227).  Such an approach effortlessly isolates and translates human concerns, as 
well as information, into controllable quantitative units (as we shall see later in Shannon's 
information theory).  The American development of Post-Modernism in architecture, for 
example, was strongly criticised for its repackaging of culture as a commodity, and a 
controlled electronic representation of reality. This made Post-Modernism especially 
vulnerable to being copied and commercially debased (Steele 2001:182, 198).  
 
The second approach places emphasis on the significance of information in terms of the 
spread of symbols and signs.  It does not isolate human matters, because its concern lies 
with the expansive growth and infiltrating presence of all forms of media.  We are 
surrounded in our contemporary world by a mass of signs and symbols, reflecting 
particular qualities and features of our everyday life (Webster 2002:227). Post-
Modernism in Europe is indebted to the influence of the French philosopher Jean-
François Lyotard (Steele 2001:182) regarding language and semiotics. He saw the move 
of societies into a new age as resulting in the status of knowledge being altered. It also 
led to a diversification of cultural influences and a move away from unity in Modernism. 
Post-Modernism, in contrast to Modernism, did believe that reality was representable and 
this was strongly emphasised by developments in photography. Post-Modernism also 
returned to the centrality of the exploration of context and history, making many of their 
projects eclectic in style. An example is British architect John Outram (Steele 2001:190), 
who was interested in returning architecture to its origins as a system of signs that the 
public can >read=. This is similar to the use of imagery in and on buildings in past societies 
such as Greek architecture. In the latter, decoration was superimposed on the underlying 
structure for carrying specific meanings. Architecture, then, has become a 
communication medium, a semiotic structure (Steele 2001:185-191). 
 
We find the same ambiguity and separation in the origin of 'technology' as a word, in the 
Greek word techne.  Techne means Acraft, skill, cunning, art, or device@ (Talbott 2001).   
Here technology is taken to include both an objective construction or a subjective 
capacity.  Information society as an idea, is approached either as an expression of the 
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external devices of techne, or as the living techne of our consciousness (Talbott 2001).  
The separation between these two meanings of technology can be seen in the many 
different opinions on what an information society is, or ought to be. It is imperative to 
bring these meanings together again, especially since the objects we create are strong 
expressions of their intellectual growth and empowerment. Such a reunion is important if 
we are to ensure that an information society is not seen and approached as merely a 
computer society. There are other ambiguities (such as the text being separated from the 
context, while at the same time a blurring or breaking down of distinctions between 
interior and exterior, subject and object, etc, is taking place) that we will attend to as the 
discussion continues.  We shall see in the next few paragraphs that there are different 
views on what this 'new' kind of society is or will be based on, varying from services to 
the flow of information and societal expressions. 
 
2.2.1 A new kind of society in the information age 
 
An information society is not merely a society that is aware of the importance of fast 
access to information, even though it does not always have the information.  In an ideal 
information society the convenience of quick access and delivery is an everyday 
occurrence (Duff 2002:139). We can determine from this that it is not the information that 
is unique to what we call the information age, but how information has become central in 
all spheres of life.  The ability and process of acquiring information, systematically 
organising it into knowledge frameworks, and passing it on to our descendants, has 
always been crucial to humankind's survival.  This process also enabled humans to 
control the natural environment and improve material wealth, most often at the cost of the 
natural environment. The idea of an information society seems to have developed out of 
a shift occurring in the occupational structures of mainly industrialised countries. This 
shift became apparent due to the growth of a section within the tertiary sector of services, 
that did not add directly to the gross national product and was viewed as non-productive. 
These occupations included policemen, clerks, teachers, in fact quite a broad range of 
anyone concerned with the processing of information (Wersig 1990:185).   
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The question is whether we can speak of an information society if its parameters are so 
broad as to include all those workers involved in the information sector, even when these 
workers do not share professional interests, similar education and experience, or 
standards.  They do not fall within the same profession or discipline (Kochen 1983a:280). 
In such a context, an information society is simply where less human power is applied to 
material production and more on immaterial needs and the processing of information 
(Wersig 1990:185).  The threat held by labour-displacing technologies, and the possibility 
of differences in lifestyle, form part of societal changes we need to be aware of. This is 
especially true as more varied institutions (political, social, economic, and educational) 
are increasingly dependent on, and involved in the production of information (Kochen 
1983a:277). 
 
Contemporary society, therefore, shares with pre-industrial and industrial societies the 
possession of knowledge and the ability to use information to influence and manipulate 
the environment.  One kind of society, eg postindustrial society, does not have to end for 
another, eg the information society, to begin.  They overlap and the characteristics of the 
one will necessarily appear and continue in the other.  We can distinguish contemporary 
society from previous kinds of society in the sense that high technology enjoys 
prominence, extreme industrialisation, and the application of electronic technology to 
most aspects of our lives.  Especially the merging of information and communication 
technologies (telematics) led to a phenomenal increase in information processing power, 
as well as a growing demand for public information services. The key feature in all these 
activities is information and information-using activities.  Information is approached as a 
dynamic resource in itself, instead of a passive tool for carrying out activities.  The 
creative talent of individuals and their ability to use information for innovation are 
emphasised (Kochen 1983a:279; Shillinglaw & Thomas 1988:9-10; Wersig 1990:185-
186).  Even though it is the centrality of information that is unique in contemporary 
society, it is strongly promoted as being a 'new' kind of phenomenon in its own right, 
existing as a physical entity in spite of our awareness of its ephemeral and intangible 
characteristics. 
 
The concept of an information society continuously changes, and the concept is 
overworked and abused, according to Kochen (1983a:280).  It has become a society 
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strongly based on information and communication technologies, and the process is 
informatisation.  One implication for such a society based on information and 
communication technologies is the availability of more information to more people.  In this 
sense we could call it not only an information technology society, but  an information 
usage or information-minded society.  Just because we have more information does not, 
of course, imply that we will make better or different use of it (Wersig 1990:186). 
 
We need to consider the position and status of the information society, and whether we 
can trust it to be an information society (that which we expected an information society to 
be, its promises and the ideologies behind it).  According to Curras (1987) for example, it 
is misleading to refer to an information age, as information has always been around.  
Curras finds the name 'information technology age' more appropriate.  In such an age 
communication is seen as crucial to survival, and the proponents of information 
technologies have an obsession with techniques for processing, storing, reproducing, and 
transmitting information, independent from its meaning content (Curras 1987:149-151; 
Swerdlow 1995:5). 
 
2.2.2 Information theory and information technology 
 
Even though we constantly refer to information technology, it is focused on in this 
paragraph.  The reason is that it forms part of any discussion on the information theory of 
Claude Shannon.  Shannon is seen as the pioneer of the information age as we know it.  
It was his quantification of the concept 'information' and the extreme step of defining 
information independent of meaning, that opened up the way for a new technology, as 
well as a reassessment of contemporary society.  One effect this had, is that we cannot 
refer to the information society, without recognising its close association with information 
technology and its phenomenal success.  Accentuating this fact, is that his influence 
reached beyond science and engineering by shaping our world.  Quite recently prominent 
scientists have started to successfully re-examine and even challenge the foundations 
and underlying dogmas of Shannon's theory.  Our world has changed so drastically, and 
our information technology has 'matured' to such an extent since its original inception, 
that we cannot accept a model anymore that requires a transmission certainty and 
reliability of a hundred percent (Hayles 1987:25; Von Baeyer 2003:215, 218). 
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Shannon's AA Mathematical Theory of Information@ of 1948 (Hayles 1987:34), and his AA 
Mathematical Theory of Communication@ (Capurro & Hjørland 2003:343) had a profound 
effect on the scientific community of the time.  He was able to quantify 'information' by 
defining it as a Afunction of probability@ (Hayles 1987:24), thereby having nothing to do 
with meaning.  Warren Weaver (Hayles 1987:25), who was responsible for the 
interpretation of Shannon's theory, saw the separation of information and meaning as the 
price we have to pay if humans wanted to Asubdue the information channel@ for it to be 
able to process information without having to fret over its meaning (Hayles 1987:25). 
Shannon effectively removed information from its external relation to the context that 
provides information with meaning.  The irony of this decontextualisation may be that in 
separating text from context, or information from meaning, a new kind of informational 
context is created.  Context is not a given anymore, but something that can be 
predetermined or created at will and for various purposes.   
 
There were attempts before Shannon's theory at decontextualisation, especially in literary 
studies, but Shannon's information theory not only transforms the content of the cultural 
context, but how context itself is constituted.  Now it is possible to accomplish the latter 
through a technology capable of fragmentation, manipulation and the reconstitution of 
information texts as it pleases.  It is in postmodernism that we find recognition of such an 
arbitrary context as our context, that is, the context of the information society (Hayles 
1987:25-26).  This separation of text from context is one of many ambiguities to come.  
For instance, decontextualisation not only effected a separation, but also, because of the 
separation, caused differences to break down. 
 
The boundaries of differences have become sufficiently blurred due to the possibility of 
manipulating and creating contexts at will. It also led to heated debates as the definition 
of information separated from meaning (or text from context) was contested right from the 
beginning.  We cannot ignore the fact that without separating text from context, 
information technology as we know it would not have been possible.  According to Hayles 
(1987:27) these physical enactments of decontextualisation had an almost immediate 
impact on cultural values, such as birth control, military manoeuvres, etc. The benefit of 
hindsight seems to confirm that we cannot present, or represent, everything we can 
conceive, as it will remain inadequate or mutilated, especially in economic and political 
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terms.  We can only perceive that which is unpresentable through writing. The possibility 
of a stable universal context for texts has disappeared and itself becomes the context for 
postmodern culture.  This renders universal or global contexts nonexistent, and makes 
only localised contexts possible (Hayles 1987:27-28).  If this is so, then the possibilities of 
a 'global', transparent  information society may become undesirable, if not impossible.  
Despite this, the aspirations of the idea of an information society remain global, and could 
in economic terms, ultimately lead to a single global economy or Global Information 
Infrastructure (Dick 2000:46-47). 
 
2.2.3 A postmodern approach to information and society 
 
Postmodernism, because its main thinkers were forceful in their insistence that 
postmodernity is a complete and decisive break with the past, makes us acutely aware of 
certain doubts.  These doubts are whether we are truly entering a novel information 
society, and that a new age has arrived or not.  This is in a way similar to modernity 
which not only broke away from classical culture (leading to Impressionism, Surrealism, 
Dadaism, etc), but also brought about the end of feudal and agricultural societies.  It was 
not a sudden end, though.  Postmodernism, on the other hand, claims in general a 
complete 'fracture' or break from the thinking styles and activities which reigned supreme 
for centuries.  This rejection or denouncement of modernist ways of seeing unites 
postmodernism as an intellectual movement and postmodernism as something that we 
encounter in our everyday lives (Webster 2002:227-228). 
 
The modern and postmodern movements are important because both are efforts to move 
away from models specifically aimed at representation.  Modernism and postmodernism 
are a refusal of representational culture, but postmodernism did not view reality as being 
unrepresentable (as we see in Post-Modernism2 in architecture).  Another aspect that 
binds the histories of modernism and postmodernism, is that talk of an information 
society started to feature strongly in the industrial period when information became a 
                                                 
2>Post-Modernism= as an architectural style or movement is written according to an 
architectural source (Steele 2001), and should be distinguished from >postmodernity= and 
>postmodernism= as a thinking style, philosophy or cultural approach, even though influences on both 
are similar. The same applies to >Deconstructivism= in architecture, and Derrida=s philosophy of 
>deconstruction=. 
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crucial element.  Postmodernism is all about the dominance of informational aspects in 
contemporary society, albeit in a different sense. Within postmodernism itself we detect 
seemingly opposing movements or approaches (Webster 2002:229). Postmodern 
studies, according to Fuery and Mansfield (2000:xiii),  resulted partly because of the 
recognition that changes in communication and information technology cannot be 
explained by using only inherited models of enquiry.  We live in a world that is different 
from what has gone before, and brings into question whether the tenets of social 
explanation are still valid.  
 
This rejection by certain postmodern thinkers of an approach that tries to explain the 
present utilisation of the conventions of the established social sciences, is 
counterbalanced by those postmodern thinkers who approach it as a condition which is 
the outcome of social and economic changes that can be investigated by established 
social analysis.  This latter group does not perceive the differences as reason enough to 
suggest a complete break or fracture from the modernist movement that gave rise to the 
Enlightenment, but rather a continuation of changes and developments.  An information 
society in a postmodern age represents a conception of reality that still contains strong 
elements of modern approaches (Webster 2002:228).  
 
A broader field of investigation of practices is important as it is the material for an 
investigation of the broad construction of meanings and truths.  This includes their social 
and political interconnections.  The major aspects of modernism that postmodernism 
opposes most vehemently are claims that it is possible to identify rationalities underlying 
social development, behaviour, action and change.  Postmodern thinkers also deny the 
possibility to offer totalising explanations (grand narratives), as well as being able to 
identify the main origins of developments, for example of civilization, capitalism, etc 
(Webster 2002:229-230).  In an age of so many differences, opposites, possibilities, and 
powers, these larger claims of identifying underlying explanations, even if it does reflect 
the originators' bias (luckily perhaps), still offers an inkling of an idea how things may or 
may not fit together.  It offers a historical context, whether local or global, and brings 
together the chaotic and the ordered of a society.  
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Postmodernism is often conceived narrowly as being mainly concerned with the cultural 
arena (art, aesthetics, music, architecture, movies, etc) (Webster 2002:229-231).  It is a 
notion or conception of postmodernism that is not acceptable.  Those who contribute to 
the debate on postmodernism, even though they do focus upon cultural phenomena, 
seldom if ever limit themselves to that alone.  Our contemporary world necessitates, 
more than ever before, the realisation of the much greater significance of the cultural.  
Perhaps in a cultural sense, postmodernism is a break from modernism, even if only the 
visible convinces us.  The narrower discussions on fashions and architecture have long 
since moved on to a Acritique of all expressions of modernity in so far as they claim to 
represent some 'reality' behind their symbolic form@ (Webster 2002:229).  Indirectly in this 
quote, maybe unintentionally, postmodernism accuses modernism of representation, the 
very thing that links  these two movements in their opposition to it. 
 
In the humanities of the last forty odd years, an investment has been made in the belief 
that human behaviour is either determined or mediated by the collective history of human 
practices. This removes or obscures the existence of a dividing line between the natural 
and cultural, the true and the artificial, the authentic and the educated, that can be used 
by human beings to measure their activity.  These inherited divisions are themselves acts 
of culture and can only be meaningful in the context of the methods groups use to 
produce and validate truth (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:xix-xx). Jacques Derrida criticised 
such binary oppositions which are used to classify and organise the objects, events and 
relations of the world.  Derrida uses undecidables (eg the zombie) to disrupt this 
oppositional logic, and places the focus on the 'between' of the opposites.  This example 
emphasises that it is vital to be aware of the limits of order (ie stable, clear and 
permanent categories).  It does not imply that order becomes unimportant.  He does not 
reject the existence of certain necessary divisions. One could rather argue that for order 
or disorder to exist, it needs its apparent opposite, therefore including the importance of 
contradictions and differences (Collins & Mayblin 2000:17-24). 
 
Cultural theorists, for example, argue that even 'unsocialised' (that which is perceived as 
outside, strange, of no direct interest, or detrimental to a particular culture) parts of 
human experience cannot be expressed without being subject to the means and 
structures of cultural mediation.  The language used to write or speak these experiences, 
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is weighed down with implications, associations and dynamics that individual language 
users cannot control.  More often than not language users are not even aware of these 
implications and influences.  To quote Fuery and Mansfield (2000:xx): A ... the outside of 
culture can only be imagined as the possible space from which we cannot speak.@  The 
reality of this 'outside' to culture can be asserted only from within the culture it is 
designed to delimit.  This seems to imply that non-cultural (that which is external or 
strange to a particular culture) influences on human beings do exist, but that these 
influences are mediated or intercepted by cultural forms.  This also implies that the use of 
rigorous analysis on truth-claims will not lead to an  understanding of the formulation of 
truth.   
 
An alternative seems to be by problematising the methods and means by which truth is 
generated and communicated (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:xx-xxi).  If we return to the first 
approach to an information society as a planned 'future' that is especially information 
technology driven, we find that postmodernism for this very reason reject the totalising 
explanations which, through its demonstration of the truth of developments, reveal how 
partial such explanations are.  Implicit for the modernists in the recommendations made 
by such an approach, is that it recommends a particular direction that social change 
ought to follow, by stating that it is 'likely' to take such and such directions.  It comes 
across as deliberate planning and organising of the present and future, but often the 
claims are refuted by the course that history followed.  The pretensions of the social 
sciences, that it can amass accurate information about the behaviours of people, are 
rejected (Webster 2002:230-231).  In the paragraph on the ambiguities and myths of the 
information society, or rather the promises foretold, we will come across many of these 
discredited 'prophesies'. 
 
2.3 The ambiguities and myths of the information society 
 
There are many who prefer concepts other than 'information society' to refer to the post-
industrial shifts and changes taking place in contemporary society, especially due to the 
fact that there is very little consensus on the definition of 'information' itself, as we have 
encountered in the chapter on information and knowledge.  Also, when referring to an 
information society different meanings and usages are attached to it depending on who, 
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for example, a sociologist, economist, politician, psychologist, information scientist, is 
involved.  Those commenting on these evolutions of society closer to its inception, use 
the concept of a 'post-industrial society' more strongly.  Kochen (1983a) refers to a few 
alternative forms of information society.  Examples are Zeleny and Skolka (in Kochen 
1983a:280) who envisioned a 'self-service society' developing, as opposed to Bell's 
(Kochen 1983a:279) depiction of a post-industrial society.  In such a self-service society 
most economic activities are based on self-service, for example knowledge products are 
manufactured to support self-service.  In such a society the main focus is ecological 
balance, and deemed more important than the use of high technology, power, and 
material prosperity.  The ideal postulated here is smaller, self-supporting units as 
opposed to large, complex societal systems.  The benefit of such small and decentralised 
units is the avoidance of depersonalised individuals (Kochen 1983a:279-280).   
 
Artandi (Kochen 1983a:280), on the other hand, views a post-industrial society as 
becoming a 'knowledge society'.  Similar to Weizenbaum, Artandi foresaw larger 
databanks, and she, Artandi, envisioned that socio-technical problems will far outweigh 
the expected technical problems.  We will be more successful in handling complex 
computer systems, and less proficient in dealing with complex social and political 
environmental matters.  The privacy and data security implications of computers and 
society are often overemphasised, and it is not often recognised, as Artandi does, that it 
is a matter of information and society and not of computers and society.  This is so 
because it is the content of data, and not the technology, that is a threat to individual 
rights such as privacy.  The concerns for privacy, according to Artandi, will always take a 
backseat when it comes to threats such as involvement in war or unemployment (Kochen 
1983a:280).   
 
The kind of society that has developed through the stages of pre-industrial, industrial, 
post-industrial, and seems to remain strong has, according to Bell (Kochen 1983a:279), 
its economic activities based mainly in services.  Bell also depicted such a society as 
concerned with professional, technical and scientific occupations, and information-based 
technology.  Central to such an affluent society is theoretical knowledge about systems, 
as well as rational, information-based decision-making (Kochen 1983a:279). 
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Capurro and Hjørland (2003:343) point out that the concept 'information' in contemporary 
society is used strongly in the sense of Aknowledge communicated.@ We notice this in the 
widespread use of computer networks, and the phenomenal development due to the 
eventual convergence of ICTs.  Capurro and Hjørland also show that knowledge and its 
communication will always be, and has always been,  the basic phenomena of human 
society.  The difference now, as mentioned, is that what separates contemporary society 
from previous societies, and in that sense makes it an information society, is information 
technology and its global impact.  Due to the digital nature of information, information 
technology is more than the basic condition for economic and capital development.  
Information technology also had a definite impact on the natural and social sciences. 
 
Dupuy (1980) argues the myths of the information society around the themes of the 
myths of postindustrial society; reification of relations with others and the world; and of 
having increasing quantities information, but dwindling meaning. He refers to the 
postindustrial society as the information society.  We shall refer throughout to 'information 
society'. The world without grace Dupuy refers to, that is, a world in which we pretend 
(and even believe) to have increasing amounts of information (quantity), is the one we 
find ourselves living in. The paradox lies in the fact that in spite of more information, our 
world is becoming increasingly devoid of meaning (quality).  Or, as Weizenbaum (Wersig 
1990:187) envisaged, a rubbish-explosion.  An 'explosion' of large stores of senseless 
data does not therefore equal an information explosion.  Kochen refers to the Ascarcity of 
needed information amidst a glut of information@ (Kochen 1983a:277); and AData, data 
everywhere nor any bit to fit@ (Kochen 1983a:295). In spite of having more information, 
meaning is increasingly becoming less (Dupuy 1980: 16).  Dupuy also indicates that the 
ideal in an information society can be interpreted as meaning that there is less and less 
absent information.  This is typically the ideal of a society focused on commodity in spite 
of claims to the contrary (ie that it is a society unhindered by commodities or 'things').  
Information is reduced for purposes of processing, storage, retrieval or supply. Large 
quantities of information that is seen as an object does not guarantee understanding or 
trust.  Cox (2001:57) reminds us that humans are flawed and therefore also their 
information sources.  Cox also quotes Michael Heim's insight that our Ainfomania erodes 
our capacity for significance.@ Being so fixated on information we end up distorting 
meaning by collecting fragments and as a result become poorer in overall meaning.  It 
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also neglects the continuities and those things that do not always change, or when 
something does change it happens in a manner unforeseen (Cox 2001:57). 
 
The phenomenal growth in information production has not been met by increased 
demand or consumption, but with a decrease (Dick 2000:49). Consumerism, and 
commercialisation, not only uses 'meaning' to its own ends, but also hinders access to 
meaning as it replaces human action needed for meaning through creation. It almost 
seems as if we find ourselves between meaning and meaninglessness. The myths of the 
information society has its own irony, that is, one where in spite of claiming to be less 
focused on material aspects, it turns out that the way we produce, process, and consume 
information is counterproductive to meaning and meaning-making.  More, instead of less, 
human power is spent on material production, even though the processing of information 
has increased dramatically. Dupuy (1980:3) calls it the Adouble myth of both an economic 
and political nature@ of such a society. 
 
In the economic dimension of the myth (Dupuy 1980: 3-4), information society is viewed 
as a new stage in the evolution of society.  It also sees humankind as freed from material 
constraints during this stage.  This means that we can now focus purely on ethereal 
needs, that is, immaterial or postindustrial needs, instead of the satisfaction of material 
needs.  Immaterial needs include health, education, happiness, culture, environmental, 
protection and security, leisure and travel, better relationships with others, etc. The 
difference between an industrial economy and a information economy, is that an 
industrial economy transforms matter and energy (input) through human labour into 
material goods (output).  In contrast the information economy is supposed to be a service 
economy for which the main input and output is information.  Instead of the information 
sector restricted to a small part of the tertiary economic sector, it became an essential 
part of the secondary sector of production, in spite of the rationalising power of 
converged technologies (Wersig 1990:186).   
 
Wersig also pointed out that information processing and communications, as the major 
factor in economic development, can be linked to more than production itself.  Included is 
the increase of productivity in all other industrial areas, becoming the support of societal 
infrastructures, and being an influence in all areas of everyday life.  Two examples are 
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the strength we use to secure ourselves against outside threats, which may be misused, 
and increased production leading to the initial displacement of jobs instead of the 
promised increase (Kochen 1983a:277). And yet it has been called a golden age of 
services, or a game between people without the intervention of material goods.  Human 
relationships are thus no longer affected by things.  Such liberty achieved through the 
lifting of necessity is part of Marx's theory.  This, suddenly, is a totally acceptable 
ideology within the Western frame of mind, and can be witnessed in the inflated tertiary 
sector.  We can now communicate in harmony without worldly possessions or obstacles. 
  
Capitalism is even seen as the 'birth' point of the process where productive forces reach 
the height of their development and where bodily needs have been satisfied. In contrast 
to this promise, we notice signs of calculated realism, forces of destruction, and 
scepticism towards that which does not adhere to the capitalist dream or idea. It is the 
idea of unlimited wealth and power. The subordination of science through technologies, 
especially of language, to capitalism makes it more difficult for such an economic market 
to present examples from the reality it supports and enforces, to verify the idea of wealth 
and power (Dupuy 1980: 3-4; Lyotard 1994: 286-287). 
 
The political dimension of the myth represents those who seem to think that mutual 
understanding and peace amongst nations will be made possible through the rapid 
growth of information networks and mass communications. This group also views an 
information society as a move away from the competition, selfish interests, and 
individualism characteristic of the economic growth of material goods. In contrast to this, 
an information society will have the characteristics of a harmonious community (as we 
shall see later on, it does not have >community=), of a global village. Dupuy (1980:4) 
reminds us that this is a very Marxian idea of a utopian, transparent, society, which is 
>free= from conflict. Yet, we find that instead of being a stage in a progressive evolution or 
development of humankind, this ideal view of an information society is rather a phase in 
Capitalist3 history coping with its contradictions. These contradictions are represented by 
the fact that, instead of freeing us from material constraints, the fight for material survival 
                                                 
3Dupuy (1980:4) defines >capitalism= as A... that form of economic and social organisation 
prevailing from Los Angeles to Vladivostok via Peking, i.e. an economy based on the accumulation of 
commodities.@ 
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has intensified. In addition, the extreme monopoly that economic4 activity holds over 
social and political dimensions of life, has been increased (and enforced) instead of 
>overcome.=  
 
Another contradiction is in a supposedly global and open society, with its claims to the 
instantaneous dissemination of information worldwide,  leading to the enlightenment and 
education of everyone it reaches. This is counteracted by a decline of interest in, and an 
increase in indifference, toward foreign news regarding disasters. The world is turning 
local in a time where it is still advocated strongly as global, especially with regard to 
agendas aimed at dominating global competition, at the expense of labour and the 
environment (Dick 2000:50).  
 
The very interactivity and virtual reality of information technology that would have brought 
this about, made it possible for an individual to avoid contact with the rest of the world 
through the use of customised information menus. Such a society, in the efforts of 
becoming global, has turned into a self-centred, individual driven phenomenon. We need 
to consider if the social costs are worth the membership to a global village, if its values 
are acceptable and to our benefit, and whether we should not rather avoid the implied 
>one best way= approach of those selling and enforcing the idea of an information society 
(Dick 2000:50-52). The Afalse certainties generally propagated by ... ideologists@ 
(Tschumi 1998:176) are nullified by what Tschumi calls >disjunctions=. The disjunctions 
between being and meaning, humans and objects, does not support a view that we are 
becoming part of a homogeneous, unified and sense-making world. The world in which 
we are located, is rather characterised by increasing dissociation, distancing and chance. 
 
                                                 
4Dupuy (1980:5) defines >economics= as Asocial activity concerned with subsistence.@ 
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One definite insight the myths and paradoxes of the information society affords us, is that 
it is only the industrial society that ended up engaging the largest portion of our energies 
and intellect. All space and time are taken up by this battle for survival in an industrial 
society. This is in contrast to previous presumptions that it was typical of traditional 
societies or subsistence economies to spend all their energy in organising survival. In 
actual fact these archaic societies dedicate the smallest part of a day to material 
necessities and obsessions. This material struggle in industrial society is still present in 
the contemporary information society. New communication technologies lead to 
intensified alienation and conflict instead of harmony. The new technologies spread these 
conflicts and clashes at an increased rate, and  produced a highly unstable system 
(Dupuy 1980:5).  We live in a machine-dominated world in which we abstract in a 
measurable and precise manner from the fuller reality.   
 
The price we so blindly and willingly pay is the loss of the expressive and qualitative 
aspects of the world, or an Aabandoning of our own embodied existence@ (Talbott 2002).  
Weizenbaum (Wersig 1990:187) saw the problem in the broadening gaps within society 
when it came to those who know and those who do not know, due to the computerisation 
of life.  Weizenbaum also referred to the problem of a rubbish-explosion in the sense that 
much of the incredible amounts of data stored, held very little meaning at all to the 
majority of people when it came to everyday life.  It is not whether the technology will be 
used or not, but rather the cost of its usage.  This is where governments normally play a 
role in ensuring the availability of public services and social tariffs for those without 
expendable income.  Another gap, related to utility, is the relevant literacy required for 
optimal use, and the ability to distinguish between what is 'rubbish' and what is not.  This 
becomes more complicated as our knowledge of the material earth is decreasingly 
originating from direct experiences, and increasingly dependent on instrument readings 
and calculation (Talbott 2002).  Yet, despite the existence of immense databases, the 
majority of people continue to make use of information within their general 
circumstances.  Such information is gained extensively from their communication world 
as diverse as the media and friends.   
 
New information technologies hold the promise of making such information more widely 
available, as well as more user-oriented.  Maybe such new technologies and the implied 
promise of user-friendly and sensible services, reflecting how information is integrated in 
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our everyday lives, will hopefully also lead to an increased awareness of the rubbish-
explosion that Weizenbaum warned us about (Wersig 1990:187-190). 
 
Kochen (1983a:280) referred to another conceptualisation of an information society 
which may counteract some of its negative aspects, related to its very materialistic focus. 
 Instead of the material embodying the exchanges within a society, a focus on the flow of 
information is preferred.  In such a society knowledge will be generated by knowledge-
based performances that are knowledge intensive in nature.  Information would also 
reflect regular societal expressions.  Conflicts between conserving these regularities and 
pressures for adaptive change will ideally be managed by reason and human values, 
rather than by strength and conveniency.  Problems, or crises, will arise from 
conceptualisations of an information society, which is never stagnant, even when it does 
not always reflect as such in discourses on it.  Kochen sees the answer in the help that is 
part of information and knowledge, provided that it is balanced by human values and 
judgement.  This is more than specialised technical and professional skills, and includes 
a human-minded, general, approach to bring knowledge to bear on important matters 
(Kochen 1983a:280-281).   
 
Menou (Kochen1983a:296) supports a much more integrated and interdisciplinary 
approach to information.  This allows for the value that generalists and specialists in the 
field of information hold.  Information plays a strong role in social matters and our ability 
to cope with these matters.  An example is the cultural implications of the epistemological 
and ethical impact of research in Artificial Intelligence.  This kind of research impacts 
especially on how we used to think about the acquisition of knowledge, meaning, 
understanding, and wisdom.  We need, more than ever, understanding (a form of power) 
to be able to cope with information overload, and be able to find, distinguish, and form 
meaningful information from such an overload (Kochen 1983a:296). 
 
The power to act and the power to understand are affected by the absence of control.  It 
results in the structural instability of the system with regard to behaviours. This instability 
is the inherent incapability to cope with noise (random disturbances) which affects its 
internal connections.  A further result regarding cognition, is the flow of meaning between 
the individual elements and the whole they constitute, that is blocked.  They therefore fail 
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to recognise themselves in what originated from the synergism or co-operation of their 
behaviours.  A conclusion one can draw from this is that a condition of the ability of a 
complex system to regulate itself, is a certain amount of indetermination.  Such 
indetermination also includes the system being able to integrate the disturbances that 
affect it, as well as transforming them into significant experiences.  'More and more 
information' can now be seen as meaning Aless and less absent information@ (Dupuy 
1980:16) in an information society.  This is the ideal of a society characterised by the 
commodification of interpersonal relations.  It immobilises the autonomy of such a 
society's members.  This ideal seems like an admirable machine whose work is 
accessible to our total knowledge. 
 
An information society cannot have community when singularly considered from a 
viewpoint of commodity. For community you need to assign responsibilities and apply 
authority. This is made impossible by the complication5 and contradictions of an 
information society. If a society is to be transparent and without conflict, it becomes 
vulnerable to totalitarian ideologies (Dupuy 1980:5). There are those who are for a global 
information society of which they claim public life is communal. Dupuy (1980:16-17) 
supplies two reasons why the exact opposite is happening.   
 
The first has to do with the fact that a communality of life requires that each person is and 
must be responsible for her or his own acts.  This includes the unforeseeable 
consequences of actions (an information society discourages action).  When social reality 
results from such action of forces (similar to those in the natural world), the investigation 
of responsibilities in an information society loses its purpose.  This forms part of the 
second reason why the opposite is happening to what proponents of an information 
society claims.  Conflicts are no longer face-to-face, or there is a lack of direct 
confrontation between groups or individuals.  Instead of direct expropriation of, for 
example, territories by the powerful and rich, it is now through the automatic action of the 
real estate market.  Humankind is no longer the dominating entity, but is now managed 
by another anonymous collective entity, that is, humankind is dominated and pushed by 
                                                 
5It is important to clearly distinguish the notion of complication from the notion of complexity: 
complication is the process of becoming complicated, and involves a circumstance/s that causes 
difficulties; complexity is the quality of being complex, intricate. 
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mechanisms (Dupuy 1980:16).  There is no single responsibility anymore, implying that 
everyone is responsible.  This is another rigid misinterpretation of the interdependence of 
all acts. 
 
Global postindustrialisation leads to a complicated and trivialised societal system which is 
extremely fragile.  Such a system is extremely vulnerable to 'noise', because it does not 
leave much room for noise resulting from the creative autonomy of its components.  This 
is also the result of the ideal that every situation has only one best way, and that it is 
becoming very risky to deviate from that way.  Political equilibriums (eg nuclear terror 
control) are rigid and becoming unstable because of it.  The only way an information 
society can cope with such potentially violent situations, is to stay in the vicious circle of 
programming and vulnerability.  The more programming is involved, the more vulnerable 
a system becomes, which then needs and justifies increased programming.  This 
increases and supports another drawback of the information society, that of a heightened 
concentration of power which benefits the few.  It leaves no place for humankind's ability 
to marvel and to surprise (Dupuy 1980:17). 
 
2.4 Information society and the element of surprise 
 
We seem to have lost our ability to be surprised by things such as discoveries (big and 
small) and rediscoveries, the new and the unexpected.  Perhaps in our contemporary 
world of finding triumph in collecting, storing and accessing seemingly limitless supplies 
of knowledge, very little space remains for anything to surprise us.  The only surprise we 
may still experience is when we encounter an unsuccessful search on the Internet, for 
example.  Manipulation leaves very little room for chance. The domination of machines or 
more specifically, information technology, is all about manipulation.   
 
Software-controlled machinery alienates us from physical work.  Our experience of it has 
been effectively neutralised and made predictable.  Abstraction is not without its benefits 
to us, but an unchecked loss of the world can be disastrous for humans (Talbott 2002).  
Human nature is essential to meaningful information.  Information that is apart from 
humans is meaningless, and because of this information is never power since humans 
can have power with or without information (Cox 2001:56).  Being human, we cannot 
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continue to learn anything if we hold fixed ideas, or schematic views, on everything, as 
this leaves no room for surprise or creation. Also, the properties of the observed object 
must be taken into account. If you made an object yourself, its complexity (the 
information that escapes you) will be nil. This missing information decreases with the 
increase of constraints one impose on a system. Surprise is a property on which the 
richness of life is grounded. To illustrate this, Dupuy (1980:14) uses the automaton as an 
example. He uses it, not to mean a combination of articulated parts, but rather a 
mathematical being that may be put in concrete form as a mechanical or electrical 
system. This system is constituted by a stimuli-response system (a well-defined input-
output relationship). Such a system, though, is called trivial, and its behaviour cannot 
surprise us.  
 
On the other hand, a non-trivial machine consists of several input-output relationships. It 
includes a certain determinism according to which the passage from one relationship to 
the other takes place. In spite of the system being deterministic, it will seem 
unforeseeable in its effects and seem to have a certain autonomy, if we are ignorant of its 
determinism.  For us, though, the machine is trivial, according to the quantity of 
information that will measure our ignorance about it.  Important here is that the property 
of being trivial is not intrinsic to the observed object.  It is rather characteristic of the 
representation made by the observer (Dupuy 1980:14-15).  It is typical, for example, of a 
person who thinks in terms of simple relations, and who is unlikely to consider others as 
anything more than trivial machines because of the limited attention paid by such a 
person to others (Dupuy 1980:15).  It is these 'others' that are needed for the criticism 
and explanation of an action, especially since the action may also be criticised and 
explained by someone else, and not only by the individual.   
 
Such rationalisation, according to Wersig (1990:190), is about more than the object of 
discourses, and is also the object of historical development.  That which is considered 
rational depends on the dimension of time it appears in.  For example, in the archaic or 
mythical dimension, the world was understood according to myths, magic, etc.  At that 
time those schemes were rational.  The same holds true for the dimension focused on 
religious systems as framework for rationalisation, that is, belief was rational.  Even in the 
later criticism of the Renaissance, remains of archaism and cultural religion can be found. 
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 This critique, though, led to two developments simultaneously, of which the roots lie in 
the previous dimensions.  The one development was ideological, containing a large part 
of the cultural religious structure, but religious belief was replaced by persuasion.  The 
other development was scientific, revolving around calculus based on empirical evidence, 
also referred to as the cause-effect-hypothesis, including uniform laws, empirical truth, 
and logical consistency (Wersig 1990:191).  It is this latter scientific model that is the 
dominating basis of rational behaviour in the contemporary information society. 
 
Two historical developments pivotal to our experience of the world, changed that 
experience.  The first is mathematical time with the invention of the clock (thirteenth 
century).  Humans previously depended on the organic nature of duration and rhythm, 
such as the seasons, mood and activity.  The clock, on the other hand, introduced 
humans to time as measurable sequences, alienated from human events and 
subordinating the authority of natural events.  In return we received a monotonous, 
uniform time-line of identical moments.  Disengagement and detachment from 
interrelated events turn us into observers instead of participants, leading to a loss of 
meaning and elimination of surprise (Talbott 2002).  The second historical movement 
towards abstraction is mathematical space.  It is probably not that surprising to find 
evidence of uniform, mathematical space in the techniques of artists.  Linear perspective 
was developed during the Renaissance, allowing space to be presented to the artist 
independently of things.  Space does not vary anymore according to the nature and 
quality of the interaction of people.  The scientific revolution replaced the plastic quality of 
space for something passive, uniform, a container to be filled, totally predictable and not 
space for surprise (at least not for the artist or creator of that space).  ASpace now 
contains the objects by which it was [formally] created@ (Talbott 2002). 
 
An independent mathematical world came about.  Even though it is rational behaviour 
that distinguishes us from animals, the scientific model brings us closer to being similar to 
machines.  Such a scientific model, based on the idea of calculus, underplay the 
aesthetic potentials of humans.  Examples of these aesthetic potentials are phantasy, 
play, mysteries, emotions, confidence, happiness, sadness, etc.  These very potentials of 
aesthetics make humans unique, and include the potentials of calculus.  Humans have 
the ability to control, mix, and let these potentials of aesthetics and calculus interact. 
 
 
51 
Dominant in contemporary society is the  results of a singular focus on the potentials of 
calculus.  An example is expert systems which follow a linear rational argument that there 
exists for every problem various solutions, and these options are evaluated by a calculus 
which is filled with data (if relevant it will become information).  Ideally all of this will lead 
to a solution, and if not then a decision will bridge such an information-gap. (Wersig 
1990:190-192). 
 
Wersig (1990:192) names a number of reasons why a description of the world of an 
information society where we behave like calculators or machines, is not acceptable.  
The first is that even though problems need to be solved, it is in the nature of human 
beings to avoid or even suppress problems or possible conflict as far as possible.  When 
errors cannot be avoided we need the right action to achieve the best in addressing it. 
The second reason is that solutions are seldom approached using existing calculi.  
Solutions are developed out of the situation at hand and appropriate to the problem.  A 
calculus should be used because it is appropriate and valid in a given situation, and not 
because it is there. Thirdly, and related to the second reason, appropriate data is not 
always available as describable calculus since no one has thought of it before.  Lastly, it 
is more often than not about finding information that we trust because of a trustworthy 
source.  The more our decisions depend on information, the more important it becomes 
that the information is timely, valid, accurate, complete, contextual, and seen as truth. 
Pure information requires calculus, but the kind of information that fits not only an 
appropriate calculus but also our personalities, is what we are looking for.  For this to be 
possible the idea of calculus sometimes needs to be suspended.  A world of perfect 
bureaucracies or functionalised environments will hopefully not be the future of societies 
(Wersig 1990:192-193). 
 
Steve Talbott (2002), for example, shows how the following developments benefit  
society. The printing press and the resultant printed book, dominant since the fifteenth 
century, have to a large extent contributed to setting us free from the immediate and the 
local. Existence in text made a greater impression than actual events. In the nineteenth 
century the telegraph took this freedom further by releasing us from the physical 
transportation of communication. Information and text became decontextualised with little 
relation to communities, people, and places where we live. Information became 
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fragmented, isolated, and irrelevant to our lives at large. We do not, therefore participate 
anymore in the traditional sense, but have become spectators of or audience to news 
events, etc.  
 
Think back on the effect of Shannon=s information theory and its consequent impact on 
information technology and a new kind of decontextualisation. Seeing as how our world 
increased in complexity, it is not too surprising that the >tearing apart= of people from their 
organic connections to the immediate world may even be inevitable. We now seek 
abstraction, the will to disembodiment, the rhythm and predictability of clock time, and 
bits of information uncluttered by our material existence. This almost self destructive 
tendency to deliberately ignore the qualities of things and the insistence upon 
disengagement from physical existence, remains a threat (Talbott 2002).  
 
The negative aspects can be turned to our benefit if we recognise the positive potentials 
of the predicament we find ourselves in, especially if we can successfully balance the  
calculative and meditative potentials of people into a comprehensive way of thinking. We 
need a positive breather from all the negativity that reference to the myths or broken 
promises of an information society that is shown as isolated, fragmented, alienated from 
its surrounding world, brings about (Talbott 2002). Using television news (or any other 
media) as an example, the possibility of an effort to fully integrate, or reintegrate 
fragments of news, locally and globally, without some appearance of disjointedness and 
incoherence, is seldom feasible.  
 
We will be overwhelmed if we attempted to try and sustain a constant level of interest 
and deep involvement regarding global awareness. It is necessary to remain free enough 
to be able to contribute meaningfully to our immediate community needs as well. The 
abstract distance between us and the rest of the world is unavoidable, but now we have 
the freedom to choose how and where we want to become connected and concerned in 
the world (Talbott 2002). 
 
The inheritance of decontextualisation and its manipulation allows us to form our own 
meanings from a disparate whole. There are no longer  traditional social or natural 
surroundings that supply us with a given coherence and meaning. The spectator 
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becomes a new kind of individual participant in meaning creation. Abstraction frees us 
from the world, but comes with the danger of being caught up in the distancing effect of 
abstraction. Freedom from a compelling world comes with its own responsibilities and a 
new sense of community becomes essential to survival and making the most of our 
freedom (Talbott 2002). To truly become community, we may do well to avoid losing truly 
human features, such as the readiness to handle risk or overcome the fear of risk, the 
readiness to take responsibility instead of shifting personal responsibility to calculi or 
systems. 
 
We should not let occasions to develop self-esteem slip through our fingers, and  accept 
the consequences of our decisions, especially when it comes to unforeseen 
circumstances (Wersig 1990:193). More human-focused systems may serve as decision-
support systems, rather than decision-making, to decide on appropriate action in the face 
of risk and uncertainty.  This goes beyond a purely scientific, reductionist, oversimplified 
approach.   
 
Moving away from a one-sided focus allows for the complexity of situations faced in 
contemporary society to be recognised (Kochen 1983a:278).  The postmodern space of 
interior reflection and the allowance for alternative interpretations is the space in which 
we are free, and the manipulation of text and its consequent arbitrary relation to context, 
is the context of contemporary society (Hayles 1987:26; Talbott 2002).  Decision-making, 
problem-solving, creativity are all involved and affected by being put into action and how 
such action relates to power.  
 
2.5 Power and action in an information society  
 
Power is the ability, capacity, or skill, to do something; madness, for example, is another 
way of doing and controlling abilities.  Power is control and influence over other people 
and their actions.  Power is the authority to act or do something according to a law or 
rule.  When we define power, we need the concept of action. Action is doing something 
toward a goal, or a process of doing something in order to achieve a purpose.  For this 
we need power in the sense of physical strength, whether it is the power of personal 
conviction, or having been persuaded to achieve a goal by a person or authority wielding 
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power (eg political, social, financial).  Action is movement B the way somebody or 
something moves or works, or the movement itself.  Action is thus a function (the way in 
which something functions) or influence (the effect it produces).  In mechanical terms 
action is the force applied to a body, relating to power.  Action, though, is not only forced 
behaviour, but can also be voluntary or intended behaviour.  Action as part of society is a 
form of power. Human action should be open, and be for the betterment of humans, and 
not for oppression.   
 
One should seriously consider the function of science and technology in society in order 
to understand the position of human beings in the contemporary world. This includes 
scientific thinking, development, innovation, compassion, and curiosity. Interdisciplinary 
interaction should lead us to knowledge implementation. This is also the crucial link 
between an information society and information science, a special kind of relationship in 
which we can speak of a society of informatisation.  Informatisation is the actualisation of 
meaningful information, taking place in the information society which, in turn, is the milieu 
of meaningful information. 
 
Knowledge can be transformed into action once a theory has been given meaning 
through its application, whether as a physical system or as an action leading to further 
study.  Our knowledge, ideally, should make our actions not only possible but successful, 
especially if the act of speech ultimately culminates in powerful action.  The power of 
instrumental reason as well as the cynical reasoning of institutionalised power, is 
something we seem to have very few forces with which to resist such overwhelming and 
determined power. 
 
The act of invention (Ulmer 1990:159), is one way of creating goals independent of 
predetermined goals.  Inventing as we go along still requires structure as leverage on 
handling unforeseen circumstances and problems arising. Taking such action, is an act of 
taking responsibility back from the institutionalised forms of theory and practice.  
Changes in the relationship between institutions and society involves the disintegration of 
boundaries between truth and action. Adorno (2000:6) points out that theory and practice 
do not fit together neatly and are definitely not one and the same thing.  The tension that 
exists between the two is crucial to the existence of both.  Theory that has no relation to 
practice will in time break down into a complacent game, or become a piece of dead  
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scholarship.  It is rendered indifferent to our living minds and active human beings.  
The same is true of a practice that freed itself from the constraints of a theory and 
rejected thought on the grounds of its own superiority.  Such practice leads to 
meaningless and continuous organising of things, and the belief that one has achieved 
something of importance.  It does not reflect on whether such activities have a chance of 
impinging on reality at all.  The objective possibility of being made real in practice 
becomes less if everything only relates to the pure will.  Theory needs to want to achieve 
something, that is, from spontaneity, the immediate, and active reaction to particular 
situations, for a valid practice to be possible.  For society to have the power to shape its 
own future, it needs resistance to the idea that theory and practice do not fill the gaps in 
each other (Adorno 2000:6-7; Ulmer 1990:157-161). A common world (a common, 
material world), created by invention and making, is necessary for the existence of 
human history, action, and encounter. Such a common world unites humankind and 
makes communication possible, with or without conflict. At the same time, this common 
world also separates them. Dupuy (1980:5) uses an effective example, that of a table that 
brings people together because it stands between them. Either extreme, ie total isolation 
or indiscriminate proximity, would be detrimental to communication.  The industrial 
capitalism that the information society inherited, does not value personal relationships.  It 
alienates people from one another, instead of recognising that people are united in their 
ability to create, invent, and can still be caught by surprise. 
 
Action in the form of surprise and creativity, crucial elements in invention, indicates to us 
the strong human accent of knowledge endeavours, the existence of which cannot be 
denied. The traditional view that only knowledge that is free from mere human interests 
can truly orient action, is rejected.  Knowledge is seen, not as disinterested, but as 
conditioned by human interests.  True freedom from blind domination can only be 
achieved in a totally emancipated society of autonomous, responsible persons, or, as a 
community (Hoy 1986:132). The ideal held out may be freedom from coercive social 
power by freeing knowledge and reason from ideologically coerced distortion. The so-
called >freedom= from material things predicted for the information society could block 
communication, leading to the opposite happening, for example in the form of 
consumerism. In truth, the relationships between people are defined by the process of 
creating things together, building a common world. Such a common world is therefore 
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created by making. This makes action and interaction possible, and because action is 
transient it needs to be actualised and fixed in memory. The real danger is the insistent 
presence of consumerism (through material things which we are supposed to be freed 
from) replacing action and creation, because of its distrust in the risks such action poses. 
 Displacing or denying action cannot be desirable, as action is necessary to beget history, 
it offers meaning and direction, and actualises history into memory by the efforts of poets 
and historians. To act is to have power, especially if human action is open.  
 
History-making offers an understanding of humans in contemporary society, and 
understanding is always a form of power. It is imperative for humankind to avoid 
becoming mere spectators, instead of being participants, in their own history. Thought 
exists in every action and it is essential to see and understand on which modes of 
thought accepted practices rest. (De Beer 1998b:90-91; Foucault 1981:31-34; Wersig 
1993:230-233). 
 
What, then, truly distinguishes an information society from an industrial one? The major 
difference is the new intellectual tools used by societies to obtain an image of 
themselves, examine themselves, and then to represent themselves. Another difference 
is the replacement of the mechanistic representations of society. This was brought about 
by major progress in the 1960's and 1970's in biology, theory of cognition, and the 
general theory of systems. The mechanistic representations of society has largely been 
replaced, in the human sciences, by a phenomenal growth in scientific progress, 
especially in thermodynamic, biological, cybernetic, organisational, and informational 
metaphors. Some of these offered rich content, but most were advanced without the 
necessary precautions and were indiscriminately adopted without determining its worth 
(Dupuy 1980:6). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
Power relations have been altered forever, while society still clings to those power 
perceptions inherited from a very dominant and far-reaching industrial era. Meaningful 
information and its configuration through information science, from which action flows, is 
important because scientific progress influences the meanings people appropriate from 
information as represented by progress.  People interpret and experience developments 
in unique and uncontrolled ways not necessarily foreseen by those involved in scientific 
work.  To be able to understand how people experience and react to their environment, it 
is necessary to take into consideration not only how the individual views himself or 
herself as 'being-in-the-world' (dasein), but also how the individual as part of a group 
exists, reacts, creates and experiences within society at large.  At present we call this 
society an information society.  Dasein at the same time is also beyond the world in 
which it exists.  The next chapter focuses not only on the relations of people to each 
other, but also on the world within which they find themselves. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ONTOLOGICAL MILIEU OF MEANINGFUL INFORMATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter relates to the information society in the sense that the individual does not 
stand in isolation.  The individual forms part of a larger society whether it is an 
information society or otherwise.  The individual not only relates to the world around him 
or her, but also to others as well as objects in that world or worlds. These relations 
impact on our meaning-making of knowledge irrespective of it being scientific, social, 
cultural or personal knowledge. This chapter also considers Heidegger=s concept of 
Dasein. It is necessary to understand our relations with others and the world, as well as 
the implications for meaningful information if such relations are objectivised.  Such an 
understanding is important since humans, as individuals and with others are essentially 
meaning-giving beings.  The ontological milieu is the social environment of the essence 
and nature of being or existence of things.  
 
3.2 Meaning of being (world) and meaningful information 
 
The meaning of the world as we perceive it indicates a concern with cognitive capacities, 
that is perception and action, and not only with higher capacities such as language and 
memory. There are also approaches that do not recognise the influence of the individual 
human being, but only as a part of a larger meaning-giving structure. This is discussed in 
detail by Tasiƒ (2001) who refers to the viewpoint of structuralism that the science-
structure develops of its own internal necessity, and is independent of the intentions of 
individuals (eg Cavaillès, Lévi-Strauss, and Saussure). To these thinkers the individual 
human being=s personal desires and intentions are irrelevant, and it is something larger 
that speaks through someone when trying to prove a theorem or tell a story.  
 
Through the rise of the new or modern mathematics, for example, formalism was 
introduced due to the perception of the social sciences as methodologically weak (Dupuy 
& Varela 1992:18-19; Tasiƒ 2001:112-113).  On the other hand we have those (eg 
Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) who strongly focused on understanding 
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the human being in his or her existence, not as a passive being and not always the 
same, but as a human in 'becoming' and forever changing.  Human existence is therefore 
not approached as a biologically fixed, measurable and predictable fact, but as a lifelong 
project.  This approach is referred to as Existentialism (the Latin word existere means to 
stand out, to come forward, to become) and has a close relationship to Phenomenology 
(Van Vuuren 1988:214-215). The intention is not to discuss these developments. It is 
mentioned to indicate that the two strongest opposing groups were those that were 
humanistically inclined (eg intuitionism, phenomenology, existentialism) and those who 
focused purely on structure and form (eg formalism, structuralism, linguistics). Yet the 
two groups are never mutually exclusive as these movements had and still have 
influences on each other (especially methodologically and philosophically).  These 
movements are important because they offer different ways of approaching and 
understanding, for example, meaning and language. 
 
Our focus gives prominence to the human being, since our main concern is the 
configuration of meaningful information by humans for humans (involving interaction).  
Meaning may be determined by a variety of human and nonhuman factors. This does not 
render other approaches invalid or useless. The following paragraphs, then, are about 
dasein (subject) and the self, and its relation to its worlds.  The discussion of Dasein is 
important in the consideration of meaningful information.  The reason for this is that it 
sheds light on the complexity of relations in which Dasein lives and from which the 
meaningfulness of things are drawn.  This constitutes the context within which a person 
understands him/herself and his or her world. 
 
3.3 Meaningfulness and Dasein 
 
How the individual person views him- or herself as being-in-the-world6 (whether as part of 
a social group or in the global sense) also determines his or her relation to others and the 
world (or different worlds within which others may appear). This in turn will have a strong 
effect on how meaningfulness is determined or even rejected. It may play a role in why 
and how an individual or a group distanced him-, her-, or themselves from the meaning of 
                                                 
6The hyphens indicate that the human and his/her world cannot be thought of separately (Van 
Vuuren 1988:216). 
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particular information (eg cultural or personal rejection). Dasein can be translated with 
'being-there', and defined as the kind of being whose mode of being is to be concerned 
with its being. Heidegger's Dasein can be explained as being-in-the-world; being destined 
to be a being that is open to Being.  Dasein is to transcend existing in the world and be a 
being-toward-Being, and to experience Being in the process.  This reality of Being is the 
goal of Dasein's existence; to experience Being as it manifests in history.   
 
The self is also future-directed and concerned to care for its being.  The process of 
looking ahead also constitutes the past, similar to time being constituted by looking 
ahead, and involves Aa living towards the future and not  simply a living out of the past@ 
(Kruger 1988:91).  The past is future-directed because we not only think of the past as it 
was, but also as it could have been.  The continuity of lost time is constituted by 
intertwining empirical recollections with interpretative actions.  It is not simply a matter of 
cause and effect. 
 
According to Tasiƒ (2001), Brouwer described the self as felt, experienced, and lived. The 
self is never given with logical certainty because it is not meant to be around forever, 
especially since it is also a mortal body. It indicates the futility of seeking some final and 
ultimate certainty. This has to do with the danger, pointed out by Brouwer, of forgetting 
the human being as central to scientific endeavours. The example quoted in Tasiƒ 
(2001:46) of such a danger, is Aconsidering the human body to be an application of the 
science of anatomy.@ 
 
Schelling (Tasiƒ 2001:121) refers to a particular mode of thinking, that is, not Descartes= 
AI think, therefore I am,@ but rather AI am in a particular way.@ Stated otherwise, as being 
in the mode that is called thinking. One may therefore be at liberty to use one=s 
imagination to produce meaning for oneself. One may feel compelled, for some or other 
reason, to justify this private meaning by taking into consideration other outside or public 
criteria, even though one does not have to blindly follow the practices of a community 
(George 2000:17; Tasiƒ 2001:42-46, 120-122).  It is what we think about that we are 
concerned with and in what way we think about our world (Kruger 1988:12).
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The human being has a physical bodilyness that cannot be ignored.  The human being in 
his/her world implies that the human and his/her world are not independent entities.  
Humans are 'embodied' persons and the world is not simply external stimuli or only 
physical reality.  It is a human world as experienced by humans (Van Vuuren 1988:216-
217).  The mechanistic viewpoint of the body as a machine controlled by biochemical 
processes have been strongly disputed, and as our discussion indicates here is too one-
sided to be accepted.  Such a view also splits the subject from the object, as we see in 
the radical dualism of Descartes, also called Cartesian dualism.  The duality that 
Descartes put forward is between mind and body and human being and world, thus 
having a twofold reality (Kruger 1988:12-13). The human body appears or lives in 
different, yet simultaneous, worlds, as will be explained next. 'World' has environmental 
and communal dimensions, and is the matrix or horizon of Dasein's total relatedness to 
others and entities (relational totalities) and the matrix of total meaningfulness.   
 
This total relatedness of Dasein has the world as its 'wherein' B  this is not in the spatial 
sense, but it is the convergence of all patterns of referential totalities (including the 
environmental and the social worlds) which reflects the nature of the community (George 
2000:90-93).  It is about how humans are in the world and how the world appears to 
human beings.  The world and human beings are correlations of each other and implies a 
coexistence of human/person and of world/situation.  The one cannot be considered or 
thought of without the other and is therefore in a dialectic relationship.  It is only alone 
through the world that the self can be understood. To be able to understand human 
beings, we need to understand all the worlds in which human beings exist and 
experience.  This includes our existence in the world of instincts and determinism, the 
world of responsibility towards others, and the world of our own individual existence and 
the meaning of our existence (Van Vuuren 1988:217-218). The world belongs to Dasein 
and is Dasein's system of total relatedness. The world, then, as the matrix of relational 
totalities, is in Dasein's own being.  The meaningfulness of these relational systems can 
be understood in one's own being or existence. (George 2000:90-93). 
 
Dasein allows entities to be involved in finding meaningfulness.  Stated differently, 
Dasein frees the 'ready-to-hand' for meaning by allowing the involvement of entities.  The 
totality of involvements is the world within which the entities can have their involvement.  
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The world is not a collection of things, but a matter of Dasein being in the matrix of 
relational and referential totalities. The matrix of meaningfulness is also called 
significance. The world is a referential totality established intersubjectively.  In this it is 
possible for Dasein to interact with other entities, human and otherwise. There are as 
many worlds as there are different meaningful or significant referential totalities (eg work-
world, academic-world).  The relationships between and within the environmental and 
social worlds represent its complexity and the totality of its meaningfulness. It must not 
be understood as Dasein creating the world, but as Dasein's way of giving meaning to 
the existential relational complex within which he/she finds him/herself (George 2000:93-
94;132).   
 
We, as being-in-the-world (Dasein) not only model the world according to ourselves, but 
interpret ourselves according to the world constituted by us (Van Vuuren 1988:217). On 
the other hand, if 'world' is seen as a term loaded with meaning, then it can be a matter of 
creating a world.  Heidegger, though, does not make meaning the property of Dasein at 
the cost of the reality of things, and only stresses the importance of the role Dasein plays 
in the meaning-giving act and the secondary meaningfulness of entities. Three possible 
>places= of meaning are (i) in the mind of the author/speaker; (ii) in the world shared by 
speaker and audience; and/or (iii) the world shared by author and readers B >author= and 
>reader= here indicate those of written text as well as visual images, or of any other 
representations of information (Barwise 1988:23; George 2000:133-141).  Kruger, quoted 
in Van Vuuren (1988:218), said that Aman7 is a being which is always open for all the 
things-that-are.@ Dasein can be seen as having a passive as well as active relationship to 
its world or places of meaning. 
 
Against this background it is necessary for us to look specifically at the relations we have 
to others and the world, as well as the necessity and danger of objectivising those 
relations.  The other place of meaning, the representations of information, relates to this 
objectification. 
                                                 
7The human as Dasein, or 'being-there.' 
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3.4 Relations with others and the world 
 
From the previous paragraph it should be clear that, even as individuals, we do not stand 
in isolation.  We share our world with others who are in the world in the same way as we 
are.  To be human Ameans being in relation to others@ (Kruger 1988:81).  This is an 
interpersonal understanding of what it constitutes to be a human being, from our birth to 
our passing away.  We are in touch with one another, it is part of being-with-one another. 
 Heidegger (Kruger 1988:83) called it AMitsein.@ To illustrate this, Kruger explains that 
loneliness can only be possible because people tend to be with one another, and 
loneliness is part of each individual's primary experience.  We stand in relation to others 
through sharing the things of our world and encountering things together in that shared 
world (Kruger 1988:83, 86).  This does not refer only to a 'friendly' kind of sharing, but 
also to other kinds even if they are in animosity, real or imagined.  
 
Our relations with other people form part of the AMitwelt@ or 'with'world8 (Van Vuuren 
1988:217). A person is not only an individual that stands in relation to other people and 
the world, but is also part of a group consciousness.  The self and the 'matrix of 
meaningfulness' within which he or she is situated, also influences, and are influenced 
by, others.  Even in total isolation, that isolation of being and existence conveys 
something about the relation of the isolated self to others and the world.  Yet, we need to 
allow for the involvement of other entities to be able to free the ready-to-hand for 
meaning.  This allows for meaning other than those meaning/s already held by Dasein. It 
is important to avoid both the temptation of ultimate grounding as external references into 
an ultimate reason and truth (order); and the temptation of complete absence of any 
regularity and disconnection from any order at all. (Dupuy & Varela 1992:22-23). 
Interesting in Tasiƒ (2001: 47) is the reference to Nietzsche's viewpoint that the world as 
displayed by logic and science is not the objective world, but is based on a previous 
interpretation.  The apparent world is therefore the only one and the so-called real world, 
                                                 
8 AMitwelt@ forms part of the three simultaneous aspects of being-in-the-world which is 
characteristic of the existence of people.  The other two worlds are AUmwelt@ (the world around us, ie 
of objects, the natural, biological world of natural laws and cycles, and biological determinism; and 
AEigenwelt@ (selfworld, selfrealisation, My-Self, relationship with myself; subjective and inner-
experience as well as the basis on which we see the world in its true perspective and on which we 
enter into relationship; what something in the world means to me).  Van Vuuren 1988:217-218. 
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a lie. The postmodern approach was an important break from institutionalised sciences, 
and traditional patterns of exploration, observation, and participation.  One cannot remain 
in such a state, since time and space continues to change, mutate and demand 
alternative approaches.  A willingness to be open to the unknown means that we accept 
the meaning in everything that exists or 'is'.  This includes that which is technique 
(mystery is also present in the technical sense) and that which has not been created or 
discovered by human beings.  Also included is the acceptance that meaning is not 
always public or accessible.   
 
Sometimes non-sense is more prominent than sense, and that which is at the same time 
public and hidden, is mystery. That which is external to the human influence plays a 
definitive role in what humans do and do not do (De Beer 1991:22).  There is also a 
realisation of the impossibility and undesirability of seeking one ultimate truth, of 
approaching our world as something to be merely discovered by our enquiring gaze of 
objective observation.  Scientific experimenting is not merely the true observation and 
exposing of facts as it is revealed.  Rather, it implies complex interaction between 
theoretical concepts and observation, between scientists through discussions, and 
choices that need to be enacted. This may imply that meaningful information is not 
something already existing 'out there'.  Meaning is never fixed B Derrida refers to the play 
of meanings. Differing from the phenomenological position, Derrida suggested that 
experience is not an immediate temporal presence alone. Such an immediate experience 
needs to place itself across or against something else to be experienced at all. That 
experience is already influenced by preexisting experiences, and the meaning of that 
experience of an object for example, cannot therefore be fixed or stabilised. This process 
of change is called the >dissemination of meaning= (Reynolds 2002). Existence of the 
subject as a being that >is=, is not undivided and self-contained as a self-presence, and 
the immediacy of experience not possible. In this Derrida seems to have seen 
phenomenology not as separate from metaphysics, but as a >metaphysics of presence= or 
logocentrism (Reynolds 2002). 
 
The objectification of relations to others and the world is already referred to in the chapter 
on the information society, regarding the commodification of information.  It is used in this 
chapter to illustrate that a very real danger to the >play= or richness of meaning is the 
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objectification and commodification of relations and information.  The reason for this 
choice is that what has proven to be detrimental to our relations with others and the 
world, is the objectification of those relations. To reify something, is to think or treat 
something abstract as if it existed as a tangible object. To objectify, is to think of or 
represent an idea or emotion as if it were something that actually exists; it is also to 
reduce something complex and multifaceted, to the status of a simple object (Encarta 
Concise English dictionary 2001, sv >objectify=; >reify=). 
 
We are concerned here with the danger of producing values which do not allow for the 
depth of meaning and understanding we seek. The approach in contemporary economic 
structures seems to be towards economical needs only, ignoring that which is truly 
meaningful and enriching. Capitalism, though, needed the development of a service 
economy to ensure its indefinite continuation. This leads to further alienation instead of 
communal harmony that it purports to support. Waste has been the key mover of 
capitalist development. This includes the waste of raw materials, energy, human space, 
and time. The saturation of consumers= material needs was avoided through innovation 
and a decrease in the life-span of material goods. These >new= products (same product, 
new name) contained even more un-renewable raw material. The resultant energy and 
ecological crises sparked an awareness in the capitalist approach that it needed 
decentralised locations to move its problems to. Economic growth was given a new base, 
called the new international economic order. This new growth entailed simply to send 
industries to Third World countries as their new base. This meant that problems such as 
pollution, industrial-related illnesses, and the disruption of time and space, are made 
someone else=s problem. The so-called information society ideally could now truly focus 
on the nonpolluting growth of immaterial productions and service-based economies. 
Marx, then, is quite prophetic in having stated that A ... capitalism begins when human 
labor loses its power to produce use values for the worker ... , thus transforming labor 
into a commodity which has only an exchange value for the worker@ (Dupuy 1980:6-7). 
 
The worker is therefore turned into a commodity through the reification of the working or 
production relations. The energy and ecological crises make it impossible for capitalism 
to use traditional avenues of economic development. It needs to transform other 
relations, that humankind has to people and the world, into commodities. All of this effort 
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is in pursuit of growth, and the main reason for the large scale development of services. 
The concepts of use value and commodity are now applied to areas foreign to them. This 
brings us to the two modes of production that can be used to produce any use value, ie 
an autonomous and a heteronomous mode of production.  (Dupuy 1980:7-8). 
 
An autonomous mode of production implies self-governance, personal freedom, 
independency from others, or the will guided by its own principles (Chambers= 21st 
century ... 1996, sv >autonomous=).  In this mode, for example, we learn knowledge and 
meaning by becoming familiar with that which is part of life inside a meaningful 
environment. People stay healthy through leading a wholesome life, and render services 
to those who need it, while avoiding the danger of structuring their lives in terms of how 
others live (Kruger 1988:88).  It is such care of oneself and of others that is the being of 
Dasein, and the opposite of indifference.  The freedom of the individual therefore does 
not mean indifference but a greater responsibility.  Because we have freedom of choice 
and decision, we also have responsibility and even guilt.  Human freedom's boundaries 
are determined by our unique situations, that is, we have the freedom of choice within a 
certain situation (Kruger 1988:88-89). The care of others also form part of heteronomy. 
One has an active relationship with the space in which one lives, and is based on 
movements that feed metabolic energy. Especially important to remember of an 
autonomous mode of production, is the fact that what is produced by this mode of 
production cannot be measured, estimated, compared with, or added to other values. 
Use values produced in this mode escape the control of economists or national 
accountants. 
 
A heteronomous mode of production involves being subject to different external rules or 
laws, and is the combination of various aspects, usually not associated with each other, 
within one system (Chambers 21st century ... 1996, sv >heteronomous=). Within this mode 
the learning of meaning and the acquiring of knowledge, for example,  takes place within 
the walls of a professional institution.  It is a formal way of learning, whereas the 
autonomous mode is informal and personal. People stay healthy through the care of 
others, and also refer those needing help to the relevant people who provide those 
services. Yet, heteronomy and autonomy are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
autonomous use values may be enhanced by the heteronomous mode of production; or 
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the professional, predetermined curriculum may enrich what people do on their own or 
through mutual aid. (Dupuy 1980:7-8). 
 
The paradox of the service economy lies in the rearrangement of the physical, 
institutional, and symbolic environment by the heteronomous production of values. Such 
a thorough restructuring paralyses the autonomous ability to produce use values. The 
resultant paradoxical effect, then, is that the heteronomous service-producing institutions 
bring into play ever-increasing pervasive means. As a result we confuse education with 
the educational system, habitation with urbanisation, or health with the medical 
establishment. This is caused in particular by the commodification and objectification of 
our relations with others and the world, and even oneself. The drawback of an artificial 
reification, or objectification, or materialisation, lies in the fact that people do not make 
sense the way they make a table. It results in the loss of people=s ability to solve their 
own problems within personal networks. Social struggles become disempowered as the 
capacity of individuals to refuse the unacceptable is weakened and discouraged. 
Humankind has, in history, always been able to cope with threats (such as the 
inevitability of death) by giving them meaning and interpreting them in terms of culture. 
The above problematic is linked to the characteristic of the industrial and postindustrial / 
information societies, where an alarming number of aspects of the human condition are 
becoming meaningless. This is especially because you have to ask how you give 
meaning to something that you are trying to eliminate at all costs. (Dupuy 1980:8-9). 
 
This elimination, or disempowerment, creates >meaningless= spaces due to a capitalist 
society breaking with a traditional experience of space (>experienced space=) based on 
connectivity. The continuous, connective path people had to any two points in that space, 
has been fragmented (or disconnected). The personal space of each individual has 
become distinct and distant centres. The perceived world acquires a falseness because 
we have become spectators instead of participants. Such spectator status places one in 
a position of illusory omnipotence with regard to how the world is represented as 
something that passes by and vanishes from sight. The myth of transportation systems, 
for example, is based on such a restructuring of space and time. The myth is one of 
coalescence, a return to a person=s traditional neighbourhood through the cancellation of 
the meaningless kind of space-time. An example is the global network brought about by 
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the presence of airports which makes the whole world seem present. Yet we notice that 
for the majority of people the global village connectivity is a loose web through which it is 
easy to slip through or become entrapped (Dupuy 1980:9-10). The objectification of 
relations and information, has implications for the configuration of knowledge 
(representation being one of those implications), and our making sense of things and the 
world.  Sense and meaning, in their individual meanings, are very close. The word 'sense' 
has two basic, very important definitional foci. The first focus is that it is any of the five 
faculties used to obtain information about the external or internal environment, ie touch, 
smell, sight, taste and hearing. The second focus is to be aware of something by means 
other than the five senses.   
 
Meanings vary quite a bit, such as sense being an awareness or appreciation, the ability 
to make judgements, soundness of mind, one's wits or reason, a general feeling or 
emotion, understanding, general and overall meaning, specific meaning, and even 
consensus, wisdom (to be wise) and that it possesses practical worth. As a verb it 
includes the act of sensibility and rationality after a period of foolishness (coming to your 
senses)! (Chambers 21st century ... 1996, sv 'sense').  We could relate these varied 
definitions of 'sense' to the different ways we have and acquire meaning.  Even if 
something does not make sense to us, for example, it still has meaning that may be 
closed to us, understood by someone else, or at another time and/or in a different 
context.  We seem to accept more readily something as true or probable if it makes 
sense to us.  We make sense of things and the world, often in a world in which we 
objectify perceptions through symbols and representations for it to make sense to us. 
 
It is necessary to realise that another kind of objectification also takes place, which is a 
positive aspect taken from the romanticist and intuitionist Bouwer, as discussed in depth 
in Tasiƒ (2001:45-48).  It is referred to here only in brief and it forms part of Bouwer's 
views on language, the will, and mathematics.  Bouwer describes the real world as an 
apparition, and that one's exterior world consists of things that are essentially only 
sequences of one's own thoughts.  The world's perceived form is essentially the act of 
the will.  How this relates to objectification and language is as follows.  The construction 
of objects is in thought, Athat is, of persistent, permanent things (simple or compound) of 
the perceptional world, so that at the same time the perceptional world becomes 
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stabilized@ (Tasiƒ 2001:47).  Bouwer reminds us that this does not mean that it is merely 
passive thoughts, but acts of the will (active involvement).  It is from this stabilised 
perceptional world that much of our meaning-forming and understanding is influenced 
and determined.  It is our exterior world that we live in and which forms part of, and 
originates from, our perceptional and subconscious worlds. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The way that humans view and experience their existence or being as individuals and 
members of a society, impacts on how they represent and configure information.  The 
aspects covered relate to, and are inseparable from, 'being-there,' and our being with one 
another in a common world, in considering what constitutes meaningful information. Even 
if we may have the opinion that the perception of phenomena >feels= immediate, unique 
and short-lived, we can appreciate how our previous experiences do influence 
experiences we have in future. In the next chapter on the configuration of meaningful 
information, aspects only briefly indicated so far (language, image, unreason, etc) will 
receive attention. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONFIGURATION OF MEANINGFUL INFORMATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter involves the ways in which information and knowledge are configured and 
represented. It is specifically about representation in language, visual images, the role of 
aesthetics, and power and madness. These matters have a most definitive influence on 
what we consider meaningful information to be, or how we configure it. Such 
configuration is not a process with a definite beginning and an end. It is ongoing and 
changing according to happenings in language, imagery, aesthetics, power relations, and 
approaches to madness. Representation appears strongly, because a configuration of 
meaningful information seems to be most often influenced by how we represent our 
knowledge in signs, symbols, images and institutional approaches to madness and 
unreason.  In a similar sense, the way we configure meaningful information will eventually 
determine how we represent it. 
 
4.2 Configuration and representation 
 
To represent something is to present (to pose, suggest, depict) something again, to serve 
as a symbol or sign for something, or correspond to that something.  It is also defined as 
meaning to speak or act on behalf of something else, and it can be an example of 
something.  The most common examples given are an image, painting, sculpture, letters 
representing sound, etc.  In art it represents those artworks which depict objects in a 
realistic rather than an abstract form.  Finally, representation is the doctrine that, in the 
perception of the external world, the immediate object represents another object beyond 
the sphere of consciousness (Chambers 21st century ... 1996, sv 'present', 'represent', 
'representation').  
 
According to Varela (Dupuy & Varela 1992:19), a fundamental shift in cognitive science 
was the questioning of the notion that cognition is representation. The problem such a 
notion held was that it adds up to the tacit and unquestioned commitment to realism or 
objectivism about the way the world is, and how we come to know it. This is because the 
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two assumptions contained in such a notion of cognition as fundamentally 
representational, is that it assumes we inhabit a world with specific properties (length, 
colour, sound, etc); and that we recover these properties via internal representation. Also 
ignored in such an approach are the many ways that the world is, including the different 
worlds of experience, which depend on the structure of the being involved and the kinds 
of distinctions he or she is able to make (as we already indicated in the chapter on being 
and Dasein).  The shift is to a non-objectivist view on how we take our world to be, and it 
covers the approach of people working in diverse fields. Dupuy and Varela (1992:20) call 
it an enactive approach, emphasising that cognition is not the representation of a pre-
given world. Rather, it is the enactment (action) or bringing forth of a world on the basis 
of history. This enactment includes the variety of effective actions that a being can 
perform.   
 
The mind is therefore more than a mirror of nature. Derrida=s critique (as explained in 
McKenna 1992:45) of our notion of representation as the representation of being, of 
being present, or of being as a presence in which representation originates, is of 
importance in any discussion on meaning and meaningful information. Derrida uses 
writing (one of many representational media) as his example for such a critique, 
especially since writing have traditionally been seen as a dangerous supplement to 
verbal speech. This is in spite of the fact that writing proves to be indispensable to the 
establishment of verbal speech itself, even if seemingly chronologically and hierarchically 
second to it.  Writing as an inventive process creates 'new' knowledges and, especially in 
industrialised countries, became the dominant medium of communication. The views of 
Derrida on language is included in the paragraph on language and meaning (Dupuy & 
Varela 1992:18-20; Girard 1992:28).  
 
How we represent knowledge is an indication of how we make sense of things, as well as 
the existence of a process of meaning-making. The meanings of things help us to make 
sense of them. Our meanings of objects shape our experience of them, and our 
experience of objects affects our meanings of them. We use words and images to form 
concepts which refer to existing objects. We are involved with information and its 
representation (fashion, lifestyles, technology) and acquire an understanding of what 
information means. Therefore, it seems that information does not have implied value, but 
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only has value in an appropriate context (time, use, space).  We perform logical 
operations on things after we have seen them in a certain way, because logic does not 
on its own offer an image of the world. This implies also that we approach information not 
only as a recorded, permanent and physical entity, but as separate from its medium of 
expression as well. According to Wersig (1993:231) new technologies are still 
impersonal, but the source has become less important and the use of knowledge more 
personal because of increased interactivity of a different kind of nomadic society. 
Diversification of knowledge representation is good, but not if it leads to artificial 
separation, fragmentation and opposition instead of a focus on complementary 
characteristics (Tasiƒ 2001:46-47; Wersig 1993: 231). 
 
More information does not imply meaningful information, or even useful information (see 
the chapter on the information society). To be usable, information needs to have 
meaning. Thinking is one form of action, and understanding and meaning add further 
usefulness. To allow for meaningful application the research or work done should be 
supported by a wide range of contextual and temporal factors. Context and time may 
change, and could affect changes in knowledge needs; and knowledge needs and 
desires affect changes in space and time. This is important to science since meaningful 
information is often approached as information flowing from digested knowledge and can 
lead to actions and exploration activities.  These activities, then, become possible the 
moment we grasp and make sense of theoretical ideas (De Beer 1994:84-85; De Beer 
1996a:80-81; De Beer 1998b:75-77; Ulmer 1990:159-160; Wersig 1993:232-234).  
Meaning, and therefore knowledge, is represented and shared mainly through language, 
whether the system of representation used is imaging, speech, writing, painting, or 
symbols.  Actionable, meaningful information is affected by the manner of 
communication.  The dynamic nature of language allows for almost infinite variations and 
possibilities of communication and therefore meaning. 
 
4.3 Language and meaning 
 
Language and meaning are two dominant aspects in the meaningfulness of information.  
Much of what we know about the world has been learnt through oral and written linguistic 
communication (people conveying information to other people).  To understand why 
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people attribute different meanings, or meaning at all, we need to understand the how.  
Since language is the main learning (formal and informal) 'tool' of meaning, it needs 
serious consideration. Any sentence or text potentially has a wide range of possible 
meanings. The >right= meaning is a function of what the author means, something only the 
author has access to. The question is whether the correct meaning is that of the author 
alone, thus whether there is a correct meaning at all.  One cannot claim that anyone had 
ever unambiguously known what someone else means, and thus that no one means the 
same thing as someone else. Language, after all, could be seen as a flawed vehicle for 
the communication of the will or intention, and not as a continuous creative flow 
(Bouwer), and error (Nietzsche) might well be one of the conditions of life (Tasiƒ 
2001:46). 
 
Barwise (1988:23-24) identified certain aspects of language interpretation that seem to 
be in conflict, especially when we consider both public and private aspects of meaning as 
vital to understanding. The first aspect is the world-oriented tradition in semantics. This 
approach has focused on the public aspect of meaning. It attempts to identify the 
meaning of a sentence or text with its truth conditions. These are the conditions of the 
actual world that are needed to ensure its truth.  Truth, though, is seen by some as a 
process of creation constructed by the creative subject (Dasein), while others maintain 
that it is a process of revelation, disclosure, or unconcealment.  Linking truth to action, 
truth may also be disclosed through activity which makes it a familiar and reliable part of 
our world.  It is also assimilated into our intuitive understanding, which implies that the 
intuitive and the formal-linguistic aspects influence one another.  Especially of importance 
is the view of Heidegger (as put forward by Tasiƒ 2001:44) that linguistic formalisation is 
necessary, but that ultimate formalistic reductions are impossible and undesirable.  
Heidegger also asserts that the subject (Dasein) is only the guardian of truth, and  not its 
master as in Bouwer's idealism.  
 
The second aspect is the psychological tradition which has focused on the private aspect. 
This aspect tries to identify meaning with an intrinsically meaningful mental 
representation of the logical form of the expression. The speech act school, for example, 
has focused on the view that utterances are actions. This implies then that they have 
consequences like other actions, and see meaning as stemming from these effects of 
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speech acts. The conflict of public and private is experienced in literary interpretation, for 
example, where it is not plausible to apply worldly truth conditions to the meaning of a 
rich and subtle text. On the other hand, an independent characterisation of the meaning 
of a text is needed to measure it against the author=s intentions. Thus the meaning of a 
text is not whatever it was that the author meant, or a representation of the author=s 
intentions (Barwise 1988:23-24; Tasiƒ 2001:44). 
 
It is crucial to realise that the meaning of a word is not intrinsic to it. It cannot be 
exhausted by the particular combination of words and symbols that constitute it.  What 
adds to this is that, due to the growing complexity of social organisation, language 
continues to evolve as a method of imposing order on the entire society.  As language is 
necessary for communication, it can be 'sold' as being morally neutral.  Language is 
therefore turned into a most subtle form of ideology, and acquires the status of thé 
objective carrier of meaning.  Language is turned into such a carrier by subjecting it to 
mathematics-like rules that are claimed to be unquestionable.  It appears that individuals 
are trained to believe that language itself has an ultimate and unambiguous meaning all 
of its own.  This meaning transcends all individuality, and the ego of the individual is 
prevented from perverting the meaning of language and turning it to the individual's own 
advantage.  Such a false belief in the magical character of language is related to the 
quote by Bouwer, at the start of chapter 1 on meaningful information, that meaning does 
not magically spring out of language.  To Bouwer language is an aid that makes social 
organisation possible, and language is not a creative act of individual will.  Language is a 
function of the activity of social human beings. We could state it differently by putting 
forward that any creative and individual act cannot be reduced to language, whether as 
speech or writing (Dupuy 1980:12; Tasiƒ 2001:47-48).  
 
We indicated earlier on that writing was an inventive process in the sense that it created 
new types of knowledge, enabling us to overcoming the limitations of speech.  Context 
can be preserved and reveal more about its history than the content of the writing itself. 
Text and context are important to content since it provides >access= to its meaning. There 
seem to be at least three possible meanings when considering the relationship between 
meaning and content. The first is the sentence (or symbol) itself; secondly the event 
where someone uses that sentence or symbol to communicate something to someone 
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else (a specific action means something); and thirdly, whatever it is that the person 
conveying the information means or intends. These are all related as well as quite 
distinct. Meanings of sentences and symbols are associated with abstract objects and 
can be abstract themselves. It should not be understood, though, as uninfluenced by the 
particular circumstances within which sentences or symbols are used. The content is 
interpreted according to that which a particular event means. Also coming into play is the 
user=s meaning. A performance of a particular play, or the representation in another 
format of a text, may have a common content, but may have different meanings 
depending on usage and circumstances.  The understanding and interpretation of a text 
or play can also depend on the reader or viewer's informedness on the topic or theme 
covered.  This often makes prior instruction of the reader or viewer essential, for the 
content to become real and manageable. The function of a text, or writing, like discourse, 
is not the maintaining of a single and exclusive meaning.   
 
It is, in a much more exciting way, the maintaining of Athe simultaneous existence of 
multiple meanings@ (Foucault 1977:99).  The written word has also made possible the 
residence of the imaginary and the fantastic in books.  Fantasy no longer belongs only to 
the heart/emotional or to that which is out of place in nature.  Dreams as well as true 
images can be in reading.  Imaginary does not oppose and deny reality, but is a reality of 
its own growing among books and signs. Fantasy and imaginary evolves from the 
accuracy of knowledge and lie dormant in documents until 'discovered' by a reader.  It is 
located in the domain of knowledge (Barwise 1988:25-26; Feyerabend 1988:158-162; 
Foucault 1977:90-91, 99).  
 
Derrida is critical of the capacity of language to refer to anything outside itself, and the 
ability of language to represent a reality which is not always already a representation, or 
a supplement to writing. Writing is conceived in many cultures simply as a technical 
supplement to language, and an arbitrary representation of representation which distorts 
access to reality or the object itself. Such a conception does not allow for the 
contradictions necessary in the exploration of other possibilities, which then also 
excludes the possibility of knowledge, and the notions of truth and value, with which 
every scientific quest is invested.  People do not have relations primarily with signs alone, 
but they have relations with others as well, including our relations with what we deem to 
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be totally other (also called the sacred) or strange. Differences and structures are 
necessary without privileging only the differences that make up a structure, or that of an 
imposed chronology. In such a way total defeatism is avoided in Derrida=s 
deconstructionist approach, as differences also produce systematic transformations. 
Derrida is quoted in McKenna (1992:50) as saying: AEverything begins with structure, 
configuration, relationship.@ (McKenna 1992:45-50). 
 
Distinguishing meaning structures are complex and ever-changing. For example, factors 
such as the mistakes humans make in interpreting the content of what someone says to 
another person. The speaker does not necessarily determine accurately the content of an 
utterance. An example is an author who does not honour his intentions by his actions, 
that is, there is a divergence between what the author meant and what the author said. 
Circumstances in which sentences/symbols are used or found, are essential in getting 
from the sentence/symbol to its content, especially because of the ambiguity of words. 
There exists different kinds of relations or constraints that underwrite meaning in general, 
and not just of language, but the meaning found in the world around us and how words 
relate to that world (natural and conventional). There is thus a relation between 
circumstances and content as being at the essence of meaning B this excludes the 
assumption that there are symbols and the thing symbolised or designated. The relation 
between meaning, content and circumstances indicates that the content a statement has, 
depends on more than the sentence used and the circumstances in which it is used. 
Additional to these factors are the shared conventions of a language community.  
 
Central to this is change B conventions change over time, not necessarily in text or 
circumstances, but the shared conventions of a language such as English.  Another 
factor is that the meaning of language involves consensus.  Consensus can be achieved 
or enforced by training, but nothing can ensure universal loyalty of the individual to such 
a consensus.  Such an individual can be forced to act according to the rule by imposing it 
on such a person.  In spite of such scare tactics, what cannot be taken away is the 
spontaneity of an individual's interpretations of such rules.  At most the ability to 
reinterpret could be suspended due to pragmatic reasons, such as the need to function 
as a social being.  The processes of socialisation and culturalisation seem to constantly 
 
 
77 
put into question the absolute autonomy of the individual (Barwise 1988:25-31; Tasiƒ 
2001:48). 
 
The tension between individual and societal aspects is especially visible in how words 
are defined, and how they are used and understood. According to Johnson-Laird 
(1988:99) Aassociation is not a meaning. It is merely a link from one representation in 
memory to another: it leads from one thing to another. But their can be many different 
relations between representations, and the relation of denotation - from word to object - is 
only one of them.@ This seems to imply that the meaning of an utterance depends on 
combining the meaning of its words in a way that takes the syntax of the sentence into 
account. It is especially this that seems to render most definitions of words incomplete. 
Definitions cannot express the complete meaning of a word, especially as words have 
consequences (Johnson-Laird 1988:99-104). 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, according to Johnson-Laird (1988:106), noted that common 
components do not exist, or that the meanings of words cannot consist of a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions common to all the things that a word can denote. At 
most, when looking at words, one will find not something that is common to all, but rather 
similarities and relationships. It represents an intricate network of overlapping similarities 
which will be either overall similarities or similarities of detail. The properties a word 
contains may serve as criteria rather than conditions. Criteria are characteristic 
components of meaning, and not necessary or sufficient components of meaning 
(Johnson-Laird 1988:100-107). 
 
Writing, as a very concrete and visible medium, links to how we visually experience, 
present, and remember our multifaceted world. The human mind is a complex system 
with the ability to form images of the world.  This world differs from one person to 
another, from one culture to the next.  The way one thinks is influenced not only by one's 
culture and its related events, but also by the way these events are contained within such 
a culture.  It is not only through reading and listening, but also through the visual image 
that ideas can improve knowledge and attribute to meaningful information (Boulding 
1986:21-30; Feyerabend 1988:157-178). 
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4.4 Image and meaning 
 
The power of the image has been successfully exploited by advertising agencies, political 
groups, and social welfare organisations.  Something must be true, because we saw it on 
the news, or a photograph in a newspaper convinces us that something actually 
happened.  Poster art, for example, had quite an impact on societal attitudes towards war 
and war participation during World War I and II, and the Vietnam incident.  Trusting that 
information re-presented by the media is meaningful information seems to be 
unproblematic for the public at large, except when we look more closely at the varied 
letters of reaction sent in by members of the public.  But then, the latter is written text, 
and is it any more trustworthy than the picture? Visual belief has, to a large extent, 
replaced the belief in something because we read it in a reputable source.  Written 
sources also rely on the visual for impact and believability B the photographer 'was 
actually there' and his or her representation and angle of the event must therefore be a 
true reflection of the happening. 
 
The visual image has a strong influence on the meanings attached to experiences, our 
world, interpretations, and language. The attempt to indicate the various attitudes 
towards the visual and the image, as well as the changes in these attitudes, is important 
to an understanding of the shifts in the consideration of what meaningful information 
entails. Vision, treated for centuries as the most noble of the senses, includes not only 
the actual physical observation with the eyes, but also internal mental speculation.  Sight 
therefore occupied a privileged position in Western thought since the Greeks as the most 
trustworthy of the Asensual mediators between man and world@9 (Jay 1986:176). The link 
to language are words and phrases that indicate the dominance of the visual contribution 
to knowledge, for example insight, perspective, overview, point of view, demonstration, 
synopsis and far-sightedness.  To read texts, for example, sight is the privileged and 
necessary medium of access to its content and form. In modern thought, especially since 
Descartes (Jay 1986:176), mental representations have been favoured as mirror 
reflections of an external reality.  Basic visual experiences formed an essential part of our 
                                                 
9 'man' to be understood as human being 
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attempts to make sense of the sacred and the profane. There is a definite link between 
vision and psychological phenomena. 
 
The image seems to have replaced the 'word' as the primary source of information, and 
therefore of analysis.  Why does this problem raise so much debate if the visual had 
always been dominant?  The rise of modern science, the Gutenberg printing press and 
its resultant 'revolution', and emphasis on perspective in painting, afforded vision (the 
domination of the visual experience) an exceptionally powerful role in the modern era.  
This new preoccupation ranged from the discourse of sight, the emphasis on clear and 
distinct ideas in Cartesian philosophy, the enlightenment project, to the fascination with 
technical improvements in the capacity to see (eg the telescope, photography, cinema). 
This earlier obsession with vision has now taken a  different turn.  What has come under 
scrutiny are the implications of an over-emphasis of sight, also seen as a critique of the 
spatialisation of time.  This position was especially brought about because of the over-
mystifications of social imagery as well as the spectacle of late capitalist culture, including 
claims to a so-called disinterested scientific gaze.  What seems to be taking place is the 
doubting of the long-standing nobility of sight, a paradigm shift in which the belittling of 
vision is replacing its adoration.   
 
Even Merleau-Ponty, according to Jay (1986:178), whose phenomenological exploration 
of perception was part of this celebration of embodied vision, was suspicious of the 
Cartesian split between a distant, spectatorial subject and its object of sight, that is 
maintained in the more celebratory thinking on vision. The split between subject and 
object, or consciousness and body, is part of the reason for the advancement of 
perspectivistic vision which has a single point of view.  A technological appropriation of 
the world is dependent on such a spectatorial split.  Such a distinction is detrimental to 
locating positive meaning in embodied vision in the world since the intertwined nature of 
the visible and the invisible, the viewer and viewed, are ignored and shunned. Another 
drawback is the illusion such a split creates of picture versus text (Jay 1986:177-180). 
 
The world-as-picture still challenges the world as written text.  As a fundamental process 
in the representation of the world, the word then seems to have fallen before the 'terror' 
of the image.  The image is not only a system of representation, but also a dominant 
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mode of interpretation, according to visual culture. It should be mentioned here that 
'representation' is and should not be the only approach to meaningful information, 
especially since the sign and symbol, used to represent, can only be computated if 
stripped of its meaning.   Foucault, according to Jay (1986:180), linked the modern view 
of insanity to the breaking up of the medieval and Renaissance unity of word and image. 
As a result madness has become spectacle, a thing to look at from the distance of 
reason, an enactment of unreason. Madness or insanity exists only as 'seen', and the 
science of mental disease developed as one of observation and classification allowing 
very little, if any, space for dialogue.  It represents an intensified faith in visual evidence.  
Even the Cartesian advancement of internal vision to the detriment of the actual senses, 
are now being replaced by the supreme power of the empirical gaze.  Foucault 
approached the visual, in writing, by employing the image to work through the idea of 
'epistemes' or knowledges, ie units of meaningful utterances that cultures develop.  The 
points of analysis he developed that interest us include the power/knowledge idea, and 
the process of meaning. Also important are the qualities of the visual and power B the 
idea of spatial realms marked by their visual otherness, is informed by a sense of the 
visual in culture (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:94-95; Jay 1986:179-82).   
 
The power of the visual is indicated here, because the power of writing, especially when 
writing about the visual, has not diminished even though contemporary society is 
experiencing a dominance of the visual image. This can be seen in how the postmodern 
world, to a large extent, shapes our consciousness, culture, and ways of sense-making of 
our world, through visuals and rapid images. This critical movement indicates how visual 
cultures as a new, upcoming field of study in the new humanities, is expanding its critical 
rigour as well as marking its intellectual territory.  Key to the development of this 
movement was the development of the analytical competence to address an increasingly 
image-driven world. Whichever contributions we consider, what remains important is 
Acounter-reading@ (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:90), that is, to read contributions in different 
ways, and to engage with traditional subjects of study, and address them in context of a 
different set of theoretical issues (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:88-92).  
 
An additional understanding of image involves writing as a form and act of imaging B 
image and writing share qualities such as ambiguity, blindness, multiple meanings, 
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falseness, representation, origin, etc. To analyse the visual is part of the agenda of 
theorising in poststructuralist terms.  For example, Barthes eventually translated his 
literary theories into the visual.  Barthes distinguished between studium and punctum.  
Barthes described studium as a culturally derived image which carries an intentionality of 
the photographer and is passive; it is a wide field of unconcerned desire, of various 
interests, of inconsequential taste; it is the order of liking and not of loving.  The punctum 
is the creative drives that the viewer brings to the image; it is the disruptive point in the 
photograph, it stabs at and disrupts the viewer; and it is a detail that, for a particular 
viewer, arouses interest, and is often beyond morality (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:95-96). 
 
Some of Derrida=s writings engaged with the image, and photography.  By investigating 
issues in painting and aesthetics, Derrida worked through and against key Western 
philosophical thought.  Examples are representation and reality, the artist as creator, and 
the role of the spectator.  He links the text to the visual, through the analogy of the frame 
and the passe-partout or mounting in art.  Derrida pursued the hermeneutic processes of 
frames as they shape how we produce meaning.  Of interest is that which is neither 
inside nor outside the painting, or the subliminal space of the between, because it signals 
everything that is different from the included and excluded.  Thus, text is seen as all-
encompassing: matters of textuality and reading are translated into the issue of the 
frame.  It also looks at how the frame operates in the formation of the aesthetic. Related 
topics include creativity and blindness, the relationship between blindness and its causes 
and effects (eg love, punishment, religion), self-reflexivity, and blindness and insight 
(Fuery & Mansfield 2000:96-97). The different levels of meaning will contain a variety of 
meaningful information.  Or, different levels of possibilities exist within which we may find, 
create and apply meaningful information.  Not even the frame or set boundaries and its 
own 'outside' are excluded as possible sources. 
 
Baudrillard's work of writing had a major influence on the theorising of the image in 
postmodernism. Baudrillard argues that everything is simulacra, and that there is no 
original point or perfect form from which all else is copied.  This runs counter to the 
tradition in Western thought derived from Plato.  Postmodernism, for Baudrillard, 
represented a different kind of real, that of the hyperreal, or a world of unending copies.  
AAt the limit of this process of reproducibility, the real is not only what can be reproduced, 
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but that which is already reproduced.  The hyperreal.@  (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:98). For 
Baudrillard the hyperreal leads one to question not only reality as it is formulated and 
represented, but also the notion of artifice. To question the tradition of the real and the 
authentic, meaning itself is being questioned.  The meaning we attached to things and life 
due to the influence of realism, rationalism and ultimate truth, can especially be found in 
traditional, and later variations and versions of, writings on aesthetics.  Visual realisations 
of whichever key way of thinking (philosophy and natural science) is dominant at the 
time, can almost always be found in the arts, and all other creative expressions of 
ourselves, others, and the world. 
 
4.5 Aesthetics and meaning 
 
Separating this paragraph on aesthetics from that of the previous one on the visual 
image may seem artificial, because traditional aesthetics tend to prejudice the fine arts 
and the visual sensory experience. There are always overlaps when meaning-structures 
are involved, and it is necessary to consider the ways in which aesthetics is defined and 
applied. 
 
Many definitions of aesthetics are problematic as they tend to be circular in nature, for 
example, defining aesthetics as that which is concerned with the aesthetically pleasing, 
etc. Definitions also demand criteria of application, that is, justifying the use of the term to 
a particular object. A definition also has necessary and sufficient conditions that must be 
met for the concept to be applied to a specific object or event. Defining aesthetics and 
justifying its use in a particular situation or as relating to an object, is not that straight-
forward. The school of thought that is one=s point of reference will determine, for 
example, whether one views the aesthetics as something that is objectively beautiful or 
ugly, or something that is in the eye of the beholder (subjective). An aesthetic object 
could be seen as only that which is truly representative of the objective world and truth, 
or an object is seen as beautiful only if it evokes an emotional reaction. Other 
approaches of conditionality is that the aesthetic object expresses its creator=s ideas, but 
is not sufficient reason to regard an object as, for example, a work of art. Perhaps it has 
no external point or function at all, or its justification is not in the object itself but in the 
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response that it causes. We may, when having to justify why we hold something as 
beautiful, struggle to separate aesthetic considerations from moral ones.  
 
When proceeding to consider a few definitions, we need to remain aware that these 
definitions are never final or complete interpretations. The idea here is not to offer any 
one possible definition, but rather to focus on the influence of an aesthetic approach on 
meaning. It includes the approach of modern aesthetics which emphasises the form-
content relation and the role of context (extrinsic). It recognises that the aesthetic object 
is not produced in a vacuum, no matter how >new= or original its creation may seem 
(abstract). The latter, of course, is based on the point of view that an aesthetic object is 
necessarily a human creation, and a natural occurring object may be aesthetically 
pleasing even though not perceived as an aesthetic object. 
 
According to Chambers 21st Century dictionary (1996, sv 'aesthetic', 'aesthetics', 
'beauty'), and The New lexicon=s Webster=s dictionary of the English language (1990, sv 
>aesthetic=, >aestheticism=, >aesthetics=, >beautiful=, >beauty=), aesthetic is derived from a 
Greek word meaning 'to perceive', or that which is perceptible to the senses.  Aesthetic is 
the ability to appreciate beauty, and aesthetics is the part of philosophy  concerned with 
the study of the principles of beauty (ie, the perception of the beautiful as distinguished 
from the moral and the useful). Aesthetics, therefore, deals with the sensations and 
emotions evoked by beauty.  The idea of aesthetics, or the concept of beauty and taste, 
is an ancient one discussed by the Greeks in relation to the nature of beauty (and which 
is still a strongly contested matter). The term itself, though, was coined by Baumgarten in 
the eighteenth century and developed further by Kant. As the term aesthetics was 
derived from a word meaning sensory perception, it indicated a shift from things to a 
perception of things, from the objective to the subjective in sensory experience. A 
philosophy of aesthetics asks questions such as whether qualities are objective or 
subjective, whether objects are beautiful or ugly independently of minds and the 
judgements they make, or whether objects (beautiful or ugly) are so only because minds 
judge them to be so (beauty is in the eye of the beholder). Questions are also raised as 
to whether we can make aesthetic as well as moral judgements at the same time, and 
whether emotions should come into such judgements.  
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The extreme aesthetic view in which there is an inordinate concern with aesthetic matters 
as opposed to ethical or practical considerations, is called aestheticism. Aestheticism 
was also a British arts movement from the 1880's to the 1900s. This movement held that 
works of art should exist and be appreciated for their own sakes, without outside 
relevance or meaning. Kant, on the other hand, already in 1790, argued that aesthetic 
appreciation reconciles the dualism of theory and practice in human nature. Kant=s ideas 
made it possible to identify beauty as a subjective quality which is not necessarily 
inherent in the aesthetic object (eg a work of art) (Key ideas in human thought 1993, sv 
>aestheticism, >aesthetics=). Beauty is defined as that which is pleasing to the senses and 
exalts the mind, and also refers to excellence, strength or quality, and admiration.  The 
part of the definition of beauty that seems to oppose that of aesthetics, is that beauty is 
also defined as those qualities pleasing to the moral sense. That which is beautiful 
concerns not only that which is physically lovely, but also that which is morally or 
intellectually pleasing. Traditional aesthetics is often associated with the interpretation of 
art (including works of art, literature, music, painting, theatre), but as we shall attempt to 
indicate in this chapter, much of our aesthetic experience includes nature. It also 
acknowledges the role of a scientific understanding of nature, thus allowing for an 
appreciation of the totality of our experienced worlds. Our environments or surroundings 
constantly engage our senses. (Chambers 21st Century dictionary 1996, sv >aesthetic=, 
>aesthetics=, >beauty=; Key ideas in human thought 1993, sv >aestheticism=, >aesthetics=; 
The New lexicon=s Webster=s dictionary of the English language 1990, sv >aesthetic=, 
>aestheticism=, >aesthetics=, >beautiful=, >beauty=).  
 
One of the contexts of aesthetics we are looking at, is an unlikely place where most 
people would not consider the aesthetic and the beautiful to be present. It is aesthetics in 
science and will be illustrated by referring to three main examples found in Tallis (1995), 
ie Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein. It is the role of imagination in science, or the extent 
to which science is driven by it, that can be seen in the work of these three thinkers and 
scientists. The first example is the heliocentric theory of Copernicus which was 
aesthetically motivated, as well as Kepler=s adoption of Copernicus= theory: AAs I 
contemplate its beauty with incredible and ravishing delight, I should publicly commend it 
to my readers with all the forces at my command.@ (Tallis 1995:18). The second example 
is the seemingly forgotten preoccupations of Newton with alchemy and theological 
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concerns. Behind his intuitions that made the achievement of his Laws of Motion 
possible, were quasi-theological notions about the nature of space and time, eg his vision 
of space as God=s mind.  
 
Newton was also aware of undiscovered worlds and possibilities: AI do not know what I 
may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the 
sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or prettier 
shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.@ (Tallis 
1995:18). The third example is the genius of Einstein which has often been portrayed as 
residing in his powerful aesthetic sense. His greatness which was his ability to invent 
invariance principles and make use of statistical fluctuations, is rooted in an intense and 
unwavering intuition of, and belief in, underlying order and of the beauty of that order. 
This is what enabled Einstein to develop the Special Theory of Relativity, and later, with 
equal intensity and input, the General Theory. To many scientists beauty is to be found or 
perceived in ordered systems, a harmony of logical rationality and a harmony of aesthetic 
achievement. The three examples of Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein reflect an excited 
intuition traditionally associated with the intuitionist Romantics, such as Bouwer (referred 
to in ch3). It is an intuition of order and beauty as an essential condition of great science, 
including great experimentation and great discoveries, because of an excitement and 
passion for the incredible secrets that the world and life holds and of which we can only 
hope to imagine a glimmer (Tallis 1995:17-19). 
 
This beauty found in order is not far from the identification, enjoyment and appreciation of 
the formal properties of art. It has in common the idea of universal human 
consciousness, and is opposed to that which is conventional, taught, and culture related. 
This approach of excluding the conventional has been opposed, according to Tallis 
(1995:157), by Gestalt psychologists. They attempted to relate aesthetic principles to the 
fundamental properties of the human mind and to identify an aesthetic element at the 
heart of perception itself. As we have seen in the definition of aesthetics, the Greek word 
aisth‘tikos means >perceptible to the sense=, >perceptual=, >perceive= (aisthesthai) (Encarta 
concise English dictionary 2001: sv >aesthetic=). The basic level where we complete an 
object that is only partly visible or where the next step in a series of sounds is anticipated 
(such expectation is shaped by the past), is perhaps where consciousness is instinctively 
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aestheticising. A sense of form can assist in separating ordinary and meaning-filled 
experience from a confusion of sensation (Tallis 1995:157). From this we can appreciate 
the necessity of form-finding and unification in consciousness to be able to transform 
sensations drawn from different senses into the perception of an object. These different 
senses can be brought together into an experience of a world, or a sensible world, 
through the production and perception of form. General or formal features allow us to 
recognise objects, and to identify larger spatial and temporal arrangements. It is to 
theorise in ordinary consciousness and is needed for art to be enjoyed and produced.  
 
External factors to a work of art, for example the time it was created in, the medium used 
to create it, and the frame (if a painting), supply information that grounds the work of art 
and draws attention to it as an aesthetic object. Information external to the work of art 
may even determine that it was created purely for its own sake and not for, say, 
ideological considerations. The danger in the approach of the Gestalt psychologists is 
that it seems as if the aesthetic sense associated with the production and reception of art 
is not so special after all. Ordinary sense experience is so rich in forms, that it is available 
in excess. Yet ordinary consciousness falls short when it comes to uniting all these many 
physical experiences with the larger forms of wholes, structures, and unities derived from 
knowledge. Tallis (1995:159) refers to it as the Aincomplete experience of experiences.@   
 
These immediate experiences of perceived objects are not sufficient for memory and 
anticipation, because it is not sustained but fragmented and its form short-lived. To use 
art as an example, art is seen as concerned more with the larger, explicit and stable 
forms than that experienced in everyday life. Art brings together that which would 
otherwise have been dispersed, offering a synoptic view denied in everyday experience. 
It includes more autonomous forms of art, such as abstract painting and music. Art, 
though, is about more than its formal qualities. The reason is, besides it not being 
created in a vacuum, the variety of purposes and instruments in art. This is related to 
certain main trends in aesthetic theory, ie imitation, expression, form, and beauty. These 
theories are not distinctive properties of works of art as they cannot easily be separated 
(Tallis 1995:158-160, 169).  
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Representations of objects surround us constantly in our visual field. Representation, to 
be able to sharpen consciousness, needs to collect into the object or event its implicit 
significance. This may be achieved by transforming the object to make it more evident, or 
to make the object stand for a whole class of objects. According to this, one cannot claim 
that art is totally different and separate from everything else in life. Art is rooted in 
ordinary experience and non-artistic activities, even though these do not have any 
necessary connection with art. A perception of beauty outside art is needed for the 
creation of beauty within art, and art makes that beauty explicit. It seems that our 
conceptions of art are as narrow as the boundaries of our cultural presuppositions. These 
are determined by the fact that the idea of art and the associated ideal of beauty is 
relative to certain cultures, including the assumption of beauty as an ideal. 
 
One of the strongest challenges to the traditional or classic and romantic approaches to 
art, was the Avant-garde movement. This movement cast doubt on the accepted rules 
that determined the representation of the figure in space, the organisation of colour and 
values. Previously the figure, space, line, colour and frame were subject to the 
constraints of representation. In many cases this is still so. It was also the recognition 
that something called indeterminacy does exist. Cézanne, according to Lyotard 
(1994:284), saw the colouristic sensations as constituting the Aentire pictorial existence of 
objects.@ It leaves out of consideration the history or subject, line, or space, and allows 
for attempts to render perception at its birth. 
 
Part of the unhappiness of the Avant-Garde with the state of art in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, was that those elementary sensations are hidden in ordinary 
perception. It will remain hidden as long as our perceptions are under the hegemony of 
classical ways of looking, also called prejudiced vision. As we have indicated before, the 
artist, through the work of art, can re-establish the sensations and make seen what 
makes one see, and not what is visible. The avant-gardes brought into doubt the 
constituents we accepted as elementary or as the origin of art. Avant-Garde asks 
whether something happens, and is not concerned with what happens to the subject, and 
for Lyotard, this is the sense in which it belongs to the aesthetic of the sublime (Lyotard 
1994:284-286; Tallis 1995:170-192). 
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We have referred to the fact that art is the typical focus of aesthetics and its definitions. 
We have also indicated that our aesthetic pleasures and appreciations are not limited to 
art, but to the world around us such as our neighbourhood surroundings (parks, 
marketplace), and nature (sunsets, horizons, mountains). There is an approach called 
environmental aesthetics that specifically considers the environment as part of our 
aesthetic appreciation of our surroundings. The aesthetic object under consideration is 
not in our world in this case, but rather forms part of the world we are in, ie we are 
immersed within the object of our appreciation (Carlson 2000:xvii). We change our 
relationship to the object of appreciation because we constantly move within it, thus 
changing the object itself as well. Our experience of the environmental object involves all 
the senses (sensory perception), that is, our experience of it is personal and total, and 
not stable and self-contained at all. It is the fragmented and continuously changing 
experiences we referred to in the previous paragraphs, that is given form in a larger 
structure through a work of art. In this case, however, the environmental object remains 
unframed, except maybe, after our initial experience of it, it is given a more constant form 
by our memories and knowledge. Another aspect that is different from traditional 
aesthetic objects, is that the latter are human products, whereas environments seemingly 
have no design, or rather, human design.  
 
Environments change, grow, and develop by natural processes, and even with the 
involvement of a human agency (human-altered environments) its unruly characteristic 
cannot be cancelled. We seem to be confronted in the world at large by an aesthetic 
appreciation of something that envelops us, that is constantly in motion, confronts us in 
our daily experiences, that is not limited by time or space, and is constrained neither in its 
nature nor its meaning. Similar to traditional aesthetics, environmental aesthetics also 
has two basic orientations. These are subjectivist (sceptical) and objectivist. The 
subjectivist orientation holds that, since we lack the traditional resources of aesthetic 
appreciation, we cannot answer questions such as what to appreciate aesthetically and 
how to appreciate it. One can either accept that it is not possible to aesthetically 
appreciate environments or that such appreciation does not exist as true aesthetic 
appreciation. One can decide, on the other hand, that the only way to achieve aesthetic 
appreciation of the environment is to open oneself to being immersed, respond to it and 
enjoy it. It becomes less important whether such an experience is aesthetic in the strict 
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sense of the word (not that it is any clearer in the arts). The objectivist point of view 
addresses the what and the how questions by making use of two sources. These are the 
appreciator (designer) and the object (design) of appreciation. When confronted by an 
environment the appreciator, similar to the artist or designer, selects the senses relevant 
to its appreciation, thereby setting the frames which limit or fix it in time and space. The 
nature of the environment provides the design whereby we can fashion our initial 
overwhelming experience of that environment into aesthetic appreciation. The nature of 
the object experienced guides our appreciation of it. 
 
To render this aesthetic appreciation complete, we need information about its nature, 
type, properties, origin, etc, for a whole or fuller appreciation and understanding of what 
makes it pleasing or even awe-inspiring. We can now frame the experienced environment 
with such knowledge and understanding. Such knowledge also allows us to adjust and 
enlarge our frames, depending on the environment in question, for example in 
appreciating human-altered environments (eg modern architecture). The subjective and 
objective orientations are both recognised as they indicate problem areas or questions in 
environmental aesthetics. The scope characterised by both orientations, is the following. 
The first continuum is the subject matter that stretches from pristine nature to the limits of 
the most traditional art forms. This includes wilderness areas, rural landscapes, the 
countryside, cityscapes and urban design, shopping centres, architecture, etc. The 
second continuum in characterising environmental aesthetics, ranges over size. It ranges 
from the most engulfing environments such as old forests, a big city, or an immense field 
of wheat, to the smallest and intimate environments such as the backyard, office, living 
room, turning over a rock, and even an environment viewed with the assistance of a 
microscope. The third and last continuum is related to the second continuum. Its range 
includes the most ordinary to the extraordinary, the mundane and the exotic. 
Environmental aesthetics is not only about the spectacular, but includes commonplace 
sights, daily experiences, ordinary scenery, etc. This approach accentuates the possibility 
of every environment offering much to aesthetically appreciate as it is rich and rewarding 
(Carlson 2000:xvii-xxi). 
 
It is within such environments or worlds that people live, and which influence and shape 
their understanding, pleasures, experiences, as well as their meaning-making activities.  
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Space and time have been seriously altered, and are still changing rapidly, in society.  In 
our discussion of the information society, Wersig's (1990:191) view on the aesthetic 
potentials of human beings were accentuated as an important and necessary companion 
to the potentials of calculus.  The potentials of aesthetics, for example, phantasy, play, 
wonder, happiness, mental images, and illusion, are under-utilised or even ignored and 
suppressed in a society where a scientific model of rationalisation is dominant.  A strong, 
mechanistic world view instead of a more human and balanced view, had a definite 
influence on power relations.  
 
4.6 Power and meaning 
 
Power is to be understood as not only meaning that which is institutional, organisational, 
or communal.  We need to recognise the more subtle levels of power, because the more 
subtle characteristics of power may in time infiltrate, distort, change, and even overthrow 
the more obvious and visible power structures.  This paragraph on power relates to the 
information society and how power can shape the way we configure meaningful 
information.  Whether structural or subtle, power in society forms part of individual as well 
as societal or communal relations.  It therefore includes external as well as internal power 
structures. If power as a concept is not understood, it will not be possible to understand 
what a society is.  Incommensurable understanding of the meaning of power is 
detrimental to interpreting and comparing conflicting views on what society is or ought to 
be.  Another consideration is that the different and often conflicting conceptions of what 
power means, are situated within different schools of thinking and contexts.  It also 
depends on the time-frame it is conceptualised in and by whom.  Thus, the different 
conceptions of what legitimation and power mean, influence debates on what social 
forms of power are legitimate.   
 
Michel Foucault (Hoy 1986:123) approached the problematic character of these concepts 
by rethinking the concept of power in terms of its connection with the social forms that 
knowledge takes.  Even though Foucault's notion of power was not traditional, it has 
factors in common with, and can be compared to, traditional social theory.  In the social 
sciences the concept of power is not a settled one because of the different social 
scientific models making use of different conceptions of power.  Findings will therefore 
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differ and it is impossible to determine in a neutral way which model is more correct.  In 
this respect the social sciences are relativistic, and there will always be endless disputes 
about the proper use of basic scientific concepts.  The definition of concepts seems to be 
tied to unacknowledged value-assumptions which predetermine the range of their 
empirical application.  According to Hoy (1986:124), there are many philosophers of 
science who do not believe that the sciences conform to the traditional empiricist 
conception of scientific method. In the social sciences choice of theory is also more 
relativistic than in the natural sciences.  The reason for this is that the principles used to 
select social theories are guided by a variety of values.  In other words, the evaluation of 
data does not rely on the pragmatic criterion of predictive success as it does for an 
explanation by a natural scientist (Hoy 1986:123-125). 
 
Lukes (Hoy 1986:125), in his radical view of power, distinguishes between subjective and 
real interests, and a related difference between observable (overt) and latent (covert) 
conflicts of interests.  Observable conflicts are those that can be acknowledged by those 
involved in the conflict, and latent conflicts are those that would not be readily admitted 
due to ideological distortions of the perceptions of the real interests of those involved.  
Conflicts of interest can, therefore, be not only overt but also covert, and both can be 
studied.  Lukes criticises these approaches for being too behaviourist.  They limit 
observations to actual behaviour and conscious decision-making processes.  The other 
limitation is that it pays attention to only one dimension of power, that is the exercise of 
'power over' an individual, social group, etc (Hoy 1986:125-127). 
 
Other ways of looking at power as concept are those of Bertrand Russell (Hoy 1986:127) 
defining power as the production of intended effects, and of Karl Marx (Hoy 1986:127) 
seeing power as not reducible to the intentions of individuals B history may happen as a 
result of individuals' wills, but not as they will it.  The debate is therefore between those 
who view power as exercised by individuals or institutions, and those who see power as a 
result of structural factors within systems.  Theorists such as Weber, Parsons, Lévy-
Strauss, Althusser, and Marx (Hoy 1986:127) all stress structure rather than agency.  
Marx, for example, sees the economic structure of society as independent of and not 
reducible to the agent's willed intentions.  This, however, does not mean that 
structuralists are necessarily determinists, or that the agent is ignored or not accounted 
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for.  It is a 'power to' rather than Lukes' 'power over' that is the main difference, and 
should not be seen as a lack of attribution of responsibility for certain consequences.  
The controversy is about free will and determinism, and not necessarily whether 
structural systems or human agents should be used as the basic explanatory units.   
 
Foucault (Hoy 1986:128) worked out a method for the historical study of power without 
leaning on the concept of the subject or on the assumption that the structural relations 
are not subject to change.  Foucault postulates power as intentionality but without a 
subject B power relations seen as intentional can be described without attributing it to 
specific subjects as their conscious intentions.  Power, then, is an explanatory concept, 
while keeping in mind that not all explanations are causal.  Foucault, through avoiding the 
attribution of power to either conscious agency or to underlying forces (eg modes of 
production), attempted to explain contemporary society by mapping the network of power 
relations that have evolved historically. 
 
Yet, agents are not ignored as Foucault also pays attention to the exercise of power as 
well as acknowledges that power cannot exist if it was not exercised by agents.  Foucault 
does not view power as something that can be possessed by those exercising it.  Thus, 
power is always exercised, never possessed, because it is not a property, privilege, or 
possession B something the dominant class has and the dominated not. Power is a 
strategy, a network of power relations and social matrix of which the dominated are as 
much a part as the dominator.  Power, then, is not manifested globally or represented by 
and located in the sovereign.  Power is diffused through society, which is the reason why 
take-overs of the state apparatus do not change the power network.  To live socially is to 
be involved in power relations, yet it does not imply that power is everything (Hoy 
1986:127-128, 134-7). 
 
Those supporting Marxist ideas, tend to view power as repressive, thus in a negative 
sense, and render power a fragile concept by exaggerating the notion of repression.  
Those supporting the ideas of Nietzsche think of power as producing negative as well as 
positive effects.  Power can also be positive and productive, and is not always 
repressive.  It is sometimes also enjoyed and not necessarily suffered. Foucault sees 
power not as preventing knowledge, but as producing it; and finds, therefore, that 
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reducing the mechanisms of power to the level of repressions (eg exclusion, censorship, 
blockage, domination, authority, manipulation, coercion) is inadequate and dangerous.   
 
Focusing only on the negative aspects of power makes it impossible to explain how the 
kinds of knowledge needed for controlling the human body and labour power have 
emerged.  Foucault aimed to show, through history, that the human body could have 
been constituted as labour power only if a technology or a knowledge of the body existed, 
making it possible to organise and subjugate bodies into docile, useful roles.  Yet the 
technology of power does not causally determine particular actions, but only makes them 
probable.  No given remains constant as it is transformed over time by various 
technologies of power.  Knowledge cannot be 'emancipated' from power relations. This in 
a way links with the reification of relations to others (human bodies) and our experienced 
world.  The subjugation or domination referred to should not be interpreted as meaning 
something imposed on one class by another.  It is more than that, as it is something that 
increasingly penetrates and characterises all aspects of society.  Foucault calls it the 
process of normalisation, which is the growing rationalisation, organisation, and 
homogenisation of society in contemporary life.  This is detrimental to action, which is 
discouraged as it may lead to uncontrolled and unforeseen consequences.  Waiting until 
one possesses a total understanding before engaging in concrete action, one will never 
go over to action.  
 
Another problem is that contemporary society seems to view progress as the break from 
the repression of power, as if freedom is the antithesis of power.  Foucault argues that 
history is full of events that do not fit into the materialistic account of the 'progression' of 
history and that things are getting 'better.' (Hoy 1986:130-137; 144-145).  A materialistic 
approach in society will necessarily bring about a more materialistic interpretation, 
representation and configuration of meaningful information. This is especially visible in 
the information society and the myths surrounding it. The chapter on the information 
society as a milieu for meaningful information, focused on the paradox of us having so 
much more information at our disposal, but at the cost of  meaning. 
 
Swan (1988:25) warns of a world so caught up in the idea that information is our 
salvation, that it has become the only real medium of exchange, a kind of madness, our 
 
 
94 
madness. Such a fanaticism is not about our use of information technology, but our 
relationship to the information being processed. Swan offers the following quote by 
Boorstin (Swan 1988:26): AWhile knowledge is orderly and cumulative, information is 
random and miscellaneous. We are flooded by messages from the instant-everywhere in 
excruciating profusion. [...] information tends to drive knowledge out of circulation .... The 
latest information on anything and everything is collected, diffused, received, stored, and 
retrieved before anyone can discover whether the facts have meaning.@  Focusing on 
information to the exclusion of everything else is detrimental to the configuration of 
meaningful information.  Knowledge remains powerful in such a configuration. 
 
It is therefore necessary to consider the relation between knowledge and power. In terms 
of will-to-power, the central hypothesis of the explanation of phenomena is that 
knowledge is power.  The connecting 'is' does not mean that the relation of knowledge 
and power implies that knowledge leads to power.  The relation is rather one where 
knowledge is already a function of human interests and power relations.  Knowledge is 
not gained prior to and independently of the use to which it will be put in order to achieve 
power.  Nietzsche identifies the will-to-knowledge with the will-to-power.  Foucault calls it 
power/knowledge, the slash indicating that knowledge and power should not be studied 
separately as the two concepts are not readily distinguishable.   Nietzsche claims that the 
will-to-power is a hypothesis or interpretation rather than a fact; and Foucault's 
power/knowledge is a heuristic device or pragmatic construction to be tested in terms of 
its value in reconstructing the history of the sciences of humans and of society.  It is a 
historical project aimed at studying the social and scientific practices that underlie and 
condition the formation of beliefs.  The immortality of knowledge as a truth-gaining 
enterprise is seriously questioned, bringing into doubt the finality of any successive 
rebirth of the truth ideal. The historical project is a way of interpreting how knowledge and 
power has come to be counted, not whether such knowledge is ultimately true or not.  
The latter epistemological question cannot be decided in a context-free, unhistorical way. 
This relates to Lukes' (Hoy 1986:130) position that historians or social scientists who may 
use similar data, but rely on different conceptions of power, will necessarily reach 
different and even competing understandings and explanations.  
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The way in which such data is interpreted will depend on the practical interests of the 
interpreters, questioning the view that texts, for example, have stable, permanent and 
inherent meaning.  A postmodern doubt is thus that the narrative offered by knowledge is 
not the only story that may be told of events.  To the modernist all phenomena are 
explicable, eventually, implying that for events that do not have a convincing and agreed 
narrative, it is because the kind of knowledge available at that time cannot as yet offer 
such a narrative. Texts can and will have subtleties and contradictions that resist one-
dimensional interpretations, and  texts do have meaning. Objective truth and verifiable 
knowledge exist within the complexities of the world and human nature. Objectivity 
becomes less certain, especially in political power struggles where the neutrality and 
objectivity of the legal system, for example, is attacked or praised depending on the 
purpose and occasion it needs to serve (Bauman 1994:289-291, 293; Hoy 1986:129-130; 
McCormack 2001:31,33). 
 
A mechanistic and strictly objective world view, similar to its effect on power relations, 
also influenced approaches to madness (also a kind of power relation). That which is 
considered strange and outside the acceptable parameters (for example behaviour) set 
by a scientific pattern of rationalisation in a society, must either be cast out, isolated, 
adapted (eg using suggestion, convincing, reasoning, force, education), or destroyed if 
neither option of isolation or adaptation is successful in removing or changing the 
stranger (eg ideas, ideology, person, concept).  A very good example of how society 
deals with the unacceptable, unknown, even the fearful, is the history of actions 
employed to deal with madness and its manifestations. 
 
4.7 Madness and meaning 
 
The treatment and understanding of, and solutions to, the phenomenon of madness 
through the ages by society tells us quite a bit about how people view themselves and 
their existence with others in the world.  Our universe of knowledge is ever expanding 
and one would expect us to be aware of the fact that madness is about more than the 
psychiatric understanding of madness as a disorder, an illness.  In our contemporary 
society we find just such a view dominant and practised as justifiable, reasonable action. 
 This renders our world views simplistic and very one-sided.  We are left with a 
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materialistic approach which ignores, or forgets, that it is in madness that we find 
alternative truths on society, other ways of reasoning and knowing.  Madness and 
unreason supplement (adding to, as well as filling gaps) reason, and does not oppose it 
in the sense of a dualism.  Derrida's deconstruction10 is important to us, as it assists us in 
approaching such dualisms, or oppositional approaches, typically found in traditional 
Western philosophy (Reynolds 2002).  In our discussion on Bernard Tschumi's Le Parc 
de la Villette (the Folies) we will see how the hierarchies and orders of secondary value 
(ie one end of a dualism, eg reason and unreason, is regarded more desirable and valid 
than the other) are interrupted.  Deconstruction pays attention, or lays bare, differences 
and similarities and the underlying meanings not apparent at first, including alternative 
meanings.  Madness is about excitement, the irrational, folly and unreason.  Or, rather, 
that which seems to fall outside the boundaries of traditional or modernistic views on 
what knowledge is, and where it comes from; and how we find and create meaning in 
information that is around us, or supplied to us.  Madness is not just a representation of 
alternative truths to and knowledges of our accepted institutionalised meanings, it ís 
those other truths and knowledges and meanings.  Madness may be defined as rash or 
thoughtless behaviour, but it is not less meaningful than some rational, thoughtful or 
logical behaviour.  This behavioural part of the definition is part of the reason why 
madness and action receive attention.  Madness can also be considered as another 
expression of power, especially since one definition of power is that it is the ability to 
influence or persuade people's judgement or emotions. 
 
                                                 
10 It is important to remember that >deconstruction= refers to Derrida=s philosophy, and 
>Deconstructivism= to an approach in architecture. 
Foucault traced the changing perceptions and definitions of madness from the 
Renaissance into the Age of Reason, and to the institutional practices of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.  What is interesting about such an investigation, is that it lays 
bare the transformation of ideas about madness initially being an accepted 
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accompaniment of social life, and was often viewed as inspirational and creative.  This 
mutated into a focus of psychiatric intervention and institutional administration, thus, it 
has been removed from social life and hidden away.  Perhaps it is easier, as Bauman 
(1994:292-293) suggests, to assume that someone with unshared beliefs, beliefs that 
differ from the offered norm, are symptoms of mental disturbances.  Such an assumption 
is much more reassuring to deal with than to face the possible acceptance of the 
possibility that the world's truth is one of many other such truths.  A last line of defence is 
the verdict of insanity and imprisonment. The mad has been marginalised and seen as a 
danger, losing status as Aliteral and metaphorical wanderers in the social landscape@ 
(Fuery & Mansfield 2000:180).  They are subjected to policing and medical intervention 
according to theories of moral, physical, or sexual normality.  A new institution came into 
being, the asylum, and a new type of knowledge, known as psychiatric knowledge.  
Lacan (Ulmer 1990:162) attempted to remove the separation, brought about by the 
Enlightenment, between science and madness, and to bring them together in one 
discourse.  It is the natural language that the science of the Enlightenment tried to 
eliminate entirely from the discourse of knowledge. (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:94-95; 
Ulmer 1990:162). 
 
Of great importance in Foucault's (1965:v) approach to madness, is the reconsideration 
of folly as the complex social phenomenon it was, and still is.  It is an inseparable part of 
the human condition, another image of who we think we are. The contribution by 
Foucault highlights two important aspects, which is also symptomatic of other theories 
and their developmental stages. The first aspect is that it sheds light on historical 
developments, such as the sudden discontinuity between the Renaissance view of 
madness as an alternative insight and imagination, but also as death of the mind, 
dreading folly as much as they admired it; and the Classical view (eighteenth century) of 
madness as unreason and therefore external to any meaningful way of understanding 
and communication (a form of silence).  This is pretty much how we seem to approach 
most things we do not understand or cannot explain in a rational manner, or rather, we 
rationalise its existence away. The second aspect is that the historical processes are laid 
bare that made the co-ordination of institutional practice and scientific knowledge a highly 
important factor in modern life. A consideration of madness is about the actions that 
divides madness, or established the distance between reason and non-reason. Madness 
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as the manifestation of the soul, became known as the unconscious part of the mind due 
to the influence of Freud.  There is no more communication between the person of 
reason and the person of madness because of societal conformity to a language of 
reason which silenced madness.  Conformity is a relinquishing of power for a focus on 
limits rather than on identity. (Foucault 1965:xi-viii). 
 
Both aspects of the historical developments identified by Foucault (madness, and 
institutional power) are powerful forms of knowing and action that is reflective of the 
characteristics of society. These characteristics, especially in the information society, 
seem oppositional and mutually exclusive. The distrust in action, especially action of the 
unpredictable and unsanctioned kind, also led to the twentieth century obsession with 
locking away, marginalising or institutionalising of that which represents madness. 
Madness, as indicated, is less about psychosis, and more about what is feared as 
alternative ways of knowing, of having truths and understanding meaning.  Madness also 
serves as an example of how our configuration of meaningful information is influenced by 
the era within which we find ourselves.  The dominating ideas, oppositions to these ideas, 
and available knowledge of such an era are just some of the influences on our 
experiences and understandings of our environment.  
 
The following paragraph is an example of how folly or madness is used to cross 
traditional and classical rules of composition for time, space and function in architecture, 
as well as allowing space for disjunction and a kind of contamination of ideas by 
traditional opposites.  It affords the configuring of meaningful information more freedom 
while still allowing for boundaries.  In the chapter on information science we will show the 
value of the grid employed by Bernard Tschumi for the subject field. 
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4.8 Le Parc de la Villette (the Folies), Paris (1984-90) of Bernard Tschumi 
 
Bernard Tschumi's11 project Le Parc de la Villette, an architectural artwork, is one of his 
experiments in Deconstructivist architecture (called 'Deconstructivism').  The project 
draws from the theoretical fields of architecture, psychoanalysis and the philosophy of 
deconstruction of French philosopher Jacques Derrida; and it also serves as an example 
of psychoanalysis overcoming its borders, allowing its external and internal aspects to 
intermingle.  Tschumi aimed to free madness, or folie, and confrontation from their 
original historical (theoretical and institutional) connotations by placing them on an 
abstract plane to allow for new meanings to emerge.  This allows for new meanings to be 
received and formed (Ulmer 1990:164; Tschumi 1998:173). A free space is created in 
effect to allow for open debate and collaborative research (Ulmer 1990:164-5).  Le Parc 
de la Villette illustrates the contemporary situation of disjunctions and dissociations 
between use, form and social values.  This disjunction suggests an interchangeable 
relation between object, movement and action, and a contamination of form which breaks 
with the more traditional classical rules of composition.  The balanced relationship 
between forms is placed in conflict, effectively disturbing its unity.   
Tschumi also shows through the project that theory cannot be reduced to its own practice 
(Steele 2001:202-203; Tschumi 1998:175-6). The deliberate disturbance of balance and 
the expected by disjunction and contamination, places Tschumi firmly within 
Deconstructivism (architecture).  The generally accepted and applied values of Aharmony, 
unity, and stability@ (Steele 2001:203) are challenged by the acceptance of flaws as part 
of the structure. Tschumi questioned the validity of architecture reflecting stability, 
balance, harmony, and continuity, when the world within which architecture is located is 
characterised by dissociation (separation, distancing, decay) and the destruction of unity. 
Architecture needs to reflect this world within which it finds itself as it exists only through 
that world (Tschumi 1998:176). The eclectic excess of styles we witness in Post-
Modernism have, according to Tschumi, removed meaning from architectural language.  
Refer to the Appendix (Plates 1 B 8) for examples of some of the folies or points brought 
together in a system of relations afforded by the point grid. 
 
                                                 
11 Swiss-born, American-based architect (Steele 2001:210). 
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This adds another level to Dupuy=s assertion that increasing amounts of information 
result in a decrease of meaning. For Tschumi an excess of meaning has no meaning. 
The key to this lies in his question: A... how can meaning be produced when signs only 
refer to other signs; when they do not signify, but only substitute?@ (Tschumi 1998:176). 
Signs are variables and form a constant. Form can be identified and therefore contains 
meaning, but does not know more than it can express. In Tschumi=s words AForm is the 
knowledge of being@ (Tschumi 1998:177). 
 
The plans to Le Parc de la Villette12 reveal relations that produce invention and 
innovation. Invention is only possible when seemingly unrelated ideas or forms are 
brought together in unexpected ways (Ulmer 1990:165). We shall see this when we 
consider what Information Science is and could be all about, not to ensure its survival but 
to ensure its continued creative, adaptable and active existence. The La Villette project is 
not about cause and effect relations. The oppositions between, for example, form and 
function, structure and economics, are replaced by superimposition and the 
disentanglement of conventions, concepts and the relation between architecture and its 
historical dependence on existing theory. The play or relation between function/use and 
form/style is opposed. It is a confrontation with the outside or external world and objects 
of architecture.  
 
Tschumi has an alternative way of delivering knowledge to problems and relating matters 
to each other. Instead of using reason, rational argument and authentic evidence to solve 
problems, he designs an alternative called >madness= (folie). This is made up of 
combinations and permutations among various categories (eg space, event, symbol, 
technique) of analysis. (Ulmer 1990:166-176). Tschumi uses schizophrenia as an 
example, because schizophrenics succeed in existing through hiding in another mode of 
being. They exist >outside= the body, sacrificing origins, identity and protective limits. This 
disturbs and interferes with the relation of subject to reality, and subverts content through 
form by placing words and objects on the same level. La Villette aims to make possible a 
correspondence between the schizophrenic dissociated elements. Knowledge of our 
relationship to such dislocated parts (whether of a city or an idea), and the necessity of 
such a relationship, brings us to transference. Transference is a tool with which we can 
                                                 
12From here on referred to as >La Villette=. 
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try and reconstruct the totality of the subject, and relates to a similar practice in 
psychoanalysis. The points of the grid of La Villette acts as meeting points or catch-nets 
for the fragments of dislocated reality due to dissociation. The grid serves as a diagram 
of order superimposed on the disorder of reality. The grid not only secures but also 
articulates and activates space (Tschumi 1998:177-179).  
 
Each folie serves as a support or the focus point for the reassembly of a new reference 
system. Without it the Park cannot form the dissociations into a system of relations 
between objects, events, and people. Madness is simultaneously a word and an object, a 
mixture of entertainment and psychoanalysis. In La Villette the cubic cages of red steel 
are the folies and can undergo deviation through permutation and combination of parts. 
Madness is taken here for use as invention. Reflected in such an approach is the 
contemporary milieu of disjunction and dissociation between use, form and social values, 
that we find ourselves in. La Villette represents, or rather replicates, these disjunctions 
which are superimposed by points, lines, and surfaces. The latter three registers can also 
be objects, movements, and spaces. Such superimposition allows for unpredictable 
interruptions and contaminations. Further interference and discordance are successfully 
introduced by subcontracting each folie to a different designer. 
 
La Villette is thus truly heterogeneous and promotes instability, disruption, and 
confrontation of elements (Ulmer 1990:167). Important for us is that this does not imply 
that the theories, ideas and practices of the natural sciences, social sciences and 
humanities should be synthesised in a unified field. These sciences are different and 
should be related to each other through chance interference. La Villette is the park or 
space of discourse through which groups can be distributed. This is similar to how the 
folies were subcontracted to allow for inventions and surprising cross-contaminations. It 
is a collective construction based on a point grid that joins while at the same time keeping 
distinct and separate; the grid mediates between mutually exclusive systems. The folie is 
an anchor, permitting synthesis. On the site of La Villette the grid of folies allows for the 
combination of places of transference, and the folie becomes both the place and object of 
transference. It is a regrouping of dissociated structures through the fragmented 
transference in madness. (Tschumi 1998:179-180; Ulmer 1990:168).  
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La Villette, though, is above all about combination. This seems to be in opposition to what 
we have said so far about disjunction, dissociation and fragmentation. La Villette also 
challenges institutional structures such as museums and urban parks. La Villette is 
combinative in the sense that it regroups our fragmented contemporary, mad, condition in 
unexpected ways. This is done through permutations that have no link to the past of the 
fragments, and the new >whole= that they now form is not coherent. 
 
The projects of the American architect Peter Eisenman (Steele 2001:203) was strongly 
influenced by the philosophy of 'deconstruction' of Derrida, which introduces disorder 
deliberately into communication as a virus, and destroys logocentrism (where the 
language of a text takes precedence over its content, and meaning is fixed).  This is the 
major difference between Post-Modernism and Deconstructivism, as the destruction of 
the dominant position of language and text stands in opposition to the semiotic structure 
of Post-Modernism.  Derrida's philosophy has also found a >place= in architecture 
(besides literature, literary theory, cultural studies, psychology, media studies, art, 
linguistics, and others) in that it allows for interaction between architecture and the home. 
 It is in the home where philosophy, discourse and aesthetics are positioned.  Even 
though we are not going to discuss Eisenman, he is an important figure in 
Deconstructivism.  He was the first to focus on the decentring of the human being by the 
use of the idea of a continuously changing text in architecture, or an eternal whirlpool of 
disintegration and renewal.  He accomplished this by weakening the traditional 
symbolism of shelter and permanence, as well as displacing conventional representation, 
in his architectural projects. (Steele 2001:203).  
 
A similar rejection of the preexisting ideology of past masterplans, is found in Tschumi=s 
point grid of folies. The latter offers a place for new investment, accessing space, and 
from space to time. The dialectic of space and time permits the building of the imaginary 
through symbol and reality. The folie as an intermediary space allows a multidimensional 
approach and we can introduce the restructuring of a dissociated world on new bases. It 
will be new because the reconstructing of a reality that has been deconstructed can 
never be done as it was before (Tschumi 1998:179-180). Tschumi=s reference to the 
psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan is timely for us in Information science. Lacan=s 
position, according to Tschumi, is that even though theory is informed by practice, it can 
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never be reduced to that practice. Architecture may be informed by space, time, history, 
movement, but cannot be those factors alone (Tschumi 1998:175-6). This kind of 
realisation needs to be made in information theory and information practice. Practice is 
not the effect caused by theory; there is still a point beyond application that is never 
reached as final and fixed synthesis. We need a theory that allows for the unexpected, 
chance, the unsure, disjunction, the pragmatic and emotions. The irrational, as in 
architecture, has been excluded from what we regard as reason and needs to be 
accounted for. Reason and unreason, for example, may be in a dualistic relationship, but 
such an opposition does not make the one (usually reason) preferable above the other. 
This allows for understanding dualism not as oppositions, but as dependent on each 
other for existence and meaning. Invention, as exposed by Tschumi=s projects, is 
suppressed and avoided through conditions that do not encourage discovery and 
invention. We typically find this in a university setup that organises the divisions between 
disciplines in such a way that it is almost impossible to breach the fixed boundaries of 
specialisations.  It also makes the configuration of meaningful information more 
complicated. 
 
Tschumi offers us a way of shifting the deadlock. He does not theorise and then design. 
He attends to theoretical concerns as he designs or works in the Alanguage of art@ (Ulmer 
1990:165). To accomplish this we need to question and reassess the classical 
oppositions found in conventional theories and practices. This includes persistent classic 
oppositions in university courses, for example truth/action, basic/applied research, 
science/humanities, knowledge/opinion, research/popularisation (Ulmer 1990:166).  
These oppositions are important, and do not simply not exist just because we do not 
want to accept them.  It is rather about an awareness of such oppositions and the 
possibility of studying them together as part of the same environment. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
 
The relation of power to information and knowledge, is also a relation of power to 
madness and action.  The closeness of the relations between power, madness and 
action, is clear when attempting to define them as concepts. The information society is 
the milieu within which power, action and madness, are situated. Society is dynamic and 
is affected by scientific and technological efforts.  Even though it may seem that the shift 
or change from the Modern to the Postmodern can be clearly distinguished, ideas of the 
Modern still permeate the Postmodern in aspects such as art and aesthetics, politics, 
science, truth, intellectual pursuits, madness and its association with unreason. Armed 
with meaningful information and understanding, a society will hopefully have the power to 
shape its own future.  Yet, hidden agendas and personal pursuits may distort the way 
information is configured and represented or repackaged as meaningful, and since we 
can never be entirely uninvolved in some way, such distortion is not necessarily negative 
but inevitable. This opposes the idea that scientific and technological endeavours are 
autonomous and separate from the complexities of society. 
 
According to Bauman (1994:294) the modernist approach to science, offering us 
scientific knowledge that is superior to any other knowledge, sets out to purify the world 
of unreason, madness, obscurity and undecidability. This is to be done in order to bring 
about a harmonious and transparent world. This is similar to Dupuy=s myths of the 
information society. Such a disclaimer of uncertainty and ambiguity has been strongly 
contested in the postmodern abandonment of the idea that the pursuit of knowledge will 
rid us of such temporary uncertainties. It needs to be acknowledged that there is more 
than one way of reporting an event, or many ways a story can develop, depending on the 
world view and agenda of the individual or group involved. Modernity moves into 
postmodernity when it accepts that as knowledge grows, so the field of ignorance will 
expand. This awareness of the constant of ignorance and the unknown does not imply 
that the journey for knowledge is futile, but that we should persevere in the travel while 
accepting that the acquisition of knowledge expresses itself in the awareness of more 
ignorance.   
 
 
 
105 
Bourdieu (1992:46-49) suggests that we do not define universal limits, but rather define 
limits in terms of their social constitution.  This way we can perhaps create ways of 
including even what seems impossible to research, into our fields of study since truth is 
seldom obvious. Our internal censors, as well as social censors, can make a whole 
collection of things unthinkable.  We need to be aware of these censors as a practical 
way of ensuring that in defining the limits of thought, we are constantly aware of the 
social and intellectual rootedness that determine the object and subject of research.  
Setting boundaries inadvertently excludes other related fields of study, but does not 
make them less valid.  Set boundaries or limits should allow for further development and 
growth. (Bauman 1994: 294-295; Foucault 1980:230-237). 
 
In the next chapter on information science we attend to the possibility of setting such 
boundaries while remaining open to, and aware of, interdisciplinary influences. This is 
discussed against the background of the aspects covered in this study. We cannot 
establish information science as an interscience in the configuration of meaningful 
information, if we do not study the aspects that strongly affect the way people configure 
and represent their world of knowledge.  These aspects were attended to in the previous 
chapters regarding the concepts of information and knowledge; the information society as 
the environment for meaningful information; our experience and memory of ourselves as 
being and of others in our world; and how language, image, power and madness are 
represented and configured (and how they in turn shape and determine how we 
represent and configure them as meaningful information).   
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CHAPTER 5 
INFORMATION SCIENCE AS EXPLORER OF MEANINGFUL INFORMATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
We focus here on the role of information science, as an interscience, in the configuration 
of meaningful information.  Also brought together here are meaningful information and 
knowledge for action as an applicable framework.  We have already in the foregoing 
chapters touched on aspects such as theory and practice, and related information and 
knowledge work; the neglected aspect of human fulfilment; the consequences of action; 
the problems and challenges of information overload; creativity and inventiveness; the 
questioning of traditional conceptions of science and knowledge.  The shifts and 
transformations due to postmodernist influence, knowledge approaches in the sciences, 
and so on, do not leave information science unaffected.  One form that action can take 
on is that of exploration.  The purpose of exploration on the one hand is about searching 
and travelling to be able to make and search out discoveries, examining carefully 
unfamiliar territory.  A result of exploration may be the establishment of procedures and 
ground rules.  To be able to reach the point of establishing such stability it is necessary to 
establish the nature of an issue, problem, uncertainty, etc before treatment or solutions 
can be brought about.  As an explorer of meaningful information, information science 
retains the value and existence of its two main approaches to information, that is a broad 
and narrow approach, as discussed in this chapter. 
 
The aim is to indicate whether information science can be a major role player in the 
configuration of meaningful information. The problem faced is the immense amount of 
available information, of which a small percentage may be meaningful, thus containing 
and representing content of more than use-value. The value of experience, implicit and 
explicit knowledge, understanding, interpretation, are all intricately related. If some are 
focused on to the detriment of others, it eliminates vast and rich fields that add to 
configuring meaning from an array of information sources.  Meaningful information can 
be configured or separated from the mass of available information through the formal but 
flexible springboard of an interscience, such as we propose information science can 
ideally be. 
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We have addressed the paradox identified by Dupuy (1980), that the more information 
we have access to, the less meaning we have.  This forms part of the problematic of 
configuring meaningful information.  A search for, and a shaping of, meaningful 
information may prove more fruitful than the search for absolute truths. The challenge to 
information science is to find and create ways of including that which is considered 
beyond the preconstructed limits of the discipline.  These limits must ideally be open-
ended to allow broader enquiry into the phenomenon of information, and we saw the 
possibilities for this in Tschumi's approach in his point grids and folies of La Villette.   
 
Another important focus of information science is the discipline's concern with humans, 
their knowledge usage, the knowledge transformation process, and especially the 
conceptualisation of knowledge and information.  It can be interpreted as being 
concerned with the re-empowerment of society.  The person-world relationship attended 
to in chapter 3 on being and dasein showed us its complexity, and chapter 4 on 
configuration and representation emphasised inventiveness and heterogeneous thinking. 
  
The involvement and engagement of humans with their world are deeply interrelated and 
interdependent.  If our world is heterogeneous and the major matters interrelated, then 
Information Science cannot ignore it, because the field itself is located in that world.  De 
Beer (1996b:75) indicates that it is not necessarily the issues that have changed, but that 
they need to be approached from a radically different point of view to what he calls 'new 
knowledge'.  This is not merely a superficial shift.  It is a real paradigm shift that needs 
the core of the subject field to be turned around, as well as a change in behaviour.  
Inventiveness needs to be core and not reproduction.  As already mentioned in chapter 
4, thinking and doing (theory and practice) are not on a continuum of two ultimately 
opposite points.  The exercise of a science starts with thinking, and we think as we 
continue to practice because we always aim for that point beyond application called 
synthesis and understanding.  Too often we stop at the application as if it is the ultimate 
end.   
 
The traditional approaches that put the 'versus' between the development of theory and 
the practical involvement with matters, form a gap that needs to be bridged.  This gap 
has led to an unfortunate isolation within information science of its theoretical and applied 
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considerations (De Beer 1996b:76-77).  These considerations should be treated as 
necessary opposites that are complementary.  The commodification of information, and 
also knowledge, hampers us here because a commodity approach does not want 
uncertainty or action or invention as it implies possible risk, and risk cannot be pre-solved 
or foreseen.  The relatedness of chaos and order, for example, and concepts such as 
dissemination, discontinuity, chance, undecidability, and others, form part of a 
transformed conception of knowledge.  Tschumi, Derrida and Eisenman especially 
emphasised these concepts and their opposites as of equal importance and validity, as 
well as their compatibility (De Beer 1996b:80-82). 
 
5.2 Information science, science and a changing world 
 
Contemporary developments in science seems linear and singular, a result of an 
undesirable separation between basic and applied science.  The separation was 
unfortunate for both, because they are complementary.  The aim should be at long-term 
goals and solutions. The artificial division in science is a modern phenomenon and not 
natural to the origins of science (which is interwoven with that of philosophy).  According 
to Derrida and Lyotard the sciences need to move away from oppositional thinking, and 
recognise that there are instabilities (postmodern and deconstruction viewpoints). A 
distinction between the benefits and drawbacks of diversification and  fragmentation must 
be made to avoid over-specialisation. It is important to share the existence of information, 
to communicate, to consider the humanness of users (or >players=), and ultimately acquire 
wisdom.   
 
Risk and uncertainty which cannot always be accounted for in more traditional 
approaches to science, need to be taken into account. The importance of action lies 
therein that methods should be inventive, and not merely discoveries. Our world is 
created as we live and experience, and does not exist to be discovered.  Unfortunately, 
scientific research (including the social sciences) seems caught up in the study of 
preconstructed concepts and ready-made realities. These >chosen= concepts and 
subjects, all lie within a tradition of socially constructed limits. How a researcher uses and 
defines the concepts, indicates a particular tradition being favoured. 
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Preconstructed or given data offers itself as a reality, but it has been invested with the 
categories of unconscious construction of meaning-giving of those who constructed it in 
the first place B  the subjective aspect. These constructed realities that subdue the power 
of knowledge for action, need to be exposed and challenged (Bourdieu 1992:37-44). One 
would find many reasons and arguments for and against the subjectivity versus 
objectivity debate in the sciences.  Whenever the one is emphasised at the cost of the 
other, we find imbalance, narrow views, stagnated ideas and closed boundaries. Both 
carry great responsibility even though subjectivity, in the history of Western science, has 
been deemed less desirable than the goal of objectivity. Subjectivity is plural, polyphonic, 
but it is demanded of it to be singular (singularity). It becomes therefore ambiguous such 
as nation versus individual right. There needs to be a move away from the failure of the 
universal representation of subjectivity.  Such a move is essential for the re-
empowerment of society, and thus of the subject or individual. Society implies people 
which necessarily implies human bodilyness. Technology links this to virtuality and 
cyberspace. This new space has implications for how we look at, and experience, the 
position of the subject and the object (ie, meaningfulness and dasein, and our relations to 
others and the world). It should also focus on the importance of collective intelligence and 
our world view.  
 
To repeat what we said in chapter 2, it is crucial that we seriously consider the function of 
science and technology in society in order to understand our position in the contemporary 
world (including scientific thinking, development, innovation, compassion, and curiosity). 
Interdisciplinary interaction should then lead to knowledge implementation. An 
interactivity between the sciences and society are crucial and can be reached through 
the application of information with appropriate meaning. 
 
Scientific research and inquiry (McCarthy 2001:287) are guided by three cognitive 
interests corresponding to three forms of the humanities.  These are technical control and 
instrumental rationality in the empirical-analytic method, the understanding of meaning 
and social action in hermeneutical science, and emancipation from domination in the 
dialectical or critical science.  The cognitive interest of each form of the humanities will 
determine the objectivity, method, and logic of the validity claims of each form.  
Hermeneutics (the science of the interpretation and understanding of texts; the method 
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used to understand and study human beings in society), as part of the humanities or 
social sciences, emphasised issues of meaning and language in history.  Two important 
foci of hermeneutics for information science are its role as mediator between past and 
present and text and interpreter (Hans-Georg Gadamer), which is about the historical 
dialogue leading to shared meaning and experience in which traditions and values of the 
past are transmitted to the present.  The second focus is where hermeneutics have an 
interest in the understanding of the other, bridging time and individuals, repairing 
connections between traditions, and in the symbolic act of sharing meaning and values 
(Karl-Otto Apel).  The goal of hermeneutics that should concern us in information 
science, is mutual understanding and communication necessary for the enhancement of 
practical life and the broadening of cultural horizons and social possibilities as beings-in-
the-world (Heidegger) (McCarthy 2001:287-288).  
 
The Cartesian dualism between subjective consciousness and objective reality is 
overcome.  This is indicated as such by Gadamer=s use of Heidegger's insights and 
vocabulary, which treat us as already existing as 'beings-in-the-world'.  We have an 
active engagement with the world through the interpretation and understanding of our 
world.  We make our world visible and known to others through the different forms of 
philosophical, moral, and technical knowledge. 
 
The danger in the natural sciences has always been the arbitrary abstraction of 
individuals through a false objectivity to form artificial statements.  Such arbitrary 
abstraction cannot be done by individuals, because they are involved in the world and 
history.  Human beings are historical and interpretive beings involved in understanding 
and evaluating the world. Stated otherwise, the researcher is situated in a specific culture 
and historical moment.  He or she therefore has a pre-understanding of existing cultural 
values and social meanings, the method of interpretive understanding, and can never 
stand objectively outside the process (as is presupposed by philosophical and scientific 
knowledge).  Fore-knowledge organises our objective experience of the world in terms of 
the horizons of meaning which is the hidden cause of art, science, religion, literature, 
politics, etc.  The ideals and intentionality of human action are directed by these cultural 
values.  (McCarthy 2001:287-288, 294). 
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It is often theorists schooled in the traditional academic methods who develop radical 
ways of rethinking both subject matter and processes of analysis. It demonstrates the 
importance of a solid grounding in one tradition and constitute the emergence of another, 
developed in order to overcome specific issues. This is especially true of information 
science, within which such tendencies have been seen, but often suppressed by those 
clinging to the traditionally known and >safe= paradigms. Important for any discipline, is 
the combination of drawing different sources of research focus together, engaging with 
new information forms, and attempts to produce new analytical methods. Through these 
efforts, identity is given to a discipline. Any new or young discipline, or scientific group, 
needs at some point to move away from its roots of origin.  It is a price that must be paid 
in order for such a discipline or field to reach scientific research status. 
 
Thus, the initial stage of exploration needs to mature into the unique field it aims to be.  
Such a move away from the core of the roots of a discipline implies a break or opposing 
set of aims, techniques, theories, etc. The discipline still needs to border or bracket itself 
within the ideal of interdisciplinary status.  Such a discipline needs to consider the 
borrowing, adapting and altering of other movements (methodologies and systems of 
analysis) to produce a different set of ideas and issues.  
 
Different analyses are not necessarily antagonistic or incompatible, but represent a 
different intellectual process. Therefore, a discipline can develop an own set of critical 
tools, because each discipline or movement engages with the material in a different way. 
By examining where such tools come from, it will then enable us to identify another set of 
influences for the discipline. The variety of paradigms with which a discipline concerns 
itself in turn produces new paradigms of, for example, the image or information.  These 
aspects lead to the production of a new set of images, or approaches to information, that 
go beyond the mere combination of paradigms or representations. The key aim is to 
develop the analytical competence to address an increasingly image-driven world, 
focused on information (Fuery & Mansfield 2000:90). 
 
All the changes happening in the sciences can be seen either as a more subtle paradigm 
shift, or as a dramatic and radical transformation. A redefinition of accepted concepts is 
needed, readdressing dehumanisation while avoiding humanism, and taking into 
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consideration new research into the ecology of knowledge. The importance of knowing 
on which modes of thinking (underlying philosophical assumptions) practices rest, and 
the new perspectives in practical and theoretical activities, have implications for the 
power relation of information. The power of understanding and explanation must not be 
underestimated. The intellectual ethnocentrism of the formal education system needs to 
be reassessed (Bourdieu). An interscience needs to investigate the ready-made realities 
and those that are hidden and obscured, that is those which lie beyond constructed 
objects. This is especially important as these theoretical realities do not necessarily exist. 
 
5.3 Information science 
 
Before we can consider whether information science is not only an interscience, but also 
whether it is well-situated as the kind of science that can be considered in the 
configuration of meaningful information, we need to determine what information science 
consists of.  As Ingwersen points out, education in information science often 
overemphasises only one aspect, that is either strongly practice-oriented or mainly 
theoretical and scientific in scope (Ingwersen 1994:197). A helpful approach is that of 
Kochen (1983b:374).  He refers to the narrow and broad sense of information science.  
Bates (1999:1043-1044) distinguishes in a similar manner between the visible substrate 
of information science ('paradigm13 above the water line') and the invisible substrate of 
information science ('paradigm below the waterline'). We will refer to it as the narrow and 
broad approaches in the subject field of information science. 
 
                                                 
13The core of the paradigm of a subject field contains a body of theory and methodology.  This 
includes the world view held regarding the phenomena of interest to the subject field (Bates 
1999:1043). 
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5.3.1 The narrow approach to information science 
 
In the narrow approach the focus is on recorded material (physical documents) and forms 
part of the explicit paradigm of information science.  The concerns are with organising 
collections of documents and facilitating their access and use by library users (Bates 
1999:1043; Kochen 1983b:374).  In information science the processes employed for 
control are typically taught in applied information science, and are called classification, 
indexing, abstracting and cataloguing.  Classification (grouping like things together), 
indexing (including thesauri) and abstracting are intellectual control of information 
resources devices.  Cataloguing, on the other hand, is used for bibliographic description 
purposes, that is for physical control of information resources (Burger 2004). 
 
All these processes are applied in libraries, archives, museums, the publishing industry, 
and all other information institutes where documentation is executed.  The purpose is 
information organisation and retrieval, in other words, access to information.  
Classification systems reflect the treatment (or categorisation) of the universe of 
knowledge (also referred to as philosophical classification).  Thus, classification has its 
roots in philosophy.  Most classificationists (scheme-makers), such as Melvil Dewey and 
SR Ranganathan, were known philosophers.  Indexing evolved as an application of these 
theories, and is accepted as a kind of classification.  The theory of cataloguing is more of 
an applied nature in that it focuses on the functions of a catalogue, user needs and 
bibliographic control (Burger 2004).  The main tasks, according to Kochen (1983a), that 
we are concerned with in the narrow approach is the continual selection from a growing 
record, bibliographic control or organising and maintaining the collection (as well as the 
tools that enable the information professional and his or her patron to determine what is 
in the collection and where it is), and guiding the patrons in the use of the records.  
These main tasks are consistent with a fairly stable definition of information science as 
Athe study of the gathering, organizing, storing, retrieving, and dissemination of 
information.@  (Bates 1999:1044).  These tasks relate to the core elements of the domain 
as identified by Ingwersen (1994:198), which are information seeking, retrieval, and  
management; IR systems design; and informetrics. 
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We can compare the product of classification theory, namely the classification system, to 
the point grid of Tschumi's Le Parc de la Villette.  The grid relates to the classification 
system in the sense that like things are grouped or clustered together (each group a point 
or folie), even when these groups themselves may be quite disparate.  Such an 
arrangement makes it possible to detect things grouped together that we thought were 
related but are exposed through the grid as not being so.  It also makes it possible to 
detect relations not previously noticed or recognised, while retaining the benefits of an 
organised yet flexible system that continues to evolve.   
 
Even though classification systems as applied by classifiers (tool users) belong to the 
narrow approach to information science, the theory behind such systems as configured 
by classificationists (tool creators) rather fit into the broad approach to information 
science.  The understanding of the narrow approach or visible/explicit paradigm is 
essential if we are to understand the intrinsic unity of the entire paradigm.  Bates 
(1999:1044) uses a definition of information science formulated by Borko in 1969.  It 
includes aspects that span a narrow and broad approach, and these are the  
investigation of the properties and behaviour of information; forces that direct the flow of 
information; the means of processing information for access and use; the body of 
knowledge that relates to the organisation, collection, storage, interpretation, 
transformation, utilisation, etc, of information. 
 
Borko sums information science up as having a pure science component (inquiry into the 
subject), and an applied science component (application, development of services and 
products (Bates 1999:1044).  The narrow approach to what used to be called 
librarianship, has come a long way since its roots in library schools that taught routines 
and procedures, which led to graduates as doers rather than thinkers.  The goal was 
'use' as opposed to knowing or understanding, and the main concern was with process 
and not purpose.  The dominance of and preference for online networks and access to 
databanks brought its pragmatic roots to the fore, though.  We lose sight of the fact that it 
is about more than mechanised, efficient access (Shera 1983:383). 
 
Ingwersen's (1994:198) idea of desired information features in his definition of 
information science that considers, and aims at, aspects such as the communication of 
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information to human generators and users; conceptualisation and understanding of 
information environments, information needs and seeking of individuals and groups; and 
organising information resources to assist in the successful access to desired 
information.  We cannot begin to consider attaining meaningful information or assisting 
others in finding or configuring it, if we do not first of all understand our own information 
needs.  The quality of interaction is determined by the ideas of desire and storage, and 
strengthened via an understanding of information in a broader context than technology 
and science, and allowing for flexibility of technology that fits the human (Ingwersen 
1994:198-199). 
 
5.3.2 The broad approach to information science 
 
The broad approach to information science according to Kochen (1983b:374) is primarily 
concerned with information and knowledge, understanding and wisdom.  These concepts 
involve the aspects or topics included in this study, such as language, images, power, 
being, etc.  Taking one example from the subject field of information science, namely the 
study of human needs, we may realise the following.  To fully understand, interpret and 
deal with human needs, it is necessary to understand the reactions of humans to their 
being and existence in the world, to the place and role of others in that world, how 
humans understand and experience, insight into cognitive processes, and the 
management of the environments within which all these aspects take place.  Our 
reactions to all of the aforementioned determine how we will view matters such as power, 
madness, and the possibility of going over into action.  For example, the use of 
technology, such as information technology (IT) and ICT, in classification, cataloguing 
and indexing to make sense of information.  Our view of all of these things is our 
reference framework, including our pre-knowledge, gained and existing knowledge; and 
is the only way to configure meaningful information. 
 
Certain goals identified by library and information scientist academics in Denmark, 
already in 1990, concern us and indicate that it is crucial to allow for the presence of both 
the narrow and broad approaches in information science.  The goals are part of a 
continuous learning programme.  The first goals of interest were to ensure that graduates 
are not just practitioners or professionals, but also scientifically minded.  Such student 
 
 
116 
may be encouraged to continue with their studies to doctoral level, or to develop further 
in research careers, within the diversity of information and knowledge-related disciplines 
(Ingwersen 1994:198).  The next goal, necessary for the success of the first, is that 
information science needs to be a coherent scientific discipline.  One way of attaining this 
is promoting a global view of research, development and professionalism.  Ingwersen 
suggests that the unproductive fragmentation of information science conceptions into 
various sub-disciplines be addressed. 
 
The Danish model of information science is divided into Information Science Theory, 
Information Management & Economics, and Applied Information Science (Ingwersen 
1994:200). These three sections concern boundaries and scientific viewpoints; making 
technology fit the human; information is about more than technology and science; and 
flexibility. Wersig (1990) divides his discussion of information science into the changing 
role of knowledge; going beyond the beginning of information science as 
>documentation=; it has no scientific domain; knowledge for action; postmodern science; 
importance of interconcepts (which is about more than re-definitions).  Interconcepts 
result from information science cutting across other academic disciplines, and having an 
interest in the subject matter of such disciplines.  Bates (1999:1044) calls information 
science a meta-science. The interconcepts (knowledge) interrelate the concepts of 
traditional disciplines without being understood as transdisciplinary. The latter status 
would rob information science of its status as a science.  (Wersig prefers to focus on 
knowledge rather than information.) 
 
Hjørland (2002:422) identifies key questions such as what kind of knowledge is required 
by information specialists working in a specific subject field; or what approaches are used 
to produce domain-specific knowledge.  Examples of such approaches are historical 
studies, research on indexing and retrieval specialities, empirical user studies, 
epistemological and critical studies, terminological studies, discourse studies, etc.  What 
he identifies is the realisation that different domains cannot be treated as if they are 
similar, and that different discourse communities should be taken into account.  The 
challenge lies in training professional information specialists while not merely teaching 
research subject knowledge alone. 
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The role of information science in the configuration of meaningful information in the face 
of the existence of such fragmentation, is determined by the issues covered in this study. 
 This environment of information science brings us to the relationship with other 
disciplines.  The environmental context has to do with language, aesthetics, images, etc 
and such a diverse context explains and leads to cultural diversity.  All of this is crucial to 
information science, because to be able to classify from the apparent chaos of our 
growing knowledge universe, we need to understand and interpret the recorded 
information already available to us.  Without meaning we cannot begin to grasp the 
impact of ordering our world of knowledge.  We cannot afford to forget that even an 
organised system never remains static and rigid.  It needs to be continually updated and 
evolved to keep track with an expanding universe of knowledge.  It is not simply a matter 
of our environment having an influence on an organising system.  The way we organise 
recorded information (as configured and then represented physically) can also influence 
our view of ourselves, the world and others. It is important that we have awareness of 
such an organising system as only a  representation (and even manifestation) of the 
knowledge universe, and that it is not that universe itself.  We are not prisoners to it, but 
retain the choice of configuring meaningful information, and because our world of 
knowledge is vastly expanding due to developments in ICT, it becomes even more 
imperative to be able to configure meaningful information.  That is, configuring as an 
active verb, and not a passive receiving of meaningful information. 
 
5.4 Information science as an interscience 
 
As an interscience, information science could offer the means to meaningful information 
and knowledge for action. It is important to study and discuss information science as a 
possible interscience. It is essential to question the traditional conceptions of science and 
knowledge; and shifts or transformations taking place within these conceptions. 
According to Wersig (1993:231-233) there are four phenomena leading to the changing 
role of knowledge, that is, the depersonalisation of knowledge (communication 
technology); believability of knowledge (observation technology); fragmentation 
(presentation technology); and rationalisation (information technology). These 
phenomena also have implications for the sciences at large.  
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Some of the important aspects affected by the above phenomena are for example, 
information and knowledge; language; meaning and sense; ways of acquiring meaningful 
information (eg a special kind of science; reading; interpretation; inventive strategies); 
madness; aesthetics; value; complexity; and power/action. These aspects all exist and 
co-exist in a changing knowledge environment. Such a new knowledge environment 
implies new realities to be faced by any science.  
 
Information science must not be seen as a prototype for a new kind of science. Its nature 
is interdisciplinary and entails a human perspective while remaining scientific. Ideally, 
such a science allows for a sensitivity to new concepts arising from the interaction, 
competition and collaboration, of older concepts. Interconcepts (Wersig) are taken from 
such diverse fields as physics, philosophy, psychology, semiotics, and literature. 
Examples of such concepts are aesthetics, stochastic-fractal, reason, knowledge, power, 
spatiality, imagery, calculus, meaning, unreason. 
 
An interscience will necessarily practise pure and applied research as collective research 
(methodologies). It does not imply, though, that the group/institution dynamic prevents 
the individual researcher from exercising a unique and personal approach to research. It 
is important to keep in mind that subjectivity is plural and polyphonic, but there is a 
demand for it to be singular (singularity). This leads to an ambiguous position: nation 
versus individual rights, and failure of a universal representation of subjectivity. 
Whichever paradigm chosen, reductionism should be avoided. Or rather, the application 
of one paradigm at the cost of other methods (the danger of hegemony) must be 
avoided. 
 
A focus on inventiveness, transformation, apparent opposites, and complexities, is one 
way of avoiding such dangers. It is essential in configuring meaningful information from 
an overload of mostly >meaningless= information or noise. Information science as an 
interscience offers a means of overcoming Dupuy=s paradox of  A ... ours is a world about 
which we pretend to have more and more information but which seems to us increasingly 
devoid of meaning@ (Dupuy 1980:3). This can be overcome by configuring or forming 
meaningful information, that is, how to give and find meaning within (and from) the mass 
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of the information >rubbish= (Wersig) explosion. This touches on the nature of the myth, 
which is economic as well as political (Dupuy 1980:4). 
 
Implied in a new kind of approach, is the re-consideration of concepts; reconsideration of 
the ecology of knowledge; and avoiding or readdressing dehumanisation, as well as the 
tyranny of >humanism= (as distinguished from >humanitarian=). A new approach also aims 
at diversification rather than fragmentation (or at least a linking of those fragments). 
Power (including understanding and explanation) is an important factor in (or influence 
on) society. New perspectives are needed in practical as well as theoretical activities, for 
example on which modes of thinking certain practices rest. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
An interscience seems to be an ideal approach for the contemporary era which is already 
moving beyond the postmodern, while retaining characteristics from both the modern and 
postmodern influences. Even such a scientific approach should avoid losing its 
uniqueness, and stagnation, in order to retain its viability and vitality.  Weizenbaum 
(Wersig 1990:187) spoke about a rubbish explosion and the resultant loss of meaning. 
An interscience needs to re-address and evaluate the role of language, technique, and 
theory in information science. This means not ignoring the role of philosophy, semiotics, 
media, and technological facts of science and communication.   
 
One of the main focus areas will be the human experience of time, space, and reality. 
Linear guidelines (grid) will be complemented and supported by non-linear ones, which is 
a challenge that must be faced. A new research context, or a re-evaluation of the existing 
one, is needed and such a context will have a broader spectrum which can be narrowed 
down where necessary. There are no predetermined results and an interscience should 
have more than problem solutions in mind.  To repeat Ingwersen's  identified aims for 
information science: global view and professionalism of research and development; 
avoidance of  unproductive fragmentation of library and information science conceptions 
into separate semi- or non-related sub-disciplines or units; human generators and users, 
thus human aspects; broader and more synergetic views; desired information; and the 
quality of interaction, thus intentionality for acquiring information. 
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Information science does not claim to be the science of information, and is not confined 
to the study of scientific information transfer and access in society, or solely on the 
means of recording and communication (information technology applications etc).  Other 
areas of concern for information science are more and more determining its boundaries 
and scientific viewpoints, such as making technology fit the human, recognising that 
information is about more than technology and science, and that flexibility in its research 
methodologies is crucial. This is emphasised in the following quote by Shera (1983:384) 
AProcessing data can be performed by machine, but only the human mind can process 
knowledge or even information.@  Related to this is Shera=s statement that librarians are 
only Aincidentally [dealing] with things but primarily with ideas, concepts, and thoughts@ 
(Shera 1983:384). It seems clear, in the present context of information science 
(consisting of a broad and narrow approach), that the scope of information science is no 
longer limited to the manipulation of data.  Mansfield reflects on Shera's statement as 
meaning that information scientists are dealing with sociological and psychological 
phenomena, rather than physical objects and processes, as their main concern. 
 
 
121 
 CONCLUSION 
 
The challenge to information science is to address the various viewpoints regarding 
conflicting conceptualisations of information and knowledge (and the confusion of the one 
with the other), the idea of an information society, which we may or may not yet be, the 
role of existence in a world shared with others and objects, and how representation takes 
different forms in different ways.  We find that these viewpoints are shaped, mutilated, 
subverted and represented as being original in a world that changes.  Changes, 
promising benefits of progress, often disappoint when the human condition does not 
improve, and even more so in a global sense.  Yet, humans have an astounding ability to 
adapt, not necessarily by changing themselves, but by adapting the environment to their 
changing needs. The role of communication, within the study of the humanities (user 
needs, thinking, behaviour, and so on), strongly affects meaningful information. As we 
notice throughout the study, it is especially communication channels that further 
complicate the situation created by the various language structures and usage (meaning, 
interpretation and understanding). These complications are not linear or controllable, and 
are influenced by how we experience time, space and reality. 
 
Only meaningful information can truly empower society, and language, context and 
ideology all influence the way it is translated into action. Chapters 1 to 4 illustrate the 
aspects that influence any discourse regarding information, knowledge, meaning and 
truth. These aspects all enable and determine the configuration and representation of 
meaningful information. We established the information society as the milieu for the 
configuration of meaningful information, as well as the ontological milieu (being, relations 
to others and the world). These environments and contexts for configuration are 
important. Therefore, as society becomes more and more focused on productivity, the 
conflicts resulting from such productivity eventually flow over into all aspects of social life, 
especially those of knowledge, language and power. The closeness of the idea of an 
information society to information theory and technology, accentuates the ambiguities in 
what constitutes an information society. In many texts by information scientists, an 
understanding of >information society= has more to do with IT and much less with 
humans. We find that it is important to realise that the function of science and technology 
in society is to understand the position of humans in the contemporary world. Scientific 
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progress always influences the meanings people appropriate from information as 
represented by such progress. We indicated that interdisciplinary interaction allows for 
knowledge implementation, and forms a basis for exploration through research. Such 
implementation is the interactive link between an information society and information 
science, that is, a society of informatisation. Such a society is the milieu within which the 
actualisation of meaningful information becomes possible, even though interpretation and 
experience develop in uncontrolled ways. 
 
The ontological milieu was determined by attending to our existence as individuals in the 
world, and as part of a group within society. Dasein was also identified as existing 
beyond the world in which it exists. Human beings are meaning-giving creatures and the 
ontological milieu is the social environment of the essence and nature of the existence of 
things. The way in which we experience our existence (as individuals and members of a 
group) impacts on the representation and configuration of information. Previous 
experiences influence immediate and future observations. In the configuration of 
meaningful information, the effect of such experiences is represented in language, visual 
images, aesthetics, power relations, and madness. These aspects not only influence 
what we consider meaningful information to be, but also the way we configure and 
represent it. We also showed that we share and represent meaning through language, 
image, and so on. Actionable, meaningful information is affected by the manner of 
communication due to the dynamic nature of language and the power of images. 
Aesthetics cannot be ignored as it accentuates the role of imagination in science; the 
external and internal levels at which power operates are visible in the information society 
and influence the manner in which meaningful information is configured. Finally, madness 
serves as an example of society=s treatment of that which is considered too different or 
strange from what, at the time, is viewed as the norm. Madness also illustrates the effect 
of power relations and how knowledge is understood. 
 
Le Parc de la Villette of Tschumi was used as it is a good example of interdisciplinary 
action (architecture, psychoanalysis and philosophy of deconstruction). It was found to be 
a way of overcoming borders in the way it allows for external and internal aspects to 
mingle, without becoming each other. The space allowed for open debate and 
collaborative research, is what information science needs to strive for. The challenge is 
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that theory can never be reduced to its practice, even though theory is informed by that 
practice. A science needs to reflect the world within which it finds itself, and has to reflect 
an awareness of the existence of oppositions. The point grid was used as an example of 
how classification brings together apparently very different knowledges, without merging 
them with each other. Such a point grid allows for the study and consideration of 
concepts and research fields traditionally viewed as being outside the domain of 
information science. 
 
As an interscience, information science can definitely be an explorer of meaningful 
information. For that purpose we identified the two main approaches within information 
science. The first is the narrow approach (application), and the second is the broader 
approach (creates environment for application). Through these two approaches, 
exploration can take place, allowing for an understanding of how other sciences relate to 
information science. The relation between information science and the other sciences 
never remains static. It changes as the environment and the sciences themselves 
change and develop. Proper theorising of the interrelatedness of the sciences is 
necessary for cooperation and healthy dialogue, since the shared aim is the desire for 
knowledge. The challenges faced by information science are to place its narrow 
approach of knowledge transfer and retrieval within a socioeconomic context, understand 
the relevance of its vocational focus, and how the competition from computer science, in 
serving the information processing needs of the information professional, affects its future 
role. These challenges are accentuated by the fact that the role of knowledge in 
information science has long since moved beyond its initial concern with documentation 
and representation of information. As individuals, societies and technologies evolve, so 
do the structures of application and thought. 
 
One answer to these challenges is the creation of an interdisciplinary framework that 
goes beyond the information processing paradigm, and works with meaning in practice. 
This requires a clear shift from approaching >information-as-object= to approaching 
>information-as-contents=. This depends on a deeper conceptualisation of information. 
Information science as an interscience offers ways of explaining relations to other 
sciences via a broader understanding of informatisation. >Broad= does not imply a lack of 
paradigm. A paradigm ensures an ordered, yet flexible, framework for doing research, 
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applying theory, and allows for the establishment of creative scientific relationships. Such 
an interscience is placed as complementary to formal and mathematical approaches. An 
interscience is flexible enough to articulate what lies on the other side of the divide (often 
indistinct) between the sciences. Applying concepts from other scientific areas provides 
explanatory (hermeneutic) power. Familiar ground can be avoided and underlying 
paradigms and historical processes can be investigated. 
 
Many disciplines, and information science is by no means an exception, tend to react to 
change by either clinging with more determination to existing structures and guidelines, 
or to get rid of everything 'old' and to embrace the new with fervour.  Lacking is the 
realisation that it is not always the content that needs to be reassessed, but the 
structures superimposed on it.  Research that cuts across different disciplines does not 
threaten the core of any discipline.  It offers opportunity to view persistent problems and  
contentions from angles not considered before.  The possibility of configuring meaningful 
information can never be seen as limited to one field of study.  It should be clear from  
the chapter on the configuration and representation of meaningful information, that 
meaning is construed from sources varying from the predetermined to the unexpected. 
We need to take into consideration the changes that take place and how the sciences 
reflect these changes, but our responsibility is not to rush in where thoughtfulness could 
serve us better. An interscience remains a science, and needs to be aware of the five 
principles of a scientific methodology (the objectivity axiom and the role of faith; truth 
criteria and the role of discovery; the hypothetical status of all empirical statements 
including the statements of the laws of nature; the pragmatic=s criterion; and the role of 
mathematics B Masani 1998:278-281). The way these principles are adhered to, 
interpreted and applied, depends on the space, time, society and science we find 
ourselves in. These principles are more flexible than they appear at first sight. 
 
Information science has been demarcated as a broader interscience, without losing sight 
of the importance of scientific research in its explorations. Explorative research ideally 
consists of two parallel, yet inclusive, directions. These directions are invention (of the 
new) and discovery (of the existing unknown). Through demarcation we still determine 
the boundaries, but interdisciplinary action allows movement outside them without losing 
focus. Boundaries offer responsible ways of dealing with changes, influences, and the 
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unknown, without becoming fixed and stagnated. Even as information science becomes a 
vehicle for bringing an understanding of the sciences together (without becoming those 
sciences), its characteristics as a science remain important. The point grid involves both 
the narrow and broad approach. This way the narrow approach allows for the necessary 
specialisations, and the broader approach ensures that the narrow approach avoids over-
specialisation in isolated pockets of research. The >trend= bandwagon can also be 
avoided in this way, and Lewis Mumford (Nora & Minc 1981:124) warns that ATrend is not 
destiny@ and that the future is always uncertain. 
 
Therefore, knowledge of the history of any science remains important. Sadly, we find that 
the teaching of the history of information science has become less frequent and more 
shallow. When it appears in a curriculum it often seems to be included as an 
afterthought. The handling of knowledge has a long history and Vickery (2004:29) sums it 
up by stating that Athe heritage of ideas and practice on which we may draw@ is essential 
in Aknowing how we got to where we are.@ The narrow approach is often overemphasised 
in curricula that emphasise the teaching of skills that will have immediate value for 
employers. The narrow approach needs to be grounded in the broader teaching of 
knowledge that will be valuable in a continued career, no matter what the employment. 
We do not want to end up with a static profession that merely >trains= students to fit into 
the available job market. It is necessary to offer prospective students a sound grounding 
in a wider range of professional concerns. This is possible since information science is 
everything but static in its nature as an interscience. An information science that 
embraces narrow and broad approaches can contribute cultural value to general 
education. It will then allow for lifelong learning, deepened knowledge and skill, while 
avoiding the trap of the mentioned over-specialisation. Practical and research 
experience, the interests as represented by other sciences and how those interests relate 
to problems in the field of information science, are included. 
 
In conclusion, we find that information science as an interscience is ideally situated as an 
explorer and configurer of meaningful information through active participation. The three 
closely related aims identified are (i) the configuration of meaningful information; (ii) the 
role of information science in the configuration of meaningful information; and (iii) what 
kind of information science can fulfil aims (i) and (ii). These aims were contextualised 
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within the contemporary information society, and supplied with an ontological milieu. We 
explored the uses and contexts of the concepts of information, knowledge and meaning. 
Where will information science be an explorer? Exactly in those areas often neglected in 
the study field of information science. 
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 APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 PLATES 1 B 8: Bernard Tschumi's Le Parc de la Villette, Paris (1984 B 1990). 
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